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In Korea, an inflation targeting (IT) regime was adopted in the aftermath of the Korean 
currency crisis of 1997–1998. At that time, the Bank of Korea (BOK) shifted the 
instrument of monetary policy from monetary aggregates to interest rates. Recently, 
central bank policymakers have confronted more uncertainties than ever before when 
deciding their policy interest rates. In this monetary policy environment, it is worth 
exploring whether the BOK has kept a conservative posture in moving the Korean call 
rate target, the equivalent of the US Federal Funds rate target since the implementation of 
an interest rate-oriented monetary policy. Together with this, the global financial crisis 
(GFC) of 2007–2009 provoked by the US sub-prime mortgage market recalls the 
following question: should central banks pre-emptively react to a sharp increase in asset 
prices? Historical episodes indicate that boom-bust cycles in asset prices, in particular, 
house prices, can be damaging to the economy. In Korea, house prices have been 
evolving under uncertainties, and in the process house-price bubbles have been formed. 
Therefore, in recent years, central bankers and academia in Korea have paid great 
attention to fluctuations in asset prices. 
In this context, the aims of this thesis are: (i) to set up theoretical and empirical models of 
monetary policy under uncertainty; (ii) to examine the effect of uncertainty on the 
operation of monetary policy since the adoption of interest rate-oriented policy; and (iii) 
to investigate whether gradual adjustment in policy rates can be explained by uncertainty 
in Korea. Another important aim is (iv) to examine whether house-price fluctuations 
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should be taken into account in formulating monetary policy. 
The main findings of this thesis are summarised as follows. Firstly, as in advanced 
countries, the four stylised facts regarding the policy interest rate path are found in Korea: 
infrequent changes in policy rates; successive changes in the same direction; asymmetric 
adjustments in terms of the size of interest-rate changes for continuation and reversal 
periods; and a long pause before reversals in policy rates. These patterns of policy rates 
(i.e., interest-rate smoothing) characterised the central bank‘s reaction to inflation and the 
output gap as being less aggressive than the optimising central bank behavior would 
predict (Chapter 3).  
Secondly, uncertainty may provide a rationale for a smoother path of the policy interest 
rate in Korea. In particular, since the introduction of the interest rate-oriented monetary 
policy, the actual call money rates have shown to be similar to the optimal rate path 
under parameter uncertainty. Gradual movements in the policy rates do not necessarily 
indicate that the central bank has an interest-rate smoothing incentive. Uncertainty 
about the dynamic structure of the economy, which is dubbed ‗parameter uncertainty‘, 
could account for a considerable portion of the observed gradual movements in policy 
interest rates (Chapter 4). 
Thirdly, it is found that the greater the output-gap uncertainty, the smaller the output-gap 
response coefficients in the optimal policy rules, and in a similar vein, the greater 
inflation uncertainty, the smaller the inflation response coefficients. The optimal policy 
rules derived by using data without errors showed the large size of the output-gap and 
inflation response coefficients. This finding confirms that data uncertainty can be one of 
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the sources explaining the reasons why monetary policymakers react less aggressively in 
setting their interest rate instrument (Chapter 5).  
Finally, we found that house prices conveyed some useful information on conditions 
such as possible financial instability and future inflation in Korea, and the house-price 
shock differed from other shocks to the macroeconomy in that it had persistent impacts 
on the economy, consequently provoking much larger economic volatility. Empirical 
simulations showed that the central bank could reduce its loss values in terms of 
economic volatility, resulting in promoting overall economic stability when it responds 
more directly to fluctuations in house prices. This finding provides the reason why the 
central bank should give more attention to house-price fluctuations when conducting 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction: Motivations, Objectives 
and Thesis Structure  
 
 
1.1   Background 
Since the early 1990s, central banks in many countries have committed themselves to an 
explicit inflation targeting (IT) regime for their monetary policy framework.  With the 
adoption of an IT regime, central banks started using the policy interest rate (or the key 
policy rate) as their main instrument to signal their monetary policy stances, instead of 
monetary aggregates such as M2 or M3.  
Under this interest rate-oriented monetary policy framework, central banks are 
required to make decisions on the size, timing and speed of adjustment of policy interest 
rates as well as judgement as to whether to change their policy stance.  Therefore, central 
banks‘ capacity to adjust their key policy rate pre-emptively has come to be regarded as 
more important than ever before. In these circumstances, inflation-targeting central banks 
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are required to assess the present and future economic conditions. Despite the development 
of forecasting techniques, the actual performance of macroeconomic variables such as 
inflation rate and GDP growth rate have often shown a large difference from the central 
banks‘ forecasts, which could bedevil price stability and economic stability that are the 
important objectives of central banks‘ monetary policy. 
These days, uncertainty is a crucial feature as well as a noticeable characteristic 
appearing in the process of actual monetary policy-making. Central banks without 
exception must navigate through evolving uncertainty when formulating and conducting 
monetary policy. Uncertainty arises in many forms and from various sources including 
imperfect knowledge about the ever-changing economy, and from unexpected internal or 
external shocks. Good examples of the last sources are the 1997–1998 Korean currency 
crisis and the financial market turmoil triggered by delinquencies in the US sub-prime 
mortgages of 2007–2009. 
Accordingly, it has become substantially important to know that central banks 
should take into consideration uncertainty arising from various matters related to the 
evolving economic situations when setting their key policy rate. In the following sections, 
first of all, diverse sources of uncertainty faced by central banks, which are the starting 
point for this research, will be discussed. In turn, research questions and objectives, and 
contributions will be presented sequentially. 
 
1.2   Sources of Uncertainty Confronting Central Banks  
Uncertainty, which has been shown to have significant impacts on various types of 
economic decisions, also is likely to affect central banks‘ decision-making. As 
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Greenspan (2003) pointed out, uncertainty is not only an important feature of the 
monetary policy landscape, but also a salient characteristic of that landscape. With few 
exceptions, central banks face uncertainty and must implement monetary policy under 
such circumstances.  Uncertainty affecting the setting and conduct of monetary policy 
arises from various sources.  In this section, these sources of uncertainty will be 
discussed in further detail. 
First of all, it may be difficult for central bank policymakers to identify with 
precision the sources and properties, the degree and persistence of exogenous economic 
disturbances (e.g., overseas shocks such as the global surge in oil or food prices; a rapid 
rise and sudden decline in asset prices). They will only be known to central banks and the 
general public after a considerable time-lag.  At the time when the economic shocks 
occur, it may be very hard to appreciate correctly whether the shocks originate from 
domestic or foreign sources, are temporary or long-lasting, and are derived from the 
demand or supply side of the economy, or both.  Furthermore, it is not easy to identify 
precisely the degree and impact of such shocks upon the economy.  
Second, central bankers need to assess the current state of the overall economy 
including asset market conditions when they adjust their policy instruments.  But, this is 
not easy because, unlike market data series such as nominal interest rates and exchange 
rates, which are available on a daily basis without a slight revision, some of the key 
macroeconomic variables (which are generally aggregate indicators) such as real gross 
domestic product (GDP) and the consumer price index (CPI), are only available with a 
lag and a longer frequency.  And, even the actual data series, which can be obtained at 
the time of policy decision-making, are also likely to be measured with great error. In the 
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real world, specifically, central banks often experience challenges in assessing the level 
of asset prices and judging whether there are bubbles in them. Given such environments, 
prior to setting their interest rate instrument, the policymakers need the best possible 
forecasts of key variables for the design and conduct of monetary policy. 
Third, even with accurate data, in reality, the monetary authorities do not know 
accurately how the economy works.  Over the past five decades, understanding about the 
macroeconomy has been considerably deepened due to significant developments in 
economic theory and analytical methods.  However, there remain highly important issues 
subject to contentious dispute (Poole, 1998). For instance, how central banks‘ policy 
instruments influence inflation and real economic activities (i.e., the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy actions into the economy), to what extent it has an influence on the real 
economy in the short-run (i.e., the slope of Phillips curve) and whether the short-run interest 
rate adjustments can cut down excessive liquidity (i.e., trade-offs between interest rate rules 
and monetary aggregate targets) etc., are all the subject of lively debate.  
Central bankers usually rely on econometric models to understand how the economy 
responds when simulated in certain ways, and to create forecasts of key macroeconomic 
variables. These econometric models contain the parameters governing the interactions 
that occur within the models.  Central bankers can use statistical techniques to obtain 
estimates of these parameters. Nevertheless, their true values remain uncertain.  In other 
words, the size of parameters may be uncertain.  Further, some parameters vary over time.  
Accordingly, these factors result in uncertainty for policy decision-makers. In this regard, 
for example, the effect of interest-rate adjustment in curbing asset prices is highly 
uncertain and can be, in an unexpected direction, transmitted to the overall economy as 
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well as a particular class of asset market. 
Finally, one possible source of the difficulties faced by policymakers is uncertainty 
as to the correct model of the economy. Our knowledge about the ever-changing 
structure of the economy is inevitably imperfect. The theoretical and empirical models 
help monetary policymakers to understand the time lags in, and the ultimate impacts of, 
monetary policy on the real economic activity, and to cope with various challenges in the 
formulation of monetary policy. 
In reality, however, there is no consensus on the appropriate specification of a 
model suitable for the analysis of policy issues. Any economic model is just an 
approximation of a complex reality.  Even if policymakers set up several competing 
models to provide the best description of reality, based on the economic theory, it is 
nearly impossible for them to exactly reflect the ever-increasing complexity of the actual 
economy. For instance, structural changes in the financial system generated by 
deregulation and financial innovation can potentially make the economy more stable or 
less stable, so that outcomes can be good or bad.  However, the models that policymakers 
rely on cannot capture these ongoing structural changes which can, in the short-run, pose 
difficult challenges for the actual conduct of monetary policy (Sellon, 2003). 
With regard to the usefulness of macro-econometric models, some economists argue 
that it is inherently difficult to describe the complex economy with a series of equations.  
In addition, a far more important problem is that econometric analysis, based on the 
assumption that the past structure of the economy remains unchanged, leads to a high 
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possibility of policy ineffectiveness
1
.  In the small-open economies undergoing frequent 
institutional reforms as well as financial innovation, uncertainty tends to be further 
magnified, especially during periods when structural and technological changes are 
continually occurring. This is because small open-economies are subject to factors 
beyond domestic control such as changes in exchange rates and world prices of raw 
materials, and structural changes often create instability in economic activities (e.g., 
money demand) which make economic movements difficult for policymakers to interpret 
as well as to explain with accuracy to the general public (Pill, 1999; Kim and Han, 2001;  
Kohn, 2007; and BOK, 2008b). After the currency crisis of 1997–1998, in particular, the 
Korean economy, a typical small-open economy, had experienced frequent and drastic 
changes in the institutional framework such as financial market liberalisation and 
monetaty policy regime, along with the restructuring of large firms (Daewoo Group, 
Hanbo Group, etc) and investment trust companies.
2
 These structural changes had 
undermined confidence in understanding of the structure of the economy, increased the 
risk of measurement error with respect to key variables, and as a result caused to increase 
the difficulty in forecasting them. 
 
1.3   Research Questions and Objectives 
In Korea, an inflation targeting (IT) regime was adopted in the aftermath of the 1997–
1998 Korean currency crisis. The Bank of Korea (BOK) started valuing interest rates as 
                                                 
1    Lucas (1976) argued that, whatever the correct model was before policy action, that action would itself change 
the structure of the economy, raising uncertainty about the transmission mechanism (Lucas's critique). 
2    The full opening of Korean financial markets was almost completed in 1998, shortly after the Korean currency 
crisis due to US' ongoing pressures for the Korean financial market liberalisation, 
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the instrument of monetary policy instead of monetary aggregates such as M2 and M3. 
In recent years, central bank policymakers have faced more uncertainties than ever 
before when setting their policy interest rates. In this monetary policy environment, it is 
worth exploring whether the BOK has kept a conservative posture in moving the target of 
the Korean call rate, the equivalent of the US Federal Funds rate since the 
implementation of interest rate-oriented monetary policy. However, there is a lack of 
existing research on the operation of policy rates under uncertainty in Korea.  
Together with this, the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009 provoked by the US 
sub-prime mortgage market recalls the following question: should central banks directly 
react earlier to control a sharp rise in asset prices? Historical episodes witness that boom-bust 
cycles in asset prices, especially house prices, can be damaging to the real economy. In 
Korea, house prices have evolved under uncertainties, and in the process house-price bubbles 
have been formed over a long period of time. Therefore, in recent years, central bankers and 
academia in Korea have paid great attention to fluctuations in asset prices. 
In this context, the thesis will focus on exploring the following issues in detail: 
•  What are the different types of uncertainty faced by central banks, and how can 
these be formally introduced into macroeconometric models for monetary policy 
analysis? 
•  Is the behaviour of monetary policymakers in practice consistent with the pre-
dictions made by the theoretical models of monetary policy under uncertainty? 
•   How has such uncertainty affected the actual operation of monetary policy in Korea? 
and 
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•  Should central banks directly react earlier to control the sharp increase in asset 
prices, i.e., prick the bubble? 
Based on these research questions, this thesis aims: i) to set up theoretical and empirical 
models of monetary policy under uncertainty; ii) to examine the effect of uncertainty on 
the operation of monetary policy since the adoption of interest rate-oriented policy; and 
iii) to investigate whether gradual adjustment in policy interest rates can be explained 
by uncertainty in Korea. Another important aim is iv) to examine whether house-price 
fluctuations should be taken into account in formulating monetary policy in Korea. 
 
1.4   Research Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are fourfold: 
• to discuss monetary policy shocks and uncertainties in the actual conduct of 
monetary policy, and to investigate the characteristics of policy rate movements, i.e., 
stylised facts and the degree of interest-rate smoothing from the Korean perspective. 
•  to understand the BOK monetary policy management by incorporating parameter 
uncertainty into the model, using Korean data, and to provide the implications of 
parameter uncertainty for monetary policy decision-making. 
•  to examine the magnitude of measurement errors in the output gap and inflation in 
Korea, and to estimate the optimal policy rule and calculate the loss values under 
data uncertainty, and 
•   to add to the debate on asset prices and monetary policy by formulating the structural 
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models based on the New Keynesian approach, and to examine which policy choice 
could be more effective in terms of validity between the one pursuing price stability only 
and the other one considering asset-price volatility as well as price stability in Korea. 
Overall, this thesis will contribute to the scarce empirical literature on analyses using 
dynamic programming techniques with the VAR approach in the presence of uncertainty, 
and theoretical and empirical formulation and discussion regarding asset prices and 
monetary policy based on the New Keynesian approach. 
 
1.5  The Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: first of all, Chapter 2 provides in-
depth surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature on monetary policy under 
uncertainty. This chapter begins with defining uncertainty, and investigates two views 
(conservatism vs. activism) regarding monetary policy in the face of uncertainty.  Various 
types of uncertainty explained and analysed in the existing literature will be discussed 
and implications of each type of uncertainty will be reviewed.  And in turn, this chapter 
will conduct a literature survey on the relationships between asset prices and monetary 
policy, along with the relationships between asset prices and financial stability. 
Chapter 3 discusses the objectives of monetary policy, reviews the development of 
the monetary policy framework in Korea, which has evolved from a monetary targeting 
to a (full-fledged) inflation targeting (IT) regime. In turn, we attempt to identify 
monetary policy shocks and uncertainties in the actual conduct of monetary policy, and 
investigate the characteristics of policy rate movements in Korea. We also show a 
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theoretical derivation of the policy reaction function with a partial adjustment term, 
examine the degree of interest-rate smoothing in Korea through empirical analyses using 
OLS and GMM estimations, and discuss why central banks smooth interest-rates. 
Chapter 4 provides the methodology used for analysis of optimal monetary policy 
rules under parameter uncertainty. The models used in this chapter are almost identical to 
those used by Sack (2000). The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether gradual 
movements in policy rates can be explained by parameter uncertainty even in the absence 
of an interest-rate smoothing motive, and to examine the effect of parameter uncertainty 
on monetary policy in Korea. We found that the call money rate has been shown to be 
similar to the optimal policy rate path under parameter uncertainty since the introduction 
of an interest rate-oriented monetary policy in Korea. This finding confirms that 
monetary policy in Korea has been conducted in a similar way to the optimal policy 
derived under the assumption that such uncertainty exists. And, gradual movements in 
policy rates do not necessarily indicate that the central bank has an interest-rate 
smoothing incentive.  Uncertainty and the dynamic structure of the economy can account 
for a considerable portion of the observed gradual movements of the interest rate.  
Chapter 5 focuses on how the presence of data uncertainty influences policy-making, 
examining how the optimal policy rules change when uncertainty on data increases. The 
main finding is that the greater the output-gap uncertainty, the smaller the output-gap 
response coefficients in the optimal rules; and in a similar vein, the greater the inflation 
uncertainty, the smaller the inflation response coefficients. The optimal policy rules 
derived by using data without errors showed the large size of the output-gap and inflation 
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response coefficients. Central banks face a large amount of uncertainty about the actual 
state of the economy when choosing their policy rates. The evaluation of monetary policy 
in most empirical studies relies on the unrealistic assumption that policymakers know for 
sure the current state of the economy with no errors. Data uncertainty may be one of the 
sources explaining why monetary policymakers act less aggressively in setting their 
interest rate instrument at each period of time. 
Chapter 6 explores how central banks should conduct monetary policy in the presence 
of high volatility in house prices and asset-price bubbles. In this chapter, we build a forward-
looking structural model that consists of the Phillips curve, the IS curve and monetary policy 
reaction rules, forming a small dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. In 
particular, this chapter will provide the discussions on the theoretical framework of a hybrid 
version of the New Keynesian (NK) model, followed by the state-space representation of the 
baseline model and the model solution method. In addition, we discuss the optimal control 
problem focusing mainly on the central bank‘s objective function which will be used to 
compare the central bank‘s responses. By using the hybrid version of the NK model, we will 
examine what should be the best response of central banks to changes in asset prices such as 
house prices in order to achieve economic stability in Korea. Through model simulations and 
impulse response analyses, we will show whether the central bank can reduce its loss values 
in terms of economic volatility, thereby leading to growing economic stability, when it 
responds more directly to fluctuations in house prices. 
Chapter 7 summarises and concludes the thesis, and finally discusses some 
directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review of Uncertainty, Asset Prices 
and Monetary Policy 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Central banks face a variety of uncertainties when implementing monetary policy. The 
causes of such uncertainties are diverse. They may include our lack of understanding 
about the monetary policy transmission mechanism, uncertain reactions of markets to 
monetary policy decisions, economic agents‘ expectations on current and future 
economic policies or conditions, and imperfect forecasting of future events.  Since these 
factors may give rise to changes in the economic outlook and unintended policy 
outcomes, central banks need to develop and implement policies in consideration of 
multiple possible consequences that may arise from diverse uncertainties. 
Knight (1921) defined uncertainty as a situation where one cannot know the 
probability distribution of an event, thereby distinguishing uncertainty from risk (to 
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which a specific probability distribution can be applied). However, in practice, risk 
and uncertainty are often treated in a similar way. For instance, an escalation in risk 
in the financial and foreign exchange markets is often regarded as an increase in 
current or future uncertainty. In general, since the probability distribution of risks is 
recognised as being subjective and differing across individuals, financial and 
portfolio theory
3
 do not draw a clear distinction between uncertainty and risk.
 
Over the past half century, much effort has been devoted to explaining economic 
phenomena and understanding the transmission mechanism of monetary policy by 
using statistical models that describe relationships between a relatively small set of 
macroeconomic variables. Such models can provide a useful description of the 
economy. However, no model can capture the complexities of the actual economy. 
The Brainard conservatism principle implies that central banks facing a variety 
of uncertainties should adjust their policy interest rates
4
 in a conservative manner. 
Since its introduction, the principle has become one of the important principles for 
central banks to follow in conducting monetary policies
5
. In accordance with the 
principle (and in order to avoid reversals in the direction of monetary policy), central 
banks tend to adjust interest rates gradually. Recently, however, some academic 
economists and policymakers at central banks argue that conservatism under 
                                                 
3      See, for example, Dow and Werlang (1992) and Epstein (2010). 
4     In this thesis, the term, the ‗policy interest rate‘, is often referred to interchangeably as the ‗key (interest) rate‘ 
meaning the main policy instrument that central banks use to signal their monetary policy stances. 
5    There is an extreme conservatism in monetary policy rules, for example, the ‗Friedman rule‘ which makes 
uncertainty irrelevant but advocates setting the nominal interest rate at zero. According to the Friedman rule, the 
opportunity cost of holding money faced by private agents should equal the social cost of creating additional fiat 
money. It is assumed that the marginal cost of creating additional money is zero. Hence, nominal interest rates should 
be zero (see Friedman (1959)). 
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uncertainty is not always desirable; and in some cases, activism can be more effective 
in reducing inflation and volatility of the real economy. 
This debate is pertinent to the issue of how policymakers ought to respond to 
fluctuations in asset prices. It is argued that central banks need to respond to changes 
in asset prices only when their stability is under threat; for instance, when inflationary 
pressures are likely to rise due to a pick-up in asset prices (Smet, 1997; Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1999). In other words, central banks should not respond to asset prices per se, 
but rather to changes in the outlook for inflation and aggregate demand arising from 
asset-price fluctuations. This view even insists that central banks should not use 
monetary policy to prick an asset-price bubble. This somewhat cautious response is in 
contrast to arguments for strong pre-emptive responses to potentially destabilising 
movements in asset prices. The reasoning behind this argument is that interrelations 
between asset prices and interest rates are uncertain, and moreover that central banks 
always face uncertainty whenever they attempt to measure asset price levels and 
assess the possible existence of a bubble in the asset markets.  
Others, on the contrary, contend that central banks should take measures upon 
any sudden changes in asset values actively and pre-emptively for the sake of 
financial stability, regardless of the stability of asset prices and general prices. 
Recently, emphasis has been placed on this view due to the global financial crisis 
(GFC) of 2007–2009 triggered by the US sub-prime mortgage market. 
In this chapter, a survey on previous studies will be conducted, being classified into 
two categories: monetary policy under uncertainty, and asset prices and monetary policy.  
First of all, Section 2.2 reviews a number of existing studies with respect to monetary 
  
  Page | 15 
policy under uncertainty. The section introduces two opposing views on measures central 
banks should take in the presence of uncertainty, and explains the implications of data 
and parameter uncertainties in relation to monetary policy through simple theoretical 
models. Next, Section 2.3 deals with the previous literature on the relationships between 
asset prices and monetary policy, along with the relationships between asset prices and 
financial stability. The section examines, in particular, the linkages between asset prices 
and financial stability after the GFC and their implications on monetary policy.  Section 
2.4 summarises and concludes. 
 
2.2  Monetary Policy under Uncertainty 
 
2.2.1  Uncertainty and Risk: Definition 
In general, uncertainty refers to a situation where the likelihood of future events is 
not measurable. Knight (1921) was one of the first economists to distinguish between 
uncertainty and risk.  This distinction was made as part of an explanation of the role 
of entrepreneur and profit in the production process.
6
  According to him, while risk 
refers to the randomness with experimentally known or knowable probabilities, 
uncertainty refers to the randomness with unknowable probabilities. LeRoy and 
Singell (1987) elaborate on Knight‘s distinction between uncertainty and risk by 
defining Knightian uncertainty as a situation with no objective or publicly verifiable 
probability distribution, in contrast to risk. This type of ‗Knightian uncertainty‘ with 
                                                 
6     Knight (1921)‘s view is that profits accruing to entrepreneurs are justified and explained by the fact that they 
bear the consequences of the risks (uncertainties) inherent in the production process that cannot be readily quantified. 
See, for a more detailed explanation, Cagliarini and Heath (2000). 
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unknown probabilities is often called ‗pure‘ uncertainty. To sum up, when 
policymakers can estimate the probability distribution of a certain event, this event is 
called risk.  In contrast, if policymakers cannot calculate the probability distribution, this 
event is called uncertainty. 
In spite of these strict distinctions, monetary policymakers frequently use the 
broader concept of ‗uncertainty‘ which encompasses both ‗Knightian uncertainty‘ and 
‗risk‘. For example, Greenspan (2003) argues that: 
Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy 
landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape. As a 
consequence, the conduct of monetary policy in the United States at its core 
involves crucial elements of risk management, a process that requires an 
understanding of the many sources of risk and uncertainty that 
policymakers face and the quantifying of those risks when possible. It also 
entails devising, in light of those risks, a strategy for policy directed at 
maximizing the probabilities of achieving over time our goal of price 
stability and sustainable economic growth that we associate with it. 
And, Kohn (2006) also states that: 
I use the words ‗risk‘ and ‗uncertainty‘ loosely. Although economists 
usually apply the former term to random events with known likelihood and 
the latter to possibilities whose numerical probability is unknown, we often 
do not know for sure in practice about actual probability distributions to 
make a sharp distinction between the two concepts. 
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2.2.2  Two Views on Monetary Policy under Uncertainty 
There are many theoretical and empirical papers which study how central banks 
should conduct monetary policy in a world of pervasive uncertainty. The debate on 
this issue has existed in the economic literature for at least half a century. But these 
papers do not always lead to the same conclusions. The two different main views on 
monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty will be explored as follows. 
 
2.2.2.1  Conservatism  
It is widely believed that policymakers facing uncertainty about the effects of policy 
changes on the economy should react more prudently than when there is no 
uncertainty.  Many empirical analyses of central banks‘ interest rate policy illustrated 
that their actual interest rate policy shows a timid pattern of movements, compared to 
that derived under the absence of uncertainty. For instance, Debelle and Cagliarini 
(2000) showed that the US Federal Reserve generally moved its interest rate multiple 
times in the same direction before reversing its policy stance: over the period from 
January 1992 to August 2000, policy changes in the same direction as the previous 
change are more common than policy reversals. The average duration between policy 
adjustments tends to be much longer in the case of policy reversals. Moreover, the 
average size of the steps at turning-points, 25 basis points (hereafter referred to as 
‗bp‘), is found to be smaller than that of continuations, 35 bp (i.e., a consecutive 
increase or decrease). As reported in Table 2.1, this tendency can be observed in 
developed countries such as the UK, Japan, Canada and Australia. 
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Table 2.1:  Policy Rate Adjustments in Selected Countries: January 1992–August 2000* 
 







Average size of change 
(in basis points) 
 Continuations 
   (+ + or – –) 
  Reversals 
 (+ – or  – +) 
 All 
Continuations 
   (+ + or – –) 
Reversals 
(+ – or – +) 
 All 
Continuations 
  (+ + or – –) 
Reversals 
(+ – or – +) 
US 18  5   133 67  374   33 35  25  
UK 27  5   96 81  179   41 43  30  
Germany/ 
Euro area 
84  10   33 22  123   11 10  20  
Japan 8  1   350 326  546   50 63  23  
Sweden 50  5   48 33  195   27 27  28  
Canada 36  5   52 42  123   34 35  25  
Australia 16  3   168 117  438   57 58  50  
Note: * Except Sweden (since December 1992) and Canada (since July 1994) 
Source: Debelle and Cagliarini (2000). 
 
The attenuated adjustment of the policy instrument was first analysed by Brainard 
(1967), who used a static macroeconomic model with a known probability distribution of 
uncertain parameters. In Brainard‘s analysis, a specific type of the model framework called 
―linear-quadratic‖ was used, and uncertainty about one of the parameters that specify the 
model was introduced. He argued that when policymakers are unsure as to the true 
parameters of the model, they should adjust policy instruments in the same direction which 
the certainty equivalence principle
7
 prescribes, but by less. This seminal prescription is 
named the ‗Brainard conservatism principle‘ (BCP) by Blinder (1997, p.11; 1998)8, and it 
is often referred to as ―gradual‖ monetary policy. Over the last few decades, this 
gradualism has come to be regarded as identical to caution (Barlevy, 2009), and Brainard‘s 
intuition has often been cited as providing a rationale to justify a cautious and gradualist 
approach to monetary policy-making in the face of uncertainty. 
                                                 
7     This concept will be discussed in Subsection 2.2.3 in further detail. 
8     Reinhart (2003) used the term ―attenuation‖, which is a more neutral term, instead of ―conservatism.‖ 
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2.2.2.2  Activism 
In recent years, there have been a number of studies advancing counter arguments to the 
Brainard conservatism principle (BCP).  These studies argue that even in the presence of 
uncertainty, the gradual adjustment of policy rates is not always desirable, and a more 
aggressive policy can be more appropriate according to what the nature of uncertainty is.  
In an environment where there are growing expectations of interest rate adjustments, 
if central banks move their key policy rate in small steps, market participants who 
recognise the pattern of interest-rate changes, react less to a change in policy than would 
otherwise be the case, anticipating that there will be further adjustments of policy rates in 
the same direction. Accordingly, their delayed reactions cause the ineffectiveness of 




In the late 1990s and early 2000s, central bankers of the major countries such as the 
United Kingdom and the United States argued that interest rate policy should be 
conducted in a more aggressive way. The Bank of England‘s policymakers remark that: 
― … so long as any (rapid) policy reversals (e.g., cutting rates very shortly after 
having raised them) could be properly explained by new developments or 
improved analysis of the (economic) outlook, they need not create confusion 
about policy goals ….  … there were no benefits in delaying changes in rates to 
                                                 
9    Caplin and Leahy (1996) argued that very gradual reductions in interest rates may prove ineffective in boosting 
economic activity.  The reason is that small reductions in interest rates are less likely to promote a response, and hence 
more likely to be followed by further cuts.  A vicious circle develops in which cautious policy is unsuccessful not only 
because it is cautious, but also because investors anticipate the greater possibility of failure and delay investment.  In 
contrast, aggressive policy initiatives, because they are more likely to be successful and hence temporary, create a 
climate of urgency that promotes a more immediate response. 
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reduce the risk of reversals, and it was better to make changes as soon as they 
appeared necessary.  Also, the desire to minimise the risk of policy reversals was 
likely to mean that interest rate changes would, on average, be made too late …‖. 
(Minutes of Monetary Policy Committee meeting, Bank of England, 1998). 
 
In addition, Greenspan (2001) in his congressional testimony remarks that: 
 ―… because the advanced supply-chain management and flexible 
manufacturing technologies may have quickened the pace of adjustment in 
production and incomes and correspondingly increased the stress on 
confidence, the Federal Reserve has seen the need to respond more 
aggressively than had been our wont in earlier decades. Economic policy-
making could not, and should not, remain unaltered in the face of major 
changes in the speed of economic processes …‖.  
Early studies demonstrating that cautious policy action is not always an appropriate 
response include Chow (1975) and Craine (1979). Both show that uncertainty can lead to 
a more active policy than in the certainty equivalence
10
 case — or what we might dub 
activism of policy. 
Since Chow‘s and Craine‘s pioneering analysis, many other economists have 
engaged in research on monetary policy under uncertainty, and have emphasised 
circumstances in which parameter uncertainty should lead policymakers to vary the 
policy instruments more than would be optimal in the absence of such uncertainty.  So, it 
has been argued that ―widely held views‖ that policy should be more passive may be 
                                                 
10    A more detailed discussion on this concept will be presented in Subsection 2.2.3. 
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wrong.  For example, uncertainty about the persistence of the inflation process can lead  
policymakers to adjust interest rates more vigorously so as to reduce uncertainty about 
the future developments of inflation (Shuetrim and Thompson, 1999; Söderström, 2000, 
2002;  Levin and Williams, 2003; and Kimura and Kurozumi, 2007). 
Notably, since the introduction of the robust control approach to monetary policy-
making, which is aimed at minimising the losses associated with the worst possible 
outcomes, it is, all in all, stressed that a stronger reaction to uncertainty, particularly about 
the model, is a more appropriate policy (Stock, 1999; Giannoni, 2002, 2007; Onatski and 
Stock, 2002; Tetlow and von zur Muehlen, 2001; and Hansen and Sargent, 2008).  
 
2.2.3  The Types of Uncertainty and their Policy Implications  
Various types of uncertainty are explained and analysed in the theoretical and empirical 
literature. Poole (1998) provides one possible classification of uncertainty that divides 
uncertainty into five categories: the data; future events, shocks and disturbances; how the 
economy works; market reactions to the Fed‘s monetary policy; and market anticipations 
of the Fed‘s policy.  Srour (1999) puts more emphasis on uncertainty about coefficients, 
time lags and the nature of shocks. From the policymakers‘ perspective, Freedman (1999) 
discusses four types of uncertainty: additive uncertainty; multiplicative uncertainty; model 
uncertainty; and uncertainty about data and the output gap.  Similarly, Dennis (2005) notes 
that each type of uncertainty could lead to different implications for how central banks 
should conduct monetary policy, and presents one possible classification of the uncertainty 
faced by monetary policymakers into three categories: data uncertainty; parameter 
uncertainty; and model uncertainty. Bernanke (2007) also highlights three areas of 
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economic uncertainty:  the current state of the economy; the structure of the economy 
(including the transmission mechanism of monetary policy); and the way in which private 
agents form expectations about future economic developments and policy actions.  
In this section, based on various classifications, uncertainties associated with policy 
responses and effects will be categorised and implications of each type of uncertainty 
will be reviewed in more detail.  
 
Figure 2.1:   General Classification of Uncertainty 
 
 
2.2.3.1  Additive Uncertainty 
The external shocks and the future time paths for the exogenous variables driving the 
macroeconomy are, in all likelihood, uncertain. The possibility of unexpected events 
caused by a demand or supply shock, or both, can be expressed by adding disturbance 
terms to the model.  These stochastic terms, which enter the models additively, are called 
additive uncertainty, capturing shocks in the models. On the theoretical side, additive 
uncertainty about shocks is said to be the simplest form of uncertainty. Together with 
 · Model uncertainty 
Additive uncertainty 
 Multiplicative uncertainty 
 · Parameter uncertainty 
 · Data uncertainty 
 · External shocks 
uncertainty 
 · Pure data uncertainty 
shocks uncertainty 
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additive shocks, another source of additive uncertainty arises from incomplete data itself 
when there are no other types of uncertainty. This kind of uncertainty is referred to as pure 
data uncertainty. 
A general principle in dealing with this type of uncertainty is to follow the well-
known ‗certainty equivalence principle‘ (CEP)11: a policy rule that is optimised under the 
assumption of the absence of uncertainty is still optimal in the presence of such 
uncertainty (see, for example, Selody (2001) and Noyer (2008)). 
The classical research papers on optimal policy rules consider only additive sources 
of uncertainty.  In a standard linear-quadratic framework with additive uncertainty, the 
CEP implies that the optimal policy rule is the same as if there were no uncertainty.
12
  
Since its introduction by Simon (1956) and Theil (1958), this principle has played an 
important role in policy discussions.
13
  
According to this principle, in an economy where a transition equation (i.e., a 
Phillips curve or an aggregate supply equation) is linear and the central bank‘s objective 
function has a quadratic form, additive uncertainty has no impact on the policy-making 
process. Thus policy decisions made by central banks that take into account this type of 
uncertainty are the same as those of the central banks that ignore such uncertainty. In this 
case, the optimal policy choice of central bankers who optimise their objective function is 
just to react to the disturbances under the premise that the certainty equivalence holds.  
                                                 
11    An early expression of this argument may be found in Tinbergen (1952).  See Clarida et al. (1999) for the 
discussion of procedure. 
12     In other words, the certainty equivalence would hold if the central bank‘s objective function (or a loss function) 
was quadratic and the transition equation (i.e., the Phillips curve) was linear.  
13     See Swanson (2004), Svensson and Woodford (2003), and Woodford (2003a) for more recent treatments. 
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This is the reason why the concept of additive uncertainty has not been regarded as an 
important element in the modelling of optimal policy, and uncertainty, for a long time, has 
received little attention from academics and central bankers.  
 
A Simple Model of Additive Uncertainty 
 
(The Deterministic Case) 
Before introducing uncertainty into the model, consider a simple model that assumes a 
certain world with only one target and one instrument
14
.  For simplicity, suppose a target 
variable,   depends linearly on an instrument variable, ,P  that is:   
 
,vP                (2.1)  
 
where   and P  stand for a target variable (say, inflation rate) and policy instruments 
(e.g., the short-term nominal interest rate) of monetary policy, respectively. The 
coefficient,  )0( measures the degree to which policy influences the target variable (a 
policy multiplier), and it is assumed to be known to the policymakers.  In addition,   can 
be affected by other variables, as summarised by the last term, v . This term could include 
exogenous variables such as a demand or/and a supply shock, which have a direct impact 
on ,  and it is also assumed to be known to policymakers.  
This relationship between   and P  implies that a rise in a policy instrument leads 
to a decrease in inflation. In this model, assuming a world of certainty, the optimal policy, 
*P  for the attainment of a target level, T  can be computed as:   
                                                 
14   The term ‗instrument‘ refers to a variable that the monetary policymaker can control so that the target variable 
will equal to some prespecified level. 
  






           (2.2) 
 
In the deterministic case, by setting its policy instrument as Equation (2.2), a monetary 
policymaker can achieve a target level of inflation, T  exactly. 
 
(The Case with Additive Uncertainty) 
To incorporate additive uncertainty into the policymaker‘s problem, consider the simple 
linear model with again only one target and one instrument, given by: 
 
,uP             (2.3) 
 
where all the notations ( , P  and  ) except the additive stochastic term u  are the same 
as in the deterministic case. As in Equation (2.1), the term u  represents exogenous 
variables (i.e., unforeseen external shocks) which have a direct impact on  .  In this case, 
additive shocks cause a variable (say,  ) to deviate from the path derived by its 
identified determinants. This formulation, however, now assumes that u  is a white noise 
disturbance with mean u  and variance .2u   In other words, the policymaker knows the 
mean u  and the variance ,2u while not knowing the value of the shock itself.  The 
additive term is meant to capture uncertainty the policymaker faces with regard to 
attainment of the targeted level of inflation .T  
If the policymaker‘s goal is to minimise the expected squared deviations between 
actual inflation, t  and its target, ,
T  the loss function is written as: 
 
].)-[(= 2Tau ππEL                 (2.4) 
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Equation (2.4) has the standard quadratic form of the loss function. It implies that the 
goal of the policymaker is to find the value of policy instrument, *P  which enables him 
to obtain the least value of the loss function.  The loss function can be rewritten as: 
 
])-+-[(= 2Tau ππππEL  
 
],)-(+[= 22 Tπ ππζ                                                    (2.5) 
 
where  = )(E  and 2 = )(Var = .)(
2 E 15   Equation (2.5) shows that the loss 
function can be decomposed into the conditional variance of the variable given all 
information available at time t  and the expected squared deviations of the variable from 
its target.  Since  = uP   and 2 =
2
u , we can rewrite Equation (2.5) as:  
 
.)-+(+= 22 Tu
au πuPαζL                    (2.6) 
 
To obtain the optimal value, *P , we take the partial derivative of Equation (2.6) with 







              (2.7) 
 
As seen in Equations (2.2) and (2.7), if vuu  , the optimal policy setting under 
additive uncertainty is equal to that under certainty, what has been referred to as 
‗certainty equivalence.‘ This means that to formulate the optimal policy, the policymaker 
could regard u  term as being equal to its expectation and proceed as in the certainty case.  
                                                 
15    In the second expression of Equation (2.5), the cross product terms from the multiplication drop out because 
0][ E . 
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In sum, in the simple model with additive shocks like Equation (2.3), the only 
uncertainty is whether the economy will deviate from the path that policymakers expect 
because of what are called ‗additive shocks‘. In this case, the best choice that 
policymakers could make might be to ignore the impact of uncertainty on the economy. 
 
2.2.3.2  Multiplicative Uncertainty 
It was not until the late 1960s that other types of uncertainty along with additive shocks 
started to be taken into account explicitly in monetary policy models. Central bank 
policymakers and academic economists started to give attention to the multiplicative 
form of uncertainty.  Brainard (1967) argues that the multiplicative types of uncertainty 
(e.g., uncertainty about parameters), can provide justification for the practice of an 
adjustment of policy instrument. 
Multiplicative uncertainty can take diverse forms. From an analytical viewpoint, it 
can be classified into three broad categories: parameter uncertainty, data uncertainty 
and model uncertainty (see, for example, Poole (1998), Dennis (2005), Bernanke (2007) 
among many others). In practice, existing studies into the effects of uncertainty, and the 
design of optimal policy in the presence of uncertainty, have focused on these three 
types of uncertainty. Conclusions on policy implications are contingent on the forms of 
multiplicative uncertainty and the methodology for analysis.  
 
A.  Parameter Uncertainty 
Parameter uncertainty refers to uncertainty regarding the numerical values of 
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parameters or coefficients in a given macroeconometric model of the economy.
16
  More 
specifically, it is related to uncertainty about the monetary transmission mechanism, or 
uncertainty concerning the exact effect of the central banks‘ principle instrument (i.e., 
the short-term nominal interest rate) on economic activities. This uncertainty is, 
therefore, often called multiplier uncertainty. So parameter uncertainty gives rise to 
multiplicative uncertainty. 
In the case of parameter uncertainty, a key result is that of Brainard (1967)‘s 
seminal work. Brainard points out its implications for central banks: monetary 
policymakers should react in a less aggressive fashion to shocks to variables associated 
with uncertain parameters in the monetary policy transmission process. This point of 
view implies that if policymakers face uncertainty about key parameters in the model, 
for example, the response of output to interest rates and the response of inflation to the 
output gap, they should typically moderate changes in their policy interest rates in 
response to a given change in the output gap or to a given change in the deviations of 
actual inflation from its target level. Like this, Brainard‘s argument relies exclusively 
on a specific type of uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty facing policymakers regarding the 
effects of their actions on the economy. 
 
The Brainard Model 
In order to consider the parameter uncertainty case in which the policymaker views the 
parameter as a random variable, let us replace Equation (2.3) with: 
                                                 
16    Some researchers (for example, Debelle and Cagliarini (2000), Onatski and Stock (2002), among others) 
regard parameter uncertainty as a particular form of model uncertainty, where only uncertainty about the variables 
included in the particular model is taken into account. 
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,~ uP                       (2.8) 
 
where the notation except the coefficient, ~ , is the same as in Equation (2.3). The 
coefficient (~ ) attached to the policy variable is assumed to be a random variable with 
mean,  , variance, 2~  and covariance, ),
~( uCov  = u ~ (i.e., u~ ). That is, it is 
assumed that policymakers know  , 2~  and ),
~( uCov  : they do not know the exact 
value of ~ , but know its distribution in advance. And, as before, the mean and the 
variance of the additive term, u  are u  and ,
2
u  which are known to the policymakers as 
well. 
This formulation assumes that policymakers are uncertain about the effect of a 
policy change, as measured by ~  that multiplies the choice of ,P  as well as about the 
factors that directly affect  , as captured by the additive stochastic term .u  In this model, 
the policymakers face two sources of uncertainty: parameter and additive uncertainties.  





2 PP uu                        (2.9) 
 
where   is the correlation coefficient between ~  and u . Here, the variance of target 
variable (inflation) is influenced by the variance of the multiplier coefficient ~ , the 
setting of the policy instrument P  and the correlation coefficient ,  as well as by the 
variance of the additive term .2u  
As mentioned earlier, the policymakers will choose P  so as to minimise the 
expected loss, that is: 
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],)-(+[= 22 Tπ
pu ππζL              (2.10) 
 
where .)( uPE    Again, the loss function can be decomposed into the 
conditional variance of the variable given information at time t  and the expected squared 
deviations of the variable from its target. Using Equation (2.9) to substitute for ,2  we can 
rewrite Equation (2.10) as: 
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P                   (2.12) 
 
From Equation (2.12), it is easily seen that the certainty equivalence principle does not 
hold
17
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In general, under the conditions where there is parameter uncertainty (that is, 2~ > 






















                    (2.14) 
                                                 
17    Notice here that as 2~  (and hence u~  and  ) → 0 and   , then Equation (2.12) reduces to Equation 
(2.7).  This is the case of no multiplier uncertainty, that is, certainty equivalence holds. 
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This result implies that the certainty equivalence principle no longer holds under parameter 
uncertainty. In other words, the optimal policy under uncertainty about the effect of a 
policy change will lead the policymakers to adjust their policy instrument less aggressively 
relative to the case where they know the effect of a policy change on the target variable 
with certainty.  
Ever since the theoretical analysis by Brainard (1967), uncertainties about the impact 
policy actions have on the economy have been studied by many other researchers.  But, in 
fact, the results regarding the strength of the optimal monetary policy response can go 
either way: conservatism or activism. However, because uncertainty about the parameter 
we consider is inherently multiplicative not additive, certainty equivalence does not hold 
regardless of whether individual results support conservatism or activism.  
 
Parameter Uncertainty and Conservatism 
There have been a number of theoretical research results supporting Brainard‘s classic 
analysis. Among them, Svensson (1999a), analysing a special case where only inflation 
enters the central bank‘s loss function, shows that uncertainty about the policy multiplier 
can lead to a more muted policy path in response to current inflation and output.  Estrella 
and Mishkin (1999) also provide an illustrative theoretical analysis that demonstrates the 
―less activist‖ nature of optimal policy in the face of uncertain parameters. Specifically, 
they show that uncertainty about the parameter, which measures the impact of interest rate 
on output (i.e., the degree of the interest-rate sensitivity of aggregate demand), will cause 
the policymakers to be less aggressive in their policy reaction. And, Clarida et al. (1999), 
with a forward-looking theoretical model, illustrate how model parameter uncertainty 
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could introduce caution in policy response, and argue that this effect can provide one 
rationale for a smoother path of interest rate than the certainty equivalence principle. 
There is also much empirical research which supports Brainard‘s theoretical results.    
First of all, Debelle and Cagliarini (2000) find that for the Australian economy, the mean 
parameter uncertainty about the interest rate sensitivity of output leads to a less aggressive 
optimum policy in the model.  Sack (2000) compares the optimal interest rate path derived 
from an unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the US economy under 
multiplicative uncertainty with the optimal interest rate path in which multiplicative 
uncertainty is presumed not to be present.  He concludes that the presence of uncertainty 
can account for a considerable portion of the gradualistic behaviour of the US Federal 
Funds rate.  For the UK economy, Martin and Salmon (1999) also reach the same 
conclusion using Sack‘s method (an unrestricted VAR). Results supporting conservative 
policy have been obtained by Hall et al. (1999). Using a five-equation empirical model of 
the UK economy, they find that policymakers should respond by taking a cautious stance 
to shocks in the face of parameter uncertainty. What these studies have in common is that 
they are based on backward-looking models. 
 
Parameter Uncertainty and Activism  
In contrast to the Brainard conservatism principle, there are many counter arguments 
suggesting that a more aggressive response to shocks may be more appropriate when the  
central bank encounters parameter uncertainty, particularly regarding the degree of 
inflation persistence. Söderström (2002), using theoretical models, investigates the effects 
of multiplicative parameter uncertainty in a dynamic backward-looking model with the 
Phillips curve, and demonstrated that uncertainty about the degree of inflation persistence 
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induces the central bank to take a more active policy stance than would be the case in the 
absence of uncertainty. Similar results are found by Kimura and Kurozumi (2007). By 
using Bayesian methods
18
, they illustrate how uncertainty on some structural deep 
parameters, capturing the underlying dynamic decision-making behavior of consumers and 
firms in the model results in a more aggressive policy reaction to shocks, overturning 
Brainard‘s classic findings. They argue that increases in uncertainty about inflation 
dynamics leads the central bank to place a higher weight on price stability than in the 
absence of uncertainty. In consequence, central bank policymakers should react more 
aggressively in the face of uncertainty in the parameters driving inflation persistence. Their 
analysis is based on the micro-founded forward-looking dynamic model and the 
assumption of a non-linear loss function. Notably, they considered the effects of both loss-
function uncertainty and the positive correlation between the policy multiplier and 
transmission of shocks, which have been ignored in most of the existing studies. 
Besides uncertainty in the parameter capturing inflation persistence, there are many 
papers showing that Brainard‘s classic wisdom might be overturned in the other parameter 
uncertainties. First of all, Shuetrim and Thompson (1999) attempt to generalise Brainard‘s 
model to a multi-period horizon and multi-variate model, using Australian data to examine 
the effect of parameter uncertainty. The conclusion they obtain is that while uncertainty 
about the interest-rate sensitivity of output decreases the willingness of policymakers to 
                                                 
18     When economists typically model decision-making under uncertainty, it is assumed that policymakers can assign 
explicit probabilities to the various scenarios they might face. Given these prior probability distributions, they can 
compute each policy‘s expected loss, that is, the expected social cost of the outcomes implied by each policy. The 
presumption, here, is that the policy rules associated with the smallest expected loss may be optimal to policymakers. This 
method is called the Bayesian approach, which searches for the monetary policy rule whose largest loss is minimised 
(Barlevy, 2009; Giannoni, 2007). This approach was first started by Brainard (1967) and has been followed by numerous 
studies such as Clarida et al. (1999), Wieland (2003), Estrella and Mishkin (1999), Hall et al. (1999), Martin and Salmon 
(1999), Svensson (1999a), Sack (2000), Rudebusch (2001) and Söderström (2000, 2002). 
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change interest rates as in Estrella and Mishkin (1999), uncertainty about the dynamic 
structure of the model can lead to the opposite result: the policymakers facing uncertainty 
should adjust interest rates more aggressively than would be the case in the absence of 
uncertainty.  
Giannoni (2002) considers uncertainty about the key parameters of the simple forward-
looking structural model and proposed a general method based on a property of zero player 
games to obtain robust optimal policy rules when the true model is known and model 
uncertainty is regarded as uncertainty about parameters of the structural model.  As a result, 
he found that robust optimal Taylor rules generally imply a stronger response of the interest 
rate to fluctuations in policy goals such as inflation and the output gap than is the case in the 
presence of certainty. Giannoni (2007) also characterises a robust optimal policy rule in a 
simple forward-looking model, when the policymaker encounters uncertainty about the 
parameters of the structural model and the nature of the shock processes. He found that the 
robust optimal policy rule involves a stronger response of the interest rate to fluctuations in 
inflation and the output gap than is the case in the absence of uncertainty.  
Levin and Williams (2003) analyse the consequences of parameter uncertainty for 
policy when policy objectives depend on the model‘s structural parameters governing the 
transmission process of monetary policy. As in Kimura and Kurozumi (2007), their papers 
employed Bayesian methods, and showed how optimal monetary policy is affected when 
the objective function depends on structural parameters whose values are uncertain. More 
specifically, they showed how Brainard‘s classic wisdom that multiplicative uncertainty 
leads to a cautious policy can be overturned when the loss function weights are not known 
to the policymakers, and therefore the effects of such uncertainty are taken into account. 
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B.  Data Uncertainty 
Central banks need to conduct monetary policy in real time. But the macroeconomic data 
on variables such as inflation and output, which the central bank policymakers rely on 
when setting their policy instruments, are typically provided with a considerable lag and 
are subject to large and extensive revisions. The revision process tends to last for several 
quarters or years, so it can take a long time before policymakers know the relevant data 
movements with a sufficient degree of confidence. For instance, since the extent of the 
revisions in the measurement of the output gap is sometimes considerable, the picture of 
the state of the economy provided by this statistic at a particular quarter may subsequently 
be turned upside down. As a result, central banks inevitably face persistent errors in data 
measurement. This means that not only are the data used in the assessment of the economy 
incomplete, but policymakers also cannot ascertain the current situation of the economy 
with certainty.  
As discussed earlier, incomplete data can be just another source of additive 
uncertainty when there are no other types of uncertainty. As in the case of additive shocks, 
therefore, by the certainty equivalence principle, the optimal policy-making process is 
typically not affected by ―pure‖ data uncertainty. In other words, the introduction of data 
uncertainty has no impact on the policy choices (Debelle and Cagliarini, 2000; Jenkins and 
Longworth, 2002; and others). 
However, data uncertainty coming from incomplete data will matter for the policy 
decision, especially when simple policy rules, such as the (so-called) ‗Taylor rule‘ which 
involves only a small number of variables, are used as a benchmark for policy 
implementation (see footnote 68 in Chapter 3 for the Taylor rule in detail). This is because 
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the coefficients attached to those variables may be significantly affected by noisy data, 
thereby resulting in uncertainty about the coefficients associated with policy rules
19
. 
Consequently, as noted by Orphanides (2003), the certainty equivalence principle ceases to 
hold in the case of data uncertainty.  In effect, the presence of this type of uncertainty can 
provide a rationale that policymakers ought to respond with greater caution to a variable 
estimated with error than would otherwise be the case in an optimal policy rule. 
For the US economy, Orphanides and van Norden (1999), who examine the reliability 
of several methods for estimating the output gap in real time, show that taking into 
consideration the sizeable measurement error derived from these real-time estimates results 
in a significant deterioration of feasible policy outcomes, causing efficient policies to be 
less activist. In addition, Orphanides (2001) shows that policy reaction functions estimated 
from the data actually available to policymakers when policy decisions were made appear 
quite different from those estimated from data for the same period, revised later.  He argues, 
in particular, that estimated policy rules derived using the ex-post revised data instead of 
real-time data can lead to a misleading description of historical policy. Furthermore, he 
emphasises that the presence of data uncertainty inevitably leads to biased estimates, and 
consequently impinges on the relevant specification of the policy reaction functions.  
Rudebusch (2001), who attempts to reconcile historical and optimal policy rules of 
the US economy, finds that data uncertainty (particularly about the output gap) would 
reduce the coefficient on the output gap in the optimal Taylor rule. Namely, greater output-
gap (inflation) uncertainty reduces the output (inflation) response coefficient. This result 
implies that policymakers are required to attenuate their responsiveness to a noisy variable 
                                                 
19     Kohn (2007) discusses some of the limitations of simple rules including this limitation. 
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with error than when there is no data uncertainty. 
Aoki (2003) uses a framework of optimising models with nominal price stickiness to 
examine the issue on how real-time monetary policy should be conducted when there are 
considerable errors in the measures of inflation and output the central bank uses. His 
theoretical study concludes that noisy indicators can lead to policy caution and therefore 
interest-rate smoothing by the central bank is optimal in policy-making. This finding 
implies that the more poorly real GDP is measured, the less policymakers should respond 
to changes in GDP when setting their interest rates. 
Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Swanson (2004) show that when several 
indicator variables (e.g., the output gap, output, unemployment and inflation) are used to 
assess the prevailing economic conditions, increased uncertainty about a specific indicator 
variable could lead policymakers to react cautiously to a coefficient on that indicator in the 
optimal policy rule and reversely, to respond more aggressively to the coefficients on other 
economic indicators. These results are in line with those of Rudebusch (2001) and 
Orphanides (2001 and 2003). 
 
C.  Model Uncertainty 
Model uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge about which model among a given set of 
alternatives provides the best descriptions of the structural relationships in the economy 
(Levin  et al., 1999).  It may be true that uncertainty regarding the structure of the economy 
is much more fundamental than data uncertainty or parameter uncertainty. There is no 
common view on the appropriate models for the analysis of monetary policy issues. 
Highlighting the importance of uncertainty about the true model in policy-making, 
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Noyer (2008) states that: 
What central banks …… face today may be seen as a radical kind of model 
uncertainty. Not only are they uncertain about the value of specific parameters, 
but the probability distributions of target variables and shocks may have 
changed and standard linear approximations may not be valid anymore.  
Concretely, this means that they have to make up their mind and set the most 
appropriate policy considering competing models of the economy (and possibly 
misspecified models, because of the unprecedented nature of ongoing events).  
Risk management considerations are then of the essence. 
 
In practice, monetary policymakers need to have a number of alternative models at 
their disposal for the conduct of monetary policy.  It is widely recognised that the best way 
to deal with model uncertainty is to use multiple models to obtain policy advice (see, for 
example, Blinder (1998), Engert and Selody (1998), Freedman (1999), Issing (1999), 
Dennis (2005), among many others). In particular, Blinder (1998), having been active both 
in central banking and in academia, provides a simple solution to the dilemma of model 
uncertainty such that: 
… Use a wide variety of models and don‘t ever trust one of them too much. … 
My usual procedure was to simulate policy on as many of these models as 
possible, throw out the outlier(s), and average the rest to get a point estimate of a 
dynamic multiplier path.  This can be viewed as a rough – make that very rough 
– approximation to optimal information processing. (1998, pp. 12-13) 
 
As in the case of parameter uncertainty, there are two conflicting implications in 
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dealing with model uncertainty: conservatism and activism. In the case of model 
uncertainty, as a whole, much literature contradicts the traditional conservatism principle.  
Recent analyses, employing the robust control approach
20
 to monetary policy-making, 
generally support policymakers‘ activist response in setting interest rates.  For instance, 
Sargent (1999) and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001), who use robust control methods 
to analyse the implications of model uncertainty, suggest that monetary policymakers 
should react more to deviations of actual inflation from its desired level and actual output 
from its potential than would be the case if this type of uncertainty does not exist.  
Particularly, Sargent (1999) studies a simple macro-policy model and shows that 
robustness, in the ―robust control‖ sense, does not necessarily lead to policy attenuation. 
Instead, the robust policy rule may respond more aggressively to shocks.  The intuition for 
this result is that, by pursuing a more aggressive policy, the central bank can prevent the 
economy from encountering situations where model misspecification might be especially 
damaging.  
Research results by Stock (1999) and Onatski and Stock (2002) among others bring 
about a similar conclusion: model uncertainty generally results in a more aggressive 
response as policymakers seek to avoid the worst-case outcomes. 
However, there are some results in favour of conservatism that under model 
                                                 
20     In general, the way to minimise expected losses is a widely used criterion for choosing optimal policy. There 
are, however, some situations where it may be impossible for policymakers to compute expected losses for different 
policy choices. This is because they cannot assign probabilities to each of the models. This point necessitates an 
alternative criterion for policy-making in the face of uncertainty which does not require knowing the probability 
distribution associated with all potential scenarios. As one line of the literature on policy-making under uncertainty, 
there is an alternative approach which attempts to search for robust policy rules that minimise expected losses in some 
worst-case scenarios, within a specified set of possible scenarios; that is, the policy under which the largest possible 
losses across all potential outcomes is smaller than the largest possible losses under any other policy. A way to pick the 
optimal policy under this criterion is referred to as the ―robust control approach.‖  
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uncertainty, policymakers should react more cautiously than in the certainty case 
(Cagliarini and Heath (2000), Tillmann (2009), and others). 
Among recent analyses in favour of conservatism, in particular, Tillmann (2009) 
investigates, using a standard forward-looking monetary model, how the optimal output 
gap weight in the central bank‘s objective function can be influenced by the degree of 
model uncertainty and finds that when the degree of uncertainty increases, the central bank 
should put a more relative weight on inflation stabilisation.  His findings show that the 
result of Rogoff (1985) – that a central banker, who places a larger weight on inflation 
stabilisation than the social planner, could be optimal – still holds even under model 
uncertainty. 
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Table 2.2:   Research Results on Monetary Policy under Uncertainty 
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(continued) 
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2.3  Asset Prices and Monetary Policy 
This section reviews previous literature on relationships between asset prices and monetary 
policy. And, it also discusses the importance of asset prices in light of the conduct of 
monetary policy. The section examines, in particular, the linkages between asset prices and 
financial stability after the GFC of 2007–2009 and their implications for monetary policy. 
  
  Page | 43 
2.3.1   The Implications of Asset Prices on Monetary Policy  
2.3.1.1   Do Asset Prices Matter? 
Traditionally, most central banks have implemented their policies to attain the twin goals 
of monetary stability and financial stability. Implications of asset prices with respect to 
the attainment of each goal, can be divided into the following two categories: first, the 
ex-ante meaning of asset prices, in light of monetary stability, includes an expected 
inflation which refers to information about the inflation outlook, and its ex-post facto 
implication is that changes in asset prices take place prior to inflation insomuch as they 
affect inflation through a variety of channels such as wealth effects;  second, in terms of 
financial stability, irrespective of the implication of asset prices on monetary stability, if 
changes in asset prices along with credit expansion deviate from a proper level reflecting 
real economic conditions for a long time and bubbles are formed, simultaneous defaults 
of corporate and financial sectors in the process of asset price booms and busts might 
result in severe problems like economic recession or debt deflation. 
 
2.3.1.2   Price Stability and the Role of Asset Prices 
Asset prices are fundamentally forward-looking.
21
 As a result, they contain information 
about expected future inflation. This information is potentially important for monetary 
policymakers, especially in the context of an inflation targeting (IT) regime in which 
                                                 
21    An asset is something that gives a holder a flow of cash or services in the future. This seems unobjectionable 
enough. In this chapter, however, asset prices refer largely to the prices of residential property (private houses) and 
equities. Since the assets we weigh for the attainment of the central bank‘s goal (e.g., financial stability) are mainly 
house property and equities, the prices of assets such as bonds, derivatives and foreign currencies are not considered in 
this subsection. 
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future inflationary pressures need to be monitored and if necessary, offset. This implies 
that asset prices can be effectively used as an intermediate target or as a source of 
information on future inflationary pressures.  
The discussion over the precedence of asset prices to future inflation tends to mainly 
focus on two arguments: expected inflation information that asset prices convey; and 
monetary transmission channels from asset prices to inflation or real economic activity. 
 
A. Information on Inflation Expectations 
The evaluation of asset prices, which is determined by the present value of future income 
generated from those assets, reflects the inflation expectations that economic agents form. 
Hence, changes in inflation expectations can be inferred from the evolution of asset prices. 
Also, inflation expectations of economic agents pose self-fulfilling characteristics in that they 
affect future inflation levels by influencing the setting of nominal wages and commodity 
prices. Accordingly, a large portion of future paths of inflation can be predicted on the basis 
of the movements in expected future inflation. 
The evidence suggests that information on expected future inflation derived from 
the bond market is relatively reliable with respect to inflation expectations (especially 
compared to that derived from other assets such as housing and stocks). For instance, 
Mishkin (1990a,b), BIS (1998) and others evaluate the changes in expected inflation 
based on the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates. The results differ 
from country to country and time periods, but the spread is generally reported as 
effective in predicting future inflation. 
In contrast to bonds, for other assets such as house property and stocks, the income 
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flows after expiry are unclear. Accordingly, even though real interest rates in the markets 
are the same over the entire period, those asset prices tend to be largely affected not only 
by expected inflation for the corresponding period but also by other economic and non-
economic factors when the flow of income is converted into the current value. For these 
reasons, some argue that it is difficult to effectively extract information about 
expectations from house or equity prices unlike the bonds. 
 
B. Monetary Transmission Channels from Asset Prices to Inflation 
Booms and busts in asset prices affect the economic activities of households, firms and 
financial institutions through a variety of monetary transmission channels, all of which 
eventually influence the evolution of prices, i.e., inflation. The wide spectrum of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms can be classified into three different channels: 
a demand channel; a cost channel; and an inflation expectation channel (see Mishkin, 
1995 and 2001; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2000; IMF, 2000 and 2008; and Bank of 
England, 2003). This subsection will provide an extensive overview of monetary 
transmission channels discussed in the existing literature.  
 
(Demand Channel) 
A demand channel refers to the effect through which changes in asset prices via the 
movements of consumption and investment lead to a change in excess demand, thereby 
finally affecting inflation. This channel can be further split into three sub-channels: the 
asset-price channel; the balance-sheet channel; and the signalling effect channel.  
First of all, the monetary policy actions are transmitted to the real economic 
activities through movements in prices of assets such as stocks, bonds and residential 
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housing. In this asset-price channel, wealth effects and the Tobin‘s Q theory (Tobin, 
1969) provide important mechanisms for how asset-price fluctuations can have an impact 
on individuals‘ consumption and firms‘ investment choices, respectively. According to 
the life cycle and permanent income hypothesis
22
, if the values of their home or stock 
portfolios they hold rise due to escalating prices, consumers may feel richer, resulting in 
an increase in consumer spending, due to the fact that consumers tend to smooth their 
consumption throughout their lifetime (consumption smoothing). This is known as the 
household‘s wealth effects on consumption. Regarding Tobin‘s Q theory23, when equity 
prices go up, the market valuation of a firm‘s stock becomes greater than its equity book 
valuation, which means that as Tobin‘s Q rises, so will the firm‘s investment. 
Second, a rise in asset prices can improve banks‘ and firms‘ balance sheets, which 
enable economic agents to borrow more from financial institutions: not only does the 
lending capacity of financial institutions improve, but the value of collateral, which 
households and firms can provide, also grows. That is, when asset prices rise, economic 
agents go through a self-sustaining process which continuously expands the credit supply 
of financial institutions via the increase of collateral values (Davis, 1995; Ham and Hong, 
2002). On the other hand, however, a sudden plunge in asset prices leads the net asset 
valuation of the debtor to dwindle, giving rise to moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems owing to lack of information. Under such circumstances, financial institutions 
reduce the credit supply itself rather than applying a lower interest rate in accordance 
                                                 
22    See Modigliani (1966, 1971) and Deaton (1992) for a more detailed exposition of the life-cycle and permanent 
income hypotheses. 
23    Tobin‘s Q can be defined as the ratio of market value of firms to the cost of acquiring new capital. See for 
example, Mishkin (1995) and  IMF (2000) for a more detailed explanation. 
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with the change in credit standing. This channel places emphasis on financial market 
imperfections, which arise from asymmetric or incomplete information in the credit 
market (see, for example, Stein, 1995; Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; and Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). 
The last sub-channel is a signalling effect channel, which stresses the potential role of 
current asset prices over future economic predictions. Aggregate demand in the economy 
in any given period can be affected by people‘s expectations about their future incomes 
and profits. The developments of real asset prices, which are closely related to real 
economic activities, have an effect on such expectations by signalling economic outlook 
including the growth of real incomes in the future. Consequently, this signal may affect 
current firms‘ investment and households‘ consumption expenditures in the economy.24 
 
(Cost Channel) 
The cost channel of monetary transmission emphasises supply-side effects of asset-price 
movements on the inflation process. Increases in the prices of real estate such as houses 
and land, which are used as inputs in the production process, have an impact on 
production costs. As a result, firms tend to raise producer prices of goods and services. 
Firms‘ production costs are attributable to rises in rent for land and plants or to increases 
in wages due to employee demands for higher payments to meet increases in housing 
expenditure. These changes in turn lead to inflation in the economy. 
 
(Inflation Expectation Channel) 
                                                 
24    Empirical evidence that stock prices influence consumption is provided in Poterba and Samwick (1995) and 
Otoo (1999). 
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The inflation expectation channel is based on the importance of the formation of 
expectations or confidence on the part of the forward-looking agents. Any changes in 
asset prices can affect aggregate economic activity and inflation through households‘ and 
firms‘ expectations about the future course of the economy. In particular, rises in 
inflation expectations owing to escalating asset prices have an influence on the process of 
firms‘ wages and price setting, thereby deciding on future expected labour income, and 
profits and costs, as a result of which aggregate demand grows in the economy. Also, 




2.3.1.3    Financial Stability and the Role of Asset Prices 
A. What is Financial Stability? 
In general, a quantitative definition, based on specific indicators, for instance, the 
consumer price index (CPI), can be applied in the case of price stability. However, 
such a quantitative definition is hard to be applied to the concept of financial stability. 
Accordingly, a variety of views have been presented with respect to the definition of 
financial stability.  
Crockett (1997) takes financial stability to apply to both the key institutions and 
markets which constitute the financial system. Stability in financial institutions refers 
to a situation where individual financial institutions are capable of maintaining normal 
business activities without any intervention or support by the authorities, and market 
participants trust such financial institutions. Similarly, stability in financial markets 
means a situation where economic fundamentals are duly reflected in price variables, 
                                                 
25    See, for example, BOE (2003) and ECB (2000) for more detailed exposition of inflation expectations. 
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such as interest rates, stock prices and exchange rates, formed in the financial markets. 
The price variables, as a result, do not vary substantially as far as there are no changes 
in economic fundamentals. 
Goodfriend (1987) and Cukierman (1991) present less conceptually, but more 
directly observable definitions that financial stability is a state where no banking crisis 
exists and asset prices including interest rates are relatively stable compared to some 
reference prices. 
In the meantime, some attempt has been made to define financial instability 
instead of its positive counterpart, financial stability, because it is convenient and 
useful to do so. In other words, by describing financial instability, they define financial 
stability as exactly its opposite state. For example, Mishkin (1997 and 1999) describes 
financial instability as a state in which the financial system does not perform its role 
well in channeling funds to economic agents with productive investment opportunities, 
and thereby the economy cannot operate efficiently. This definition emphasises the 
intermediation function of the financial system in supplying credit to the real sector, 
and stresses the role of asymmetric information in causing financial instability. 
Similarly, Ferguson (2002) defines financial instability as a situation where some 
important financial asset prices rapidly diverge from fundamentals, and/or a situation in 
which aggregate demand significantly deviates from the potential capacity of an 
economy as the market functioning and credit availability are rapidly distorted both 
domestically and internationally. 
Issing (2003) argues that the role of central banks for financial stability and trade-
offs between price stability and financial stability differ in accordance with how we 
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define financial stability. For example, the definition of financial stability from a 
systemic perspective highlights prudential supervision as a way of achieving financial 
stability, and therefore the trade-offs do not always exist between financial and price 
stability. In such a case, the best outcome can be derived when price and financial 
stability are achieved with different measures, respectively. But, a short-term trade-off 
can appear between price and financial stability when the latter is defined in 
consideration of the stability in asset prices such as house prices and stock prices; 
thereby creating room for the central bank to make some contributions to the pursuit of 
financial stability. However, he points out the problem that moral hazard can occur if 
the central bank manages monetary policy with an objective of affecting asset-price 
levels, insisting that the central bank should monitor changes in asset prices rather than 




To sum up, financial stability can be defined as a state where financial institutions 
carry out a financial intermediary function smoothly while price variables in the 
financial market move stably, reflecting economic fundamentals. 
 
B. Why does Financial Stability Matter? 
Apart from protecting inflationary pressure risks, which is traditionally their best-
known function, central banks, in recent years, recognise asset-price volatility as a 
bigger risk in terms of financial stability, particularly when asset prices fail to reflect 
                                                 
26     Responding to asset prices itself or establishing mechanical policy reactions by targeting the asset-price level 
may result in moral hazard problems because it might promote risk-taking behaviour by private agents in anticipation 
of the asset price stabilising attempts of monetary policy (Trichet, 2005; ECB, 2005). 
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underlying economic conditions such as faster productivity or lower interest rates, and 
excessively rise to generate a bubble
27
. The first reason why central banks weigh asset-
price volatility is that for asymmetric issues of asset-price shocks, the degree of the 
negative effect arising from the collapse in asset prices after bubble booms and busts is 
much bigger than that of the positive effect caused by rising asset prices. Large falls in 
asset prices lead to a reversal of the feedback loop in which lenders diminish credit 
supply, the demand for assets decreases further, and asset prices accordingly fall even 
further. These changes can put the stability of financial systems at risk, thereby causing 
severe harm to real economic activity (Hessius, 1999; Mishkin, 2008). 
The second reason is that price stability does not necessarily guarantee financial 
stability. Asset-price bubbles can form even in a low and stable environment in which 
bank credit can expand gradually over time (Goodhart, 2013; Park, 2011)
28
. Especially, 
under an IT regime utilising interest-rate management, the logic for pre-emptively 
adjusting the interest rate upward is very weak when inflation remains subdued. This 
means that central banks are subject to some constraints in keeping any excessive credit 
expansion under control. Moreover, financial instability caused by increased asset-price 
volatility may threaten price stability by aggravating the environment for operating 
monetary policy. Hence, most central banks have recently placed more importance on 
achieving financial stability through credit management as well as asset-price 
stabilisation rather than price stability when carrying out their policies. 
                                                 
27     The term, ‗bubble‘ is often referred to interchangeably as ‗misalignments‘ meaning that actual asset values are 
significantly deviated from their fundamental values. 
28    A good recent episode is the GFC following the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008. Note that this crisis 
showed that even under low and stable inflation, imbalances such as wide swings in asset prices can occur, and that 
this can cause financial instability. 
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Figure 2.3 summarises the above discussion, demonstrating the monetary 
transmission mechanism with macro- or micro-prudential policy. For simplicity, this 
figure does not display all inter-linkages including feedback effects and additional 
interactions between variables. 
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2.3.2   The Debate on the Monetary Policy Responses to Asset Prices 
In the previous section, we discussed the importance of asset prices in light of the 
conduct of monetary policy. In the meantime, most central banks have the same view in 
that they should pay more attention to asset-price changes, but have different ideas on 
how to react to fluctuations in asset prices. At the risk of oversimplifying, possible policy 
responses may be split into direct responses and indirect responses in accordance with 
the adequacy and the degree of policy reactions. 
Before the GFC of 2007-2009, a prevailing view was that central banks should 
restrain from directly reacting to asset prices per se until their changes visibly put 
pressure on general prices. Recently, however, asset prices have been fluctuating under 
low and stable inflation conditions. Thus, a number of academics and central bankers 
have started to recognise some structural limitation of the pre-crisis approach for 
monetary policy, and many of them insist that central banks need to take more active 
measures against asset-price fluctuations. 
 
2.3.2.1   Indirect Responses to Asset Prices: the pre-crisis view 
An indirect response to asset-price changes, which is labelled as the conventional view or 
the benign neglect approach among economists and central bankers, refers to a strategy 
in which central banks should place an emphasis exclusively on stabilising the prices and 
real activity in the economy, and as a result they should not react directly to asset-price 
movements per se. In other words, policymakers should respond to asset prices only 
insofar as they surely signal future changes in expected inflation and real economic 
activity (see, Smet, 1997; Bernanke and Gertler, 1999; Batini and Nelson, 2000; and 
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Greenspan, 2002). As Kohn (2006) stated, keeping this strategy does not mean that 
central banks ignore the expected future dynamics of speculative activity. When central 
banks suspect that an asset bubble seems likely to build up for a time before bursting, 
they need to take some actions in advance considering the future evolutions of inflation 
and output. 
This conventional view reflects central banks‘ concern that economic instability 
may be generated when they directly react to asset-price misalignments. There are three 
reasons for this view: the first reason is that there may be doubts about central banks‘ 
ability to identify asset-price bubbles and their ability to act at just the right time to curb 
the rise in asset prices without causing a rapid decline in asset prices (Plosser, 2007).     
In particular, it is difficult to disentangle the expectational factor of the price from the 
objective valuation of the asset, due to the fact that asset price determinants depend on 
each market participant‘s subjective expectations of uncertain magnitudes of the future 
course of the asset markets or economic developments (ECB, 2005). Central bank 
policymakers are not always any better than market participants in determining whether 
asset prices reflect economic fundamentals, so they cannot at times identify 
misalignments in the prices of assets such as house property and equities with certainty.  
In particular, Mishkin (2008) argues that when monetary policymakers are uncertain 
about the presence or extent of bubbles, their actions to impact asset prices can interfere 
with the role of asset prices in allocating resources
29
.  
Secondly, even though asset-price misalignments could be identified, the effect of 
interest-rate adjustment in curtailing them is highly uncertain and can be, in an 
                                                 
29      See, for example, Bernanke (2002) for a discussion of this potential problem. 
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unexpected direction, propagated to the overall economy as well as a particular class of 
asset market (Mishkin, 2008). For example, pre-emptively raising policy rates to cut off a 
rapid rise in house prices is likely to impact other asset markets such as the stock market, 
not just the escalating housing market. As Bernanke (2002) stated, monetary policy 
might be far too blunt a tool for effective use against asset bubbles: central banks do not 
have the fine policy tools to cut out the bubbles alone. 
Thirdly, it is also argued that after the collapse of asset market bubbles, a decisive 
easing (or expansionary) reaction of monetary policy would be sufficient enough to avoid 
any subsequent negative effects on the financial system and the real economy. Hence, 
central banks should be simply prepared to vigorously interfere with asset markets by 
cutting policy interst rates right after the bursting of the bubble in order to sustain real 
economic activity and minimise the potential probability of deflation (Smaghi, 2009). 
The most important criticism for this conventional view is whether such indirect 
responses can provide a guarantee of financial stability under the current monetary 
operating system. Regarding this issue, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that a policy 
goal in normal times, price stability, and a policy goal in times of financial stress, 
financial stability can be pursued within a unified framework which is a regime of 
flexible IT. A key strength of this framework is that it enables central banks to 
automatically adjust interest rates in a stabilising direction in the face of asset market 
imbalances. Moreover, the flexible IT that strongly focuses on stabilising aggregate 
demand and inflation will appear to result in ―leaning against the wind‖ to the extent that 
increases in asset prices will act as a spur to aggregate demand, and vice versa for 
declines in asset prices. 
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2.3.2.2   Direct Responses to Asset Prices: the recent concensus view 
In contrast to early arguments that were often posited in general skepticism about both 
the feasibility and the desirability of the pre-emptive policy strategy, many central 
bankers and economists now argue that monetary policy should aim to do more than just 
respond to current and expected developments in asset prices, inflation and the output.  
The point of the approach of directly responding to asset-price changes is that even if 
the effect of asset-price movements on inflation, via changes in aggregate demand, is 
insignificant and uncertain, central banks should take a much tighter policy stance in the 
face of rising asset markets to preclude any potential bubble creation. This pro-active 
strategy reflects the following arguments: changes in asset prices may affect aggregate 
demand but may not lead to rising inflation in the future because of aggregate supply-side 
factors like productivity enhancement; moreover, even if they cause inflation, any 
inflationary pressures may not be fully taken into consideration when conducting monetary 
policy due to the limitation of methods to measure inflation levels. In these circumstances, 
if central banks selectively react to only information regarding inflationary pressures, 
financial market stabilisation cannot be achieved due to a possible delay in implementing 
monetary policy, especially during the asset-price bubble period. 
Kent and Lowe (1997)
30
 come out in favour of a way to pre-emptively respond in 
the incipient stage of bubble formation, while Cecchetti et al. (2000) maintain that when 
asset prices deviate from their underlying fundamentals and when bubbles continue to be 
created, central banks should intervene in the movements of asset prices by interpreting 
                                                 
30    They set up a model where monetary policy choices can impact the evolution of a bubble. Their analysis is 
based on a one-shot bubble that never arises again after it bursts. They show that the monetary authority has an 
incentive to prick the bubble in the face of an initial boom-phase stage. 
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information implied in the bubbles rather than automatically responding to all the 




 In the meantime, Blanchard (2000) advocates that central 
banks conduct rather active aggregate demand management policies; they should tighten 
monetary policy during the bubble-formation period more than is suggested by inflation 
targeting (IT), and they should loosen it in the opposite circumstances, considering the 
so-called ‗composition effect‘, meaning that asset-price bubbles have a relatively bigger 
impact on investment than on consumption. The problem here lies in how central banks 
can pre-emptively detect bubbles that are formed when asset prices deviate greatly from 
economic fundamentals, and then how they can effectively cope with those bubbles 
through policy actions such as interest-rate adjustment. 
The extreme view with respect to the important role of asset prices in the conduct of 
monetary policy is to include asset prices directly in the price index defining the policy 
objective, as is suggested notably in Alchian and Klein (1973). The basic idea is that 
from a welfare perspective central banks should care about stable prices not only of 
current but also future consumer goods by focusing on a cost-of-life index. Price indices, 
such as the CPI or GDP deflator, are deficient in that they consider only the price of 
goods consumed today. A complete measure of the living cost would also contain 
changes in the prices of future goods. Asset prices reflect the current money prices of 
claims on future as well as current consumption. In short, asset price today can be a 
reasonable proxy for future prices of consumer goods. In a similar vein, Goodhart (1995) 
                                                 
31     Cecchetti et al. (2003) are cautious in arguing whether monetary policy should target asset prices or not. They 
state that ―we are not advocating that asset prices should be targets for monetary policy, neither in the conventional 
sense that they belong in the objective function of the central bank, nor in the sense that they should be included in the 
inflation measure targeted by monetary authorities‖ (p. 429). 
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also highlights the need to take the movements of asset prices into account in the setting 
of monetary policy. More recently, Smaghi (2009) and Allen and Rogoff (2010) argue 
that asset prices such as real estate prices should be taken into account when 
implementing monetary policy, pointing out some limitation of the pre-crisis view that 
central banks should not directly intervene in the movements of asset prices until they 
visibly put pressure on general prices.  
 
2.4  Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the existing literature dealing with two important issues 
confronted by central banks in the conduct of monetary policy. 
The first issue is about monetary policy under uncertainty. Central bank  
policymakers are faced with different types of uncertainty, and each type has unique 
implications for monetary policy-making. Additive uncertainty, such as uncertainty 
associated with possible shocks in exogenous variables, does not cause a serious problem 
for policymakers inasmuch as optimal policy responses in the presence of this type of 
uncertainty are identical to the certainty case: under additive uncertainty, when a 
standard linear-quadratic framework is assumed and the economic structure could be 
known to monetary policymakers, then certainty equivalence implies that uncertainty 
regarding the future time paths of shocks would not affect the policy-decision choices. 
In contrast, multiplicative uncertainty — for example, uncertainty about the state of 
the economy (data uncertainty) or the strength of economic relationships (parameter 
uncertainty) — justifies the need for a cautious approach to changes in central banks‘ key 
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policy rate. But, even within one category of uncertainty, it is often difficult to draw clear 
conclusions for policy-making since policy prescriptions can be different depending on 
the employed methodologies or models. Nonetheless, we can obtain one important 
implication from the literature: uncertainty should be taken into account when policy-
decisions pertaining to interest rates are made. Many studies which derive the optimal 
interest rate rule considering uncertainty about parameters or data draw conclusions that 
the central bank‘s conservative policy stance is more appropriate. However, previous 
studies on model uncertainty insist that an aggressive policy stance is more desirable. All 
in all, monetary policy gradualism would seem to be frequently observed and sensible in 
the real world. However, central banks should confront the challenges such as the more 
accurate recognition of uncertainty and the timely implementation of policy, in order to 
navigate, as best they can, through evolving uncertainty. 
Turning to the second issue, this chapter has discussed the relationships between 
asset prices and monetary policy, and it has reviewed how central banks should react to 
the movements in asset prices. The GFC of 2007–2009 has led to a rethinking of how 
central banks react to possible asset-price bubbles. A review of the literature indicates 
that volatile fluctuations in asset prices can pose severe risks to the real economy, 
especially when they are accompanied by financial instability. Accordingly, a number of 
economists and central bankers argue that uncertainty and the challenges faced by central 
banks in dealing with asset prices cannot be grounds for policymakers just looking on 
without doing anything, notwithstanding the fact that it is hard to detect bubbles in real 
time, particularly in their nascent stages. Many of these advocates, for example, Smaghi 
(2009) and Allen and Rogoff (2011), have pointed out some limitation of the 
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conventional view that central banks should not directly react to the movements in asset 
prices until they visibly lead to pressures on general prices. Thus, they insist that central 
banks need to take more active measures against asset-price fluctuations, since asset 
prices can fluctuate in low and stable inflation conditions, so as to minimise the risk of 
economic weakness and financial instability. There is a need for further theoretical and 
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Chapter 3  
Monetary Policy in Korea:  a Framework, 
Uncertainty and Interest-rate Smoothing 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
From the early 1990s, price stability became one of the most important goals of central 
banks in many countries. Central banks, however, found the traditional approach — 
namely, influencing inflation and output by controlling intermediate target variables, 
such as broad monetary aggregates, to achieve their ultimate goals of low inflation and 
sustainable growth — inadequate or not uniformly successful. The main reason is that in 
the 1980s, rapid financial innovation and liberalization with the accordingly increased 
complexity of new instruments and explosive growth in the volume of financial 
transactions, obscured distinctions between monetary aggregates and thus destabilised 
the relationship between the monetary aggregates and ultimate policy goals, resulting in a 
reduction in the efficacy of this method of conducting monetary policy (Oh, 2000). 
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In order to address this problem, several advanced countries — New Zealand (1990), 
Canada (1991), the UK (1992), Sweden (1993) and Australia (1993) — adopted an 
inflation targeting (IT) regime with an explicit objective. Other advanced countries that 
later joined the group of inflation targeters are Israel (1997), Iceland and Norway (both, 
2001). From the late 1990s, a large number of emerging markets and developing 
countries adopted the framework.
32
  In the wake of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, 
Korea was among a number of emerging market economies (EMEs) that adopted an IT 
regime as its framework for the operation of monetary policy. The complete transition to 
a full-fledged IT (or a pure IT) regime in Korea was made in 2001, when the monetary 
indicator, M3, was no longer set as an intermediate target.  
Regarding the choice between an interest rate and a monetary aggregate as the 
central bank‘s policy instrument, Poole (1970)‘s classic analysis provides a simple but 
instructive solution, explaining the policy instrument shift from monetary aggregates to 
interest rates mentioned above. The basic message from his conclusion implies that 
growing volatility in the financial sector (money demand or money multiplier shocks) 




With the adoption of an IT regime, many central banks switched their framework 
                                                 
32     These IT frameworks basically operate under officially flexible exchange rate regimes. As of the end of March 
2010, 26 countries use an inflation targeting, about half of them emerging market or low-income countries. Moreover, 
several central banks in more developed countries, including the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve 
Board in the United States, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of Japan, have adopted many of the main elements 
of inflation targeting. See Roger et al. (2009) and Roger (2010).  
33   Poole (1970) argues that under the assumption that the policy objective is to stabilise real output, greater output 
stability can be achieved by adjusting interest rates when money demand is highly unstable and difficult to predict 
over a short period of time. See Walsh (2010) for a summary of Poole‘s conclusion on the choice of monetary policy 
instrument. 
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from monetary aggregate-oriented operations to interest rate-oriented. In other words, 
inflation targeting central banks, in general, use the short-term interest rate as their policy 
instrument (or an operating target), not monetary aggregates such as M2.
34
  Under this 
interest rate-oriented monetary policy framework, central banks are required to make 
decisions on the size, timing and speed of adjustment of policy rates as well as judgement 
on whether to change their policy stance. In conducting this IT strategy, central banks are 
faced with considerable uncertainty regarding both the economic outlook and the impact 
of their policy instrument (i.e., the short-term nominal interest rate) on inflation and real 
economic activity. 
In the presence of uncertainty, some specific patterns in policy interest rate path are 
found in Korea as in most advanced countries: infrequent changes in policy interest rates; 
successive changes of the interest rates in the same direction; asymmetric adjustments in 
terms of the size of interest-rate changes for continuation and reversal periods; and a long 
pause before reversals in policy interest rates. 
This chapter will provide an analytic overview as to the objectives that the Bank of 
Korea (BOK) has sought to achieve, and on how the monetary policy framework in 
Korea has changed, since its estabilishment in 1950. We will also discuss interest-rate 
smoothing, and in the light of this discussion, present several stylised facts on the path of 
the policy interest rate using Korean data. In this chapter, we take the position that 
interest-rate smoothing is an appropriate result for developments in macroeconomic 
                                                 
34    Of course, non-IT countries, for example, the US, Japan and Switzerland, also use interest rates as policy 
instruments. However, the essential distinction between inflation and monetary targeting rests on which indicator 
central banks use as a policy instrument: under a monetary targeting regime, monetary policy is conducted by making 
use of an intermediate monetary growth target and employing reserve money as the operating target to attain it, unlike 
IT countries which use an interest rate as the operating target. 
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conditions, especially in today‘s highly integrated global environment. Such an 
environment inevitably poses difficulties for central bank policy-making: policymakers 
are constantly faced with an ever greater degree of uncertainty when determining the 
policy interest rate. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, the objectives of 
monetary policy will be discussed. Section 3.3 reviews developments of the monetary 
policy framework in Korea, which has evolved from a monetary targeting to a (full-fledged) 
inflation targeting regime. In the same section, we also attempt to identify monetary policy 
shocks and uncertainties in the actual conduct of monetary policy. Section 3.4 investigates 
the characteristics of policy-rate movements, including stylised facts and the degree of 
interest-rate smoothing. This section also provides a theoretical derivation of the policy 
reaction function with a partial adjustment term, and examines the degree of interest-rate 
smoothing in Korea through empirical analyses using OLS and GMM estimations, and 
discusses why central banks smooth interest-rates. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.  
 
3.2   What are the Objectives of Monetary Policy? 
3.2.1  Price Stability 
The objectives of monetary policy have varied over time according to the economic 
situation of a country, but it is nowadays usually agreed that monetary policy should 
pursue price stability
35
 as the most important objective. As with the majority of central 
                                                 
35    Under the gold standard system, central banks in many countries stressed equilibrium in the balance of 
payments since large disequilibria often arose from the inflow and outflow of gold as a result of trade with other 
countries. Beginning in the early 1930s, many countries, hit by the Great Depression, adopted a fiat currency or 
managed monetary system. Subsequently, removing the possibility of monetary laxity and stabilising prices came to be 
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banks, the BOK‘s primary objective in its monetary policy is price stability.36 Price 
stability is often referred to interchangeably as monetary stability (Issing, 2003).  A 
generally accepted definition of price stability is one where the general level of prices in 
the economy is stable or the level of inflation is low (Selody, 1990; Crockett, 1997; 
Svensson, 1999b).  
This objective reflects the view that sustainable economic growth cannot be achieved 
without price stability. High inflation has sizeable adverse consequences for the real 
economy. Inflation is a source of uncertainty that makes economic decision-making more 
difficult. In periods of high inflation, relative prices and wages become more variable. High 
and variable inflation can generate uncertainty because people become confused about what 
the appropriate price for each good is, and about how quickly the general price level is rising. 
Uncertainty in turn makes the price system less efficient as a mechanism for the allocation of 
income and resources, leading to a decline in economic efficiency. 
In Korea, during the period
37
 from 1965 throughout the 1970s, the annual rate of 
increase as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) reached around 14 percent. But, 
in the 1980s the annual rate of CPI inflation dropped to single-digits thanks mainly to 
economic stabilisation policies. In the 1990s, this pattern was on the whole maintained 
except for the year 1998
38
. In the early 2000s, the CPI inflation rate moved more stablely 
                                                                                                                                                 
seen as one of the important goals of monetary policy. In particular, with the global economy suffering from inflation 
owing to the two oil crises in the 1970s, this view became widely accepted. See BOK (2008b) for a more detailed 
explanation. 
36    The current Bank of Korea Act clarifies that the Bank proclaims price stability as the purpose of the Bank of 
Korea‘s establishment, and stipulates that it should seek to achieve price stability by setting an inflation target in 
consultation with the government and do its utmost to attain this target.  
37     In Korea, this period is dubbed the era of economic development in view of the rapid growth rate. 
38   At that time, consumer prices rose rapidly due to the Korean won‘s depreciation against major currencies 
following the 1997–1998 Korean currency crisis. 
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within a range of 2~3 percent. From early 2008, however, it accelerated again due to a 
sharp rise in international commodity prices such as those for crude oil and cereals. 
It is widely agreed that a small positive inflation rate is more desirable than zero 
inflation. Frequently the argument has been made that even though price stability is 
important for economic growth, inflation is to some extent unavoidable mainly because 
of structural problems such as wage stickiness in the form of sticky-wage contract 
practices (Tobin, 1972 and Akerlof et al., 1996); and that reining in inflation too tightly 
may come at a high cost; for example, the weakening of growth momentum.  
In addition, it is well known that most price indices do not properly reflect shifts in 
demand to substitutes caused by price changes, or qualitative improvement in goods due to 
technological advances. As a result, the inflation rate measured by a specific index, for 
example, the CPI, may be overestimated, which is called an ‗upward bias‘ in the 
measurement of the consumer price index
39
. In this case, if the targeted rate of inflation is set 
as zero percent, actual deflation may occur. Proponents favouring mildly positive inflation, 
therefore, argue that price rises within a certain range should be accepted. 
However, even though a certain mildly positive inflation rate is desirable, there is no 
consensus as to what the optimal rate of inflation should be. In fact, the optimal rate of 
inflation is dependent on country-specific factors, such as each country‘s economic structure, 
previous inflation experience, and sociopolitical environment. The UK and Canada regard 
inflation of 2 percent as price stability; New Zealand takes 1~3 percent; and the European 
Central Bank, in a more explicit way, defines price stability as inflation of ‗below, but close 
to, 2 percent‘ which is to be maintained over the medium term (ECB, 2004). 
                                                 
39     For further details, see IMF (1999). 
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Compared to these countries, emerging market countries that operate an IT regime 
tend to regard a somewhat higher level of inflation as indicative of price stability: for 
example, Brazil and Indonesia take 4.5 percent; South Africa 3~6 percent; and Korea and 
Chile 3 percent. 
 
3.2.2  Financial Stability 
Another policy objective that central banks nowadays strive to attain is financial stability. 
This is because financial development and stability are essential constituents of 
sustainable economic growth. In contrast to the case of price stability, concerning which 
a greater degree of consensus has been reached, no generally accepted definition of 
financial stability has yet been provided. 
Even though there has been no general consensus on the best definition of financial 
stability, many have cited Crockett (1997)‘s definition: financial stability broadly rests 




Financial stability is often defined in terms of its antithesis, i.e., financial instability. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Mishkin (1997 and 1999) defines financial instability as a 
situation where the financial system does not work well in supplying funds to economic 
agents who have productive investment opportunities, and as a result the economy cannot 
operate efficiently. In this definition, the intermediation function of the financial system 
                                                 
40    This requires (i) that the key institutions in the financial system are stable, in that there is a high degree of 
confidence that they can continue to meet their contractual obligations without interruption or outside assistance; and 
(ii) that the key markets are stable, in that participants can confidently transact in them at prices that reflect 
fundamental forces and that do not vary substantially over short periods when there have been no changes in 
fundamentals (Crockett, 1997). 
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is emphasised in terms of supplying credit to the real sector, and moreover, the role of 
asymmetric information is weighed with respect to financial instability. In a similar way, 
Ferguson (2002) defines financial stability with reference to its absence, i.e., financial 
instability. According to him, financial instability refers to a situation where the prices of 
some important financial assets diverge rapidly from fundamentals, and/or a situation in 
which aggregate demand significantly deviates from the potential capacity of an 
economy as market functioning and credit availability are distorted. 
Financial instability can trigger severe economic crises
41
, while a stable financial 
system enhances the efficiency of the distribution of resources and thus boosts economic 
development. In general, financial instability tends to be accompanied by a serious credit 
squeeze. To cope with this situation, the central bank uses its exclusive power to issue 
paper money and to quickly supply the necessary funds to financial markets.
42
 When a 
serious liquidity crisis breaks out in the economy, the central bank attempts to prevent a 
string of bankruptcies by supplying the necessary liquidity to financial institutions which 
are in trouble. Furthermore, to the extent that the effects of monetary policy are 
transmitted to economic activities and prices through the financial sector, the 
transmission channel of monetary policy will not work appropriately when financial 
markets do not function properly or suffer from instability. Consequently, the monetary 
policy will not have as much effect on the economy as expected. For this reason, the 
BOK has viewed financial stability as an important policy objective and has paid great 
                                                 
41    Since the early 1980s, as the volume of financial transactions has grown and the integration of capital market 
has increased, institutions in the financial sector have become more interdependent and they have been accordingly 
exposed to systemic risk. As a consequence, many countries, including Argentina (1980-82), Chile (1981-83), Spain 
(1977-85), Mexico (1995), among others, experienced financial crises, leading to a serious economic recession. 
42      This is frequently called the central bank‘s function as the lender of last resort. 
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attention to it in the practical conduct of policy. 
In the aftermath of the GFC, particularly, there was much criticism of central banks‘ 
role regarding systemic risks in the financial markets. Macrofinancial imbalances had 
been accumulated over a long period of time through the linkages between the financial 
sector and the real economy. These undesiarable developments gave rise notably to asset-
price bubbles, as a result of which many countries such as the US and the UK began to 
emphasise the importance of financial stability as a central bank objective. In response to 
this global trend, the Bank of Korea‘s role of financial stability has been greatly 
strengthened in Korea: the current Bank of Korea Act states that the BOK can take more 





3.3   Monetary Policy in Korea 
Since the end of the 1970s, the monetary policy framework in Korea has undergone 
many structural changes, the most notable of which was the adoption of inflation 
targeting at the end of the 1990s. For the twenty years prior to April 1998, Korea 
maintained a monetary targeting regime. This section briefly reviews the institutional 





                                                 
43    The revised Bank of Korea Act of 2011 explicitly specified achieving financial stability as well as price 
stability as the purposes of its establishment. Consequently, the Bank of Korea was given the right to demand data and 
materials from non-bank financial institutions while being required to compile biannually a report appraising the 
soundness of financial institutions in Korea and the macroprudential stability of the financial system as a whole and 
submit this to the National Assembly. 
44      Most of this section follows the descriptions in BOK (2008b and 2012). 
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3.3.1  Brief History: from Monetary Targeting to Inflation Targeting 
 
Korea‘s ―Financial Stabilisation Programme‖ launched only in 1957 sought to create an 
overall framework for macroeconomic policy, within which monetary policy could be 
systematically conducted. The main aim of this programme was to curb the high inflation 
resulting from the dramatically changing social and economic environment and the fiscal 
laxity that had characterised liberation from Japanese rule, the foundation of the Republic 
of Korea, the Korean War and post-war reconstruction. The programme provided for a 
limit on the rate of money growth (M1) to be determined annually or quarterly. 
Subsequently, in order to handle its chronic balance of payments deficit in its rush for 
concentrated development, Korea signed a Stand-by Credit Agreement with the IMF in 
March 1965. Under this Agreement, Korea was required to set a specific target for M1 in 
consultation with the IMF, which marked an important change in monetary policy 
operations. 
Once the current account started to improve from 1976 onwards, the BOK began to 
set its own M1 growth target independently of the IMF Agreement. A shift was made to 
M2 growth as the intermediate target in 1979 because the gap between the actual figures 
and the desired target had widened. It was at this time that the monetary policy operating 
framework finally took on the contours of a full-fledged monetary targeting regime. 
The money supply target was determined based on the then European Community 
(EC) method
45
; that is, the BOK set the money supply target, considering a number of 
expected economic conditions such as economic growth, the rate of inflation, and the 
                                                 
45    Since the EC‘s Council recommended the method‘s adoption by all of its member countries in 1972, this 
method has been named the ‗EC method‘. 
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change of monetary velocity.  Targeting of the M2 growth rate was maintained until the 
mid-1990s, largely since it remained closer to the target value thanks to the stability of 
M2 demand.
46
 In Korea, at that time, M2 still maintained a close relationship with prices, 
while remaining generally its target range. That it did so is largely attributable to 
relatively late start of financial market and interest rate deregulation, which meant that 
the financial innovations, which lessened the effectiveness of monetary targeting in the 
advanced countries, occurred at a relatively slow pace in Korea.
47
 
When the trust account system was realigned in 1996, however, M2 demand began 
to show unstable fluctuations. As a result, in 1997 Korea introduced what was termed a 
dual monetary targeting system, whereby the rate of increase in MCT (a broader measure 
of money which is defined as ‗M2+CDs+money-in-trust‘) was used as an intermediate 
target indicator alongside the M2 growth rate.
48
  However, the usefulness of MCT as a 
monetary target declined with a further financial system reorganisation in 1997 under 
which reserve requirements were imposed on CDs (certificates of deposit). 
In line with the declining effectiveness of monetary indicators, discussions on 
adopting inflation targeting as an alternative to monetary targeting had begun from the 
                                                 
46    Most advanced countries had come to abandon monetary targeting in the 1980s since the rapid financial innovation 
and liberalisation destabilised the relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation, thus greatly reducing the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Therefore, in the early 1990s, central banks in many countries started to take interest in the 
inflation targeting as an alternative for the operation of monetary policy. See Oh (2000) for a more detailed explanation. 
47    Financial deregulation spurs financial innovations; innovations take place when the authorities change the 
operational rules of the financial markets so as to permit activities previously forbidden. This deregulation has been 
conceived of as  ―reregulation‖ since one regulatory code replaces another even though the new regime is more liberal 
(see, for example, İzgi Koğar (1995) for a discussion of financial innovations and monetary policy). In a similar 
context, Suzuki (1986) states that financial innovations can be promoted when the financial authorities recognise the 
obsolescence of the existing statutory framework and deregulate the essential part of it. 
48     However, the BOK placed more emphasis on MCT than on M2 in the actual conduct of monetary policy. The 
reason is that when funds move from money-in-trust to time & savings deposits, MCT is not influenced even if M2 
expands, therefore counteracting the effects arising from flow of funds between financial assets.  
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the mid-1990s. Under the revised Bank of Korea Act which came into effect in April 
1998, an inflation targeting system (IT) was officially introduced. The BOK started to 
announce explicitly an annual target rate of inflation determined in consultation with the 
Korean government. The revision of the BOK Act and the introduction of an IT regime 
effectively gave the BOK independence in terms of monetary policy operation: the MPC 
of the BOK now decided the direction of monthly monetary policy and conducted 
monetary policy in line with this direction. Moreover, the BOK independently formulates 
and promulgates an operation plan for monetary policy. In that sense, goal independence 
was to some extent established as well although the inflation target itself is set in 
consultation with the government (Fischer, 1995).
49
 
In fact, however, it followed the method of monetary targeting recommended by the 
IMF as a part of the conditionality on its provision of credit.  In other words, a supply 
ceiling for reserve money was set as an indicative limit corresponding to the appropriate 
rate of growth in broad-money, M3. Neverthless, the BOK continued to announce an 
average growth rate for M3 as an operational target alongside the inflation target in a 
system similar to the two-pillar system of the European Central Bank (ECB). Notably, 
from 1999, it was no longer necessary for the monetary authorities to consult with the 
IMF regarding the appropriate target level of M3 growth, but even so the two-pillar 
system was retained with the BOK continuing to set an M3 growth target.
50
 
                                                 
49     On the legal side, the new Act established the neutrality and autonomy over the conduct of monetary policy: 
the Governor of the Bank of Korea took over the Chairmanship of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in place of 
the Minister of Finance and Economy. In addition, in order to reduce government influence on monetary policy, only 
two among six MPC members are recommended by the government. Hence, the legal independence of the central bank 
has become better secured than ever before (Oh, 2000). 
50    There were three reasons; firstly, there were some worries that financial markets could have been disrupted if 
the monetary targeting implemented over the past three decades were to be abolished suddenly. Secondly, the 
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Meanwhile, for the two years starting from 2001, the target M3 growth rate was no 
longer set as an intermediate target but only as a monitoring indicator.
51
  This change led 
to the complete transition to a pure IT from the two-pillar system (BOK, 2008b; Roger 
and Stone, 2005; and Kim and Park, 2006). In 2003, even the monitoring of M3 growth 
was finally abandoned. 
 
Table 3.1:  Monetary Targeting and Inflation Targeting 
 
Type of Targeting Operating System 
 Monetary Targeting 
Policy                Operating    Intermediate    Policy Goals 
Instruments       Targets            Targets                 or Objectives 




Policy              Operating     Policy Goals 
Instruments      Targets                                           or Objectives 
 
                                            Information Variables 
 
 
3.3.2  Current Framework 
 
3.3.2.1  Operating System: Inflation Targeting 
 
The current monetary policy operating framework in Korea is inflation targeting (IT). 
The central bank announces an explicit inflation target and makes use of its policy 
instruments to achieve the target. The IT regime has several essential features: (i) an 
official quantitative target (or target range) for the inflation rate is generally set over 
one or more time horizons; (ii) the future path of the inflation rate is forecast by using a 
wide range of information variables such as interest rates, exchange rates and monetary 
                                                                                                                                                 
announcement of an appropriate growth rate for M3 was judged helpful to lower inflation which was still affected by 
monetary indicators. Lastly, it was intended that both systems should be used during the period of transition until 
inflation targeting took root. 
51     This means that even if the rate of growth of M3 did not stay within the target range, measures were not taken 
immediately as they had been when it formed the intermediate target. 
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aggregates, and (iii) a short-term interest rate
52
 is usually used as a policy instrument 
(i.e., an operating target) without an explicit intermediate target in order to attain the 
inflation target taking into account the inflation forecast (Oh, 1999). Among the three 
features, the inflation target is the essence of the monetary policy framework, in that it 
not only provides discipline for monetary policy decision-making, but it also serves as 
an anchor for the formation of public inflation expectations that have a bit great impact 
on pricing decisions in wages, goods and services.  
The IT regime of the BOK can be explained in more detail by breaking down the 




During the initial years of 1998–1999 when IT was first implemented in Korea, the 
BOK‘s target indicator was total CPI inflation (or as it is often called ‗headline CPI 
inflation‘). This was mainly because CPI inflation was thought most appropriate as the 
key anchor for the operation of monetary policy since it represents the indicator of 




                                                 
52     Regarding the implementation of the inflation targeting, some literature, for example, McCallum (1988 and 
2000) proposes using the money growth as a policy instrument to conduct monetary policy, rather than interest rates. 
As in the Taylor rule where a policy instrument is interest rates, in the McCallum‘s reaction function that is called the 
McCallum rule, the policy objective is also an inflation target. The McCallum rule is of the following form:  
)(5.0+= 1
**
-ttt x -xv  -xm  
where 
tm  is the growth rate of the monetary base, 
*x  is the target growth rate of nominal GDP, tv  is the growth rate 
of base velocity, 
1-tx is the growth rate of nominal GDP. The target value 
*x  is specified as ** + yπ , where *y  is the 
long-run average growth rate of real GDP. For the Taylor rule in detail, see footnote 68 in Subsection 3.4.3 of Chapter 3. 
53    It was additionally considered that the Korean government had already announced CPI inflation forecasts in 
accordance with the IMF conditionality, so if another indicator were to be used, it could result in public confusion.  
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In 2000, the target indicator was changed to core CPI inflation (or underlying 
inflation), which strips out the effect of shocks attributable to a rise in prices of non-
grain agricultural and petroleum products.
54
  Core inflation, however, has some weak-
points; above all, it does not reflect the day-to-day experiences of the general public 
because it excludes the prices of agricultural products and petroleum-based fuels that 
constitute major items in the cost of living. Moreover, the Korean government had long 
been using the CPI as its inflation indicator in macroeconomic management. In this 
situation, the BOK‘s use of core inflation threatened to lead to considerable confusion 
in public judgment of price levels. Most countries that have adopted IT employ CPI 
inflation as their target indicator. Taking all these points into consideration, the BOK 
changed its target indicator back to CPI inflation in 2007. 
 
Target Level and Horizon 
The BOK sets the inflation target in consultation with the Korean government. The 
target inflation level is determined in overall consideration of domestic and overseas 
economic as well as financial market conditions, as in most countries that adopt the IT 
system. Figure 3.1 shows actual inflation performance and the inflation targets for the 
period from 1998 to 2012. The target was set on an annual basis from 1998 until 2003. 
In 1998, the initial year of the IT system, the target was set at 9±1 percent.  
Subsequently, it was lowered to 3±1 percent in 1999 and to 2.5±1 percent in 2000, but 
it was raised to 3±1 percent for the three years from 2001 to 2003. 
 
                                                 
54   Non-grain agricultural product prices are heavily dependent on weather conditions and harvests, and petroleum 
product prices are greatly affected by changes in international oil prices. 
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Figure 3.1:   Actual Inflation and Inflation Targets 
 
 
Notes: 1) Consumer prices and core inflation are compared with the same month of the previous 
 year.  
2) Shaded areas represent the inflation target range. 
        Source: The Bank of Korea. February 2012. 
 
In 2004, however, a shift was made to an official medium-term (three year) IT 
system
55
 upon the following considerations: firstly to allow enough of a time-lag for 
monetary policy to be transmitted to the economy; secondly, in view of the considerable 
uncertainties surrounding economic forecasts and the effects of policy actions; and 
finally, to provide sufficient flexibility for monetary policy to tolerate temporary or one 
off short-run economic fluctuations, for example, allowing temporary deviations of 
inflation from the target. Thus, for the first medium-term period of 2004–2006, the 
inflation target was set at a range of 2.5~3.5 percent (annual average basis during the 
period).  In 2007, the target was set at 3.0 percent for the second medium-term of 2007–
                                                 
55     Clause 1 of Article 6 of the Bank of Korea Act (entry into force, 1 April 1998) required the Bank of Korea to 
establish an inflation target ‗every year‘, but under the revised Act of 2003 (entry into force, 1 January 2004) the word 
‗every year‘ was removed and the BOK was able to set an inflation target from a medium-term perspective.. 
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2009. In the current system, the application period (three year) and method of evaluation 
(annual average rate of inflation during the period) are substantially the same as with the 
first medium-term inflation target. The difference is that the target indicator was changed 
from the core CPI measure to headline CPI, and the method of establishing the target 
altered from a target range to a midpoint with a tolerance band of  +/– 0.5 percentage 
point (BOK, 2004 and 2007). Meanwhile, in 2010, the inflation target was set at 3.0 
percent for the third medium-term of 2010–2012, with a tolerance range of +/– 1.0 
percentage point around this target, in terms of the 12-month rate of change in the 
consumer price index. 
 
3.3.2.2  Method of Operation 
 
The Official Policy Rate 
Under the monetary targeting regime in force up until 1997, monetary policy was 
implemented by using an intermediate monetary growth target and employing reserve 
money as an operating target to attain it. This formulation was premised upon the 
assumption of a stable relationship between reserve money and money supply. Monetary 
policy was operated by converting the monetary target into reserve money and achieving 
the required scale of reserve money through open market operations. 
However, the monetary aggregate indicator showed unstable movements due to 
realignment and financial innovation, and hence its relationship with the ultimate goals 
of monetary policy was largely blurred. This resulted in a decline in the effectiveness of 
monetary policy indicators. As a consequence, any chosen monetary aggregate was 
found to gradually lose its effectiveness as an intermediate target. And the introduction of 
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an IT system following the 1997–1998 Korean currency crisis drove a shift to an interest 
rate-oriented monetary policy in Korea.  
From May 1999 onwards, the overnight call rate, which is the equivalent of the US 
Federal Funds rate, started to be used as the operating target for the conduct of monetary 
policy. The level of the call rate was decided at the monthly meeting of the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC). The introduction of the call rate target framework contributed 
substantially to widening flexibility in adjusting liquidity, which helped dampen market 
unrest in that it allowed a shift reaction through the expansion of liquidity supply by way 
of open market operations in periods of financial tension such as the Daewoo business 
group‘s collapse (in September 1999) and the credit card debacle (during the period of 
2000–2003). The call rate, though, tended to become closely tied to its target level 
regardless of liquidity conditions in the money market, which greatly weakened its 
signalling of information about the market and its liquidity-allocation function. This 
constraint on the volatility of the call rate led to short-term transactions of funds 
becoming excessively concentrated in the call market, hindering the development of the 
money market. This acted to impede the seamless operation of the interest-rate 
transmission channel of monetary policy. 
Under these circumstances, there was a need to boost the effectiveness of an interest 
rate-oriented monetary policy and create conditions for the development of short-term 
money markets as well. To this end, the BOK in March 2008 changed the policy rate 
from the ‗call rate target‘ to the ‗Bank of Korea Base Rate,‘ which is the standard rate 
applied in transactions such as repurchase agreements (RPs) between the Bank of Korea 
and its counterpart financial institutions (BOK, 2008a,b). 
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The Policy Rate Decision and Communications 
The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the BOK makes decisions about the policy 
interest rate, i.e., the Bank of Korea Base Rate. The MPC basically meets twelve times 
each year on the first Thursday of the month. 
In order to assess economic conditions including inflationary pressures, like most 
other central banks, the Committee uses an inflation forecast and other relevant 
indicators. This is dubbed the ‗Look-at-Everything Approach‘ which monitors as wide a 
range of information variables as possible. Such variables include production, demand, 
real asset prices, the P* ratio
56
, the output gap, the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment) and so on (Kim and Park, 2006; Sánchez, 2009). 
Together with price stability, which is stipulated as the primary objective of 
monetary policy in the Bank of Korea Act, both the reduction of short-term economic 
fluctuations and the stability of financial markets are important policy goals as well. In 
this regard, ―flexible‖ inflation targeting rather than ―strict‖ inflation targeting and an 
‗eclectic‘ approach57 characterise Korea‘s monetary policy. In addition, as with what are 
termed ‗Greenspan‘s baby steps,‘ the target policy rate is adjusted gradually (by 25~50 
bps), and when it has been determined, open market operations are carried out to move 
the actual policy rate close to the policy rate target. 
Communication is now regarded as an important monetary policy tool which may 
                                                 
56       The P* ratio is defined as the ratio of the long-run equilibrium price level to the current price level.  
57     When inflation rate appears to move above the target range amid an economic slowdown or financial 
instability, the central bank will face difficulties in choosing the appropriate policy direction. In these situations, the 
central bank should focus on the objectives that it judges most urgent under prevailing situations, as long as this does 
not detract greatly from price stability. In this flexible or eclectic approach, the central bank‘s judgment on the 
economic situations plays an important role in determining the policy direction (Kim, 2006). 
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affect financial stability and the real economy through its impact on agents‘ expectations. 
Hence, the BOK announces the direction of monetary policy as soon as a decision is 
made, informing the public about current monetary policy issues and future policy 
directions. Twice a year (in March and September of each year), the BOK submits a 
Monetary Policy Report to the National Assembly, showing whether the inflation target 
has been achieved and describing the monetary policy actions taken and the future policy 
directions. The Governor of the BOK attends the Finance and Economy Committee of 
the National Assembly to testify concerning the operating stance of monetary policy and 
the economic outlook (see BOK (2008b) for a more detailed explanation). 
 
3.3.3  Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks and Uncertainties in Korea 
In recent years, uncertainty has been the focus of great attention in drawing up and 
conducting monetary policy in Korea as elsewhere. This was attributable several changes 
in the economic situation; firstly, from the 1990s, many industrial countries entered a 
phase of low and comparatively stable inflation. Improved monetary policy management 
as well as the greater openness of economies and closer integration of the world economy 
(i.e., globalisation) were seen to have contributed to this development (IMF, 1999). A 
leading concern for monetary policy came to be no longer how to achieve low inflation 
but how best to conduct monetary policy in an environment of low and stable inflation. 
This prompted central banks to concern themselves greatly with handling uncertainty; 
secondly, the much closer international linkages owing to the liberalisation and 
globalisation of the real economy and financial markets added to the potential sources of 
shocks that were unpredictable and difficult to quantify. At the same time, there have 
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been large advances in econometric tools which have enhanced computational capacity; 
for instance, the possibility of undertaking stochastic simulations has allowed central 
bank economists to develop a more systematic analysis of uncertainty and strategies for 
contending with it. 
The sources of shocks or uncertainty associated with the conduct of monetary policy 
in Korea can be domestic or international in origin. Some sources of shocks can be 
events that are certain to occur, but whose exact outcomes are often difficult to know. 
Domestic examples are the financial market unrest centring around the Daewoo Group in 
1999, a sharp expansion of household credits in 2002, the North Korean nuclear issue, 
etc. Together with these, over the last decade, global scopes of uncertainty have become 
more pervasive. These examples entering the set of uncertainties faced by policymakers 
are events such as the 1997–1998 Korean currency crisis and Russian debt default, the 
large run-up in world commodity prices, the 11 September 2001 incident in the US, the 
turmoil of 2007–2009 in the US sub-prime mortgage market, and Lehman brothers‘ 
collapse in September 2008. 
In addition, the persistence of shocks is unknownable. Given that the Korean 
economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks or uncertainties, this subsection 
investigates examples of uncertainties that the central bank has confronted in the course 
of actual conduct of monetary policy.  
 
● 1997–1998, Korean Currency Crisis and Credit Crunch in the Banking Sector 
The exchange rate of the Korean won to the US dollar peaked at 1,965 on 24 
December 1997, and maintained a level of 1,600~1,700 won per dollar during early 1998. 
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The BOK, acting under its agreement with the IMF, raised the interest rate applied in its 
open market operations to as much as 35 percent to stabilise the exchange rate. As major 
market interest rates consequently rose to the level of 30~40 percent, Korea experienced 
a period of unprecedentedly high interest rates. 
During the course of the contraction of business activity after the currency crisis, a 
credit crunch erupted as banks cut back their lending. 
 
● 1999, Financial Market Unrest Centred around the Daewoo Group 
Following severe problems among member companies of the Daewoo Group, a 
restructuring plan was unveiled on 19 July 1999 and guidelines were established for the 
workout programs of 12 Daewoo affiliates during August. This led to severe financial 
market turmoil. In particular, once it became generally known that a considerable volume 
of the corporate bonds issued on a large-scale by the Daewoo Group following the 
currency crisis had been acquired by investment trust companies‘ funds in the form of 
bond-type beneficiary certificates, fears arose that the investment trust companies would 
be hit by knock-on insolvencies. 
 
● 2000, Inflationary Pressures and Capital Market Crunch 
From June 2000 onwards, prices deviated from their previous stable track, and rose 
steeply. CPI inflation showed a steep upward trend, registering 0.5 percent compared to 
the previous month (comparisons are the same below) in June, 0.3 percent in July, 0.8 
percent in August, and then increasing to 1.5 percent in September. Additionally, the 
release of second-quarter GDP growth of 9.6 percent caused fears that with the widening 
of the positive output gap taking the slack out of the economy excess demand pressures 
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would progressively built up. 
From May 2000 onwards, financial markets were again thrown into turmoil by the 
liquidity crises of Saehan Group and Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. In the 
latter half of 2000, there was a bunching of the maturities of corporate bonds that had 
been issued in 1997. With banks averse to granting credit following the liquidity 
problems of large companies, there was a strong possibility that large-scale insolvencies 
might arise as enterprises with low credit standing could well face difficulties in rolling 
over their corporate bonds.  
 
● 2001, Global Recession and Uncertainties caused by Geopolitical Risks 
From the beginning of the latter half of 2001, US economic growth remained 
virtually stagnant. As a result, the possibility of a global recession increased.  To add to 
this, the effect of the events of September 11, the subsequent outbreak of war against 
Afghanistan and fears aroused by a perceived threat of biochemical terror further 
depressed economic activity. In order to avert financial turmoil and provide the impetus 
for a recovery of economic activity, the US Federal Reserve continued to lower interest 
rates, and other major central banks around the world joined it in greatly lowering 
interest rates. 
 
● 2002, Expansion of Household Credits amid Mounting Uncertainty of the 
External Environment 
In a low interest-rate environment, household loans grew explosively by 45.0 
trillion won in 2001 and 61.6 trillion won in 2002. Due to the rapid expansion of 
household loans and a subsequent sharp rise in house prices, there were worries that asset 
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markets might become overheated or inflationary expectations among the general public 
might become embedded in the economy. As a result, the question as to how monetary 
policy should react to changes in asset prices emerged as a contentious issue in Korea as 
it had in major countries. 
From early in the second half of 2002, external uncertainty greatly increased due to 
geopolitical factors, including the North Korean nuclear issue and the looming threat of 
the outbreak of a US war against Iraq. At the same time as a sharp run-up in world oil 
prices, major US firms, notably, Enron and WorldCom, faced the risk of bankruptcy. 
Consequently, stock prices declined sharply in all the major countries. Korean stock 
prices also fell and the confidence of economic agents shrank so that the downside risks 
to growth increased greatly. 
 
● 2003, Heightened Financial Market Instability and Geopolitical Risks  
The BOK confronted a number of uncertainties in the course of maintaining its 
monetary policy stance. Above all, house prices followed an upward track from February 
2003 onwards
58
, bringing greater uncertainty to the policy environment. Despite the 
sluggishness of economic activity, house prices were rising sharply, sparkling a debate 
over how monetary policy should deal with this.
59
 
And, uncertainty was running high owing to the increased possibility of financial 
                                                 
58     The prices of apartments in the Seoul area exhibited a steep upward trend with a 5.4 percent rise in the second 
quarter of 2003 and rose by 4.4 percent in the third quarter. 
59     The issues of contention were that the Bank should not lower its policy rate, or rather, should raise it to cope with 
house price-bubbles. The Bank judged that countering sharp increases in house prices through interest rate policy would 
face certain limitations. It was true that prolonged low interest rate policy had contributed in part to the rise in real estate 
prices, but there were other factors including the imbalances between housing supply and demand in certain districts that 
reflected disparities in schooling and quality-of-life, and the speculative demand for apartments slated for reconstruction. 
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market instability and continuing geopolitical risks including the outbreak of the US-led 
war against Iraq (March 2003) and the North Korean nuclear issue. In addition, there 
were worries over a deep contraction of economic activity under the negative impact of 
the spread of the SARS epidemic, decreases in private consumption due to households‘ 
heavy debt burden, and the delay in the global economic recovery. 
 
● 2004, Sharp Rise in Oil Prices and the Weakening of Global IT Business  
Investment and consumer confidence among economic agents, which had shrunk 
abruptly from May 2004 onwards because of the uncertainties at home and abroad, 
weakened further under the impact of the sharp run-up in international oil prices in early 
July 2004. It was also expected that the pace of growth of the world economy would 
slow in response to the rise in oil prices and the Federal Reserve‘s shift to a tighter 
monetary policy. Meanwhile, owing to the possibility of global IT business reversing to a 
downward trend, it was feared that the expansion of exports, which had been the 
mainstay of economic growth for some time, would falter. 
 
● 2005, Rapid Rise in Real Estate Prices and Oil Prices  
Keeping interest rates low for a considerable length of time to support the recovery 
of economic activity led to a number of malign side-effects such as increasing upward 
pressure on asset prices caused by financial speculation. House prices, which had been 
stabilised with the introduction of a package of real estate measures on 29 October, 2003, 
started to surge from the beginning of 2005. In addition, there were concerns that the 
trend of high oil prices might continue longer than expected as oil prices defied forecasts 
by remaining on a steeply rising course.  
  
  Page | 86 
● 2006, Heightening Geopolitical Risks and Slowdown in Economic Activity 
Amid heightening geopolitical risks, including the Iranian nuclear issue and attacks 
on Nigerian oil facilities, international oil prices rose steeply from the beginning of 2006. 
Moreover, from July 2006 onwards, a number of events taking place both at home and 
abroad acted as sources of risk factors. Geopolitical risk increased greatly with the 
eruption of armed conflicts in the Middle-East and international oil prices rose steeply 
again. For Korea, in particular, various events also occurred including North Korea‘s 
test-firing of missiles and strikes at several large firms. All of these combined to slow 
down economic activity for a while and reduced economic agents‘ confidence.  
 
● 2007, Sharp Increase in Oil Prices and Financial Market Unrest 
Growing macroeconomic uncertainty was typified by sharply rising international oil 
prices and heightened international financial market-unrest arising from the US sub-
prime mortgage meltdown. Notably, from late July 2007, the volatility of price variables 
such as market interest rates and share prices increased markedly in the financial markets 
of the US and many countries around the world including Korea under the impact of 
concerns over a credit squeeze triggered by the turmoil in the US sub-prime mortgage 
market. 
 
● 2008–2009, Rapid Increase of Uncertainty Resulting from Global Financial Crisis 
and Economic Recession 
Lehman Brothers‘ filing for bankruptcy protection in September 2008 led to the 
deterioration of the international environment in the forms of global financial market 
turmoil and economic recession. Interest rates, share prices and exchange rates became 
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increasingly volatile and a credit crunch emerged. The BOK‘s monetary policy focus was 
to minimise the negative effects on the financial markets and the real economy caused by 
these economic conditions. It cut its Base Rate from 5.25 percent in October 2008 to a 
record-low of 2.0 percent in February 2009, resulting in a total cut of 325 bps in five 
months. The BOK then expanded the supply of Korean won and foreign currency 
liquidity. Due to this accommodative monetary policy, the Korean real economy showed 
a gradual improvement while stock prices rebounded and the Korean won/US dollar 
exchange rate demonstrated downward stability. Despite these continued improvements 
in the financial and economic situation, there remained a high degree of uncertainty in 
the economic environment at home and abroad. 
 
● 2010–2011, Increasing Uncertainty Arising from Global Financial Crisis and 
Economic Recession 
Despite the steady improvement of domestic real economic activity, the demand-
side pressures on prices were not very great, and the Korean won/US dollar showed 
downward stability, easing below its level of the previous year. Subsequently, CPI 
inflation remained subdued. The BOK kept its key interest rate at a historic low of 2.0 
percent in view of the high degree of uncertainty about the future economic outlook 
arising from the weak economic recovery in major advanced countries and the possible 
reemergence of global financial market turmoil.  
From the latter half of 2010, however, the economy continued its upward trend, in 
consequence of which upward pressures on prices appeared gradually. The Bank of 
Korea shifted its policy stance toward gradually lessening the degree of monetary 
accommodativeness, normalising interest rates: it adjusted the Base Rate upward in five 
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steps, raising it by 25 bps from July to June 2011. As a result, the Base Rate rosed from 
2.0 percent to 3.25 percent.  
During the latter half of 2011, the BOK maintained the Base Rate at 3.25 percent 
since the downside risks to growth and uncertainty in domestic and overseas financial 
markets had increased owing to the sovereign debt problems in the eurozone, the 
economic slowdown in major countries and the global financial market unrest.  
 
3.4  Policy Interest Rate Movements: Evidence in Korea 
3.4.1  Stylised Facts 
Figure 3.2 plots the path of the intended policy rate from May 1999 through December 
2011, and Table 3.2 provides statistics on the frequency and the magnitude of changes in 
policy rates in Korea. Overall, the path of the short-term policy interest rate that results 
from the conduct of monetary policy tends to remain unchanged for some time in the 
face of a changing environment. More specifically, the pattern of policy rate movements 
can be described by several characteristics.  
 
3.4.1.1  Infrequent Changes in Policy Interest Rates 
 
Changes in policy rates by the central bank are relatively rare given the frequency with 
which new information about the state of the economy is released. Almost every day the 
economic space and financial markets bim over with a multitude of new items of 
information. In general, however, this should not lead to large day-to-day revisions in the 
central bank‘s forecasts on inflation and output. It may be, of course, true that whether or 
not revisions in forecasts are needed hinges on the size of the shocks or the importance of 
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information contained in the news. Despite this, adjustments of policy rates are quite 
infrequent. Some would argue that the policy rate should be changed in accordance with 
the arrival of new important information, if policy were to react in order to cope with 
shifts in asset prices. This would imply that more frequent changes in policy rates should 
be made than is the conventional practices. In practice, the BOK moves interest rates less 
frequently than once a quarter, and sometimes goes several quarters without any change 
in rates. 
 
Figure 3.2:  The Path of the Intended Policy Rate Target in Korea, May 1999– 
December 2011 
 
Note: The policy rate was changed from the ‗call rate target‘ to ‗the Bank of Korea Base Rate‘ 
from March 2008 onwards. 
 
In Korea, over the last decade or so, there have been 30 changes in policy rates. 
Since May 1999, the Bank of Korea has adjusted, on average, its policy rate once every 
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154 days (about 53/25 months), with about 17 months
60
 being the longest period without a 
change. 
 
Table 3.2:  Policy Interest Rate Adjustments in Korea, May 1999–December 2011 
 




Absolute size of changes 
(in  average basis points) 
Continuations Reversals  All Continuations Reversals  All Continuations Reversals 
24 6  154 125 273  32 33 25 
(+ +: 13, 
– –:11) 
(+ –: 3, 




(+ +: 161, 
– –: 82 ) 
( + –: 187, 




( + +: 25, 
– –: 43 ) 
(+ –: 25, 
– +: 25) 
Notes:    means two more successive increases in policy interest rates (policy tightness) 
  means increase followed by decrease in policy interest rates 
  means decrease followed by increase in policy interest rates 
  means two more successive decreases in policy interest rates (policy easing) 
 
3.4.1.2  Successive Changes in the Same Direction 
Changes in policy rates by the central bank are often carried out in the form of multiple 
steps within a single policy rate movement. These changes appear to be frequently 
followed by relatively small and additional changes in the same direction. For the sample 
period, 80 percent of the policy rate alterations showed continuations in the direction of 
previous policy changes: the number of consecutive increases (monetary policy 
tightnesses) in policy rate is 13 times and that of consecutive decreases (monetary easing) 
11 times. These continuations often occur in rapid succession with an average of 125 
days in contrast to reversals with an average of 273 days. Moreover, the number of 
reversals, which means a change of policy stance, is just 6 times among a total of 30 
times changes. The central bank appears to have a strong reluctance to frequently change 
                                                 
60    The policy rate remained unchanged at 2.0 percent from 12 February 2009 to 8 July 2010. 
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the direction of interest rates. 
As is evident in Figure 3.2, it is common for three or four moves to be made in the 
same direction before a move is made in the opposite direction, which implies the 
existence of autocorrelation in policy interest rates. This can be confirmed in the 
autocorrelation coefficients, calculated by using the level of policy interest rates. As is 
reported in Table 3.3, quarterly policy rates show positive autocorrelations. These 
autocorrelations up to the second quarter are strongly significant.  
This fact suggests that like most other central banks, the BOK deliberately chooses 




Table 3.3:  Autocorrelations of the Policy Interest Rate, 1999:q2–2011:q4 
 
 
Lags in quarters 
1 2 3 4 8 10 
Policy base rate 0.923
**
   0.781
*
   0.626
*
 0.463 -0.106 -0.276 
Actual call rate 0.921
**
   0.778
*
   0.627
*
 0.470 -0.101 -0.262 
Note: The asterisks (** and *) represent significantly different from zero at the 5 percent and the 10  
percent levels, respectively. 
 
3.4.1.3  Asymmetric Adjustments of Interest Rates 
There might be a possibility of asymmetric adjustment of policy interest rates in Korea. 
This pattern can be discussed from two perspectives. One is that the average size of 
interest rate change at turning-points is found to be just 25 basis points (hereafter, 
referred to as ‗bp‘), which is much smaller than it is for continuations, 33 bp. This 
                                                 
61    Similar patterns are observed in many other countries. See, for example Debelle and Cagliarini (2000); Lowe 
and Ellis (1997) for evidence from other countries. 
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evidence might partly reflect the fact that because the central bank is not confident of the 
correct state of the economy in periods when the real economy is in an upturn or 
downturn, it must be much more cautious in reversing its interest rate policy. 
The other is that the average size of changes for the period of consecutive 
decreases, 43 bp, is relatively greater than it is for the period of consecutive increases, 
25 bp. In other words, the policy rates in Korea is adjusted differently under 
expansionary versus contractionary monetary policy, meaning that the BOK behaves 
more cautiously in raising interest rates than lowering them. More specifically, over 
the past decade, there have been 13 instances of successive increases and 11 of 
successive decreases: amongst the successive decreases, there were 3 of 50-bp 
decreases (19 September 2001, 9 January 2009 and 12 February 2009); 1 of a 75-bp 
decrease (27 October 2008), and 1 of an 100-bp decrease (11 December 2008). 
 
3.4.1.4  Long Pause before Reversals in Policy Interest Rates 
Reversals in the direction of policy interest rates are generally preceded by a 
relatively long period without a change in the policy rate. As explained earlier, the 
average time between interest-rate changes is greater in the case of reversals with an 
average of 273 days than it is for continuations with 125 days. This means that the 
BOK kept policy interest rates unchanged for about nine months before reversing its 
preceding policy stance. 
 
3.4.2  Comparison with Selected Advanced Countries 
As seen in Table 3.4, the four characteristics that we discussed above can be also found 
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in movements in policy interest rates in major advanced countries: specifically the US, 
the UK, Canada and Australia. 
 
Table 3.4:  Policy Rate Adjustments, January 1999–December 2011 
 




Absolute size of changes 
(in  average basis points) 
 Continuations Reversals  All Continuations Reversals  All Continuations Reversals 
US 42 4  79 57 308  36 36      38 
 (+ +: 21,  
– –: 21) 
(+ –: 2, 
 – +: 2) 
  (+ +: 50, 
 – –: 65) 
(+ –: 339, 
  – +: 276) 
  (+ +: 26, 
   – –: 45) 
(+ –: 50, 
 – +: 25) 
UK 31 6  100 73 243  34 36      25 
 (+ +: 11,  
– –: 20) 
(+ –: 3, 
 – +: 3) 
  (+ +: 69, 
 – –: 75) 
(+ –: 294, 
  – +: 191) 
  (+ +: 25, 
   – –: 43) 
(+ –: 25, 
 – +: 25) 
Canada 42 7  87 78 139  32 33      25 
 (+ +: 18,  
– –: 24) 
(+ –: 3, 
 – +: 4) 
  (+ +: 91, 
 – –: 69) 
(+ –: 163, 
  – +: 121) 
  (+ +: 26, 
   – –: 38) 
(+ –: 25, 
 – +: 25) 
Australia 32 6  124 115 172  35 35      30 
 (+ +: 21,  
– –:11) 
(+ –: 3, 
 – +: 3) 
  (+ +: 151, 
 – –: 47) 
(+ –: 135, 
  – +: 209) 
  (+ +: 26, 
   – –: 55) 
(+ –: 38, 
 – +: 25) 
Notes:  means two more successive increases (tightnesses);  means increase followed by decrease; 
 means decrease followed by increase;  means two more Successive Decreases (easing). 
 
Figure 3.3: Policy Interest Rates, May 1999–December 2011 
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3.4.3  Interest-rate Smoothing in Korea 
The four stylised patterns in the policy interest rate path described in the previous section 
are also found in other countries (see, for example, Goodhart (1999a); Debelle and 
Cagliarini (2000); and Lowe and Ellis (1997) for evidence in other countries). Such 
policy rate patterns characterise the central bank‘s reaction to inflation and the output gap 
as being less aggressive than the optimising central bank behavior would predict. 
The tendency of central banks to adjust their policy instruments in a slow and 
moderate manner is dubbed ―interest-rate smoothing62‖, which is used interchangeably 
with ‗partial adjustment‘, ‗gradualism‘ or ‗inertia‘. Sack and Wieland (2000) define 
interest-rate smoothing as a high degree of partial adjustment and limited overall 
responsiveness of the interest rates. They argue that deviations of inflation from its target 
or output from its potential will lead to a sequence of policy adjustments in the same 
direction until they have been restored to their desired path (partial adjustment of interest 
rates to changes in inflation or/and output), and the overall responsiveness of the interest 
rate rule is determined by the sizes of response coefficients of inflation and output in the 
interest rate reaction functions
63
.   
 
3.4.3.1   Two Approaches to Analysing the Interest-rate Smoothing Behavior 
 and their Implications 
There are two approaches to explaining and analysing the interest-rate smoothing 
                                                 
62    More detailed empirical evidence on the existence of interest-rate smoothing was first provided by Rudebusch 
(1995) for US data. 
63    Smaller regression coefficients on inflation and output imply more timidity in the responsiveness of the interest 
rate, causing lower interest-rate fluctuations. 
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behaviour of central banks. One approach commonly employed in many empirical 
analyses of monetary policy incorporates an explicit incentive for interest-rate smoothing 
in the central bank‘s objective function (see, for example, Rudebusch and Svensson 
(1999a and 2002), Collins and Siklos (2004), and Castelnuovo and Surico (2004), among 
others). This literature justifies the partial adjustment mechanism by including an 
interest-rate change term in the central bank‘s loss function. The authors argue that 
central banks are reluctant to change their policy interest rates boldly, attempting instead 
to operate them less aggressively towards the desired target levels. In fact, it is well 
known that this gradualist pattern of policy interest rate movements boils down to 
providing evidence that central banks may have a separate objective which is to minimise 
changes in interest rates along with the task of managing dual goals of price stability and 
sustainable economic growth. 
As for the other approach, there exists an extensive literature on estimating interest 
rate rules which include a past interest rate term, in addition to the variables associated 
with policy goals such as inflation and output stabilisation without any consideration of 
loss function having an interest-rate change term. This approach has been employed by 
numerous researchers, for example, Clarida et al. (1999 and 2000), Rudebusch (2001 and 
2002b), and Orphanides (2001 and 2002), among others. This approach reflects the point 
that because the monetary policy authority systematically reacts to macroeconomic 
variables such as inflation and the output gap, these gradual patterns in interest-rate 
movements are affected by the persistence in the movements of those variables. 
However, we can show that the first approach implies the second one. In other 
words, the first approach is a theoretical method of justifying the empirical results from 
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ttttttt rEiyEy      0,0      (3.2) 
 
Equation (3.1) is the standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve in which a measure of 
inflation, t , depends on expected future inflation, 1ttE , the output gap, ty , and a cost-
push shock, st
64
. The parameter   governs the degree to which the current period‘s infl-
ation rate is influenced by the next-period expectations of inflation at the current time and 
the parameter,  , governs the slope of the curve. Equation (3.2) is the IS equation in 
which the output gap, ty , depends on the expected future output gap, 1tt yE , the real 
interest rate gap, defined as rEi ttt  1 , where ti  denotes the one-period nominal 
interest rate which is under the control of the central bank and r  is the desired real 




  The parameter,  , governs the sensitivity of the current period‘s output gap to the 
expected future output gap.  The parameter,  , governs the sensitivity of the current 
period‘s output gap to real interest rate. Both shocks, st  and 
d
t , are assumed serially and 
mutually uncorrelated: st ~i.i.d. N(0, 
2
 ) and 
s
t ~ i.i.d.N(0, 
2
 ). 
                                                 
64      See Galí (2008, p.48-49) for derivations of this type of relationship. 
65     Since r  is a constant, the inclusion of the equilibrium real interest rate in Equation (3.2) does not affect the 
derivation of the optimal policy rule. Hence, it is often omitted from the IS equation for simplicity of exposition. 
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Assume that under discretion
66
, central banks set the nominal interest rate, ti , at the 
beginning of period t  on the basis of expectations formed at time 1t . Their 














              (3.3)                                                     
 









tt iiiiyL                (3.4) 
 
is a conventional per-period quadratic loss function, where
T  is the level of inflation 
(implicitly or explicitly) targeted by the central bank; i  the equilibrium or desired 
nominal interest rate, defined as .
Tri   And in the loss function,  ,   and   are 
positive parameters that capture the relative weights on the output gap stabilisation, 
interest rates stabilisation and interest-rate smoothing, respectively. 
Assume 1k  for simplicity where k  determines the degree to which policy is 
forward-looking. According to the existing literature (e.g., Clarida et al, 1999); Walsh, 
2010), solving this optimisation problem under discretion, leads to the following first-




























           (3.5) 
                                                 
66     The debate on whether policymakers should commit to a certain course of action or have the perfect flexibility 
to attain their policy goals has been a central question in setting monetary policy. In practice, it is often found that no 
central bank commits itself in the design of monetary policy. 
67     To simplify the problem, it is assumed that .1  
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Using (3.1) and (3.2), the optimal monetary policy rule is obtained as follows: 
 
,])()[1(ˆ 111   ttt
T
ttt iyEEci     (3.6) 
 
where tiˆ  denotes the optimal interest rate, ,ic  ,
  
  , and 
  .  In 
particular, ]1,0[  is a parameter that captures the degree of smoothing in the time path of 
the actual policy interest rate, ti , and c  is a constant interpretable as the nominal policy interest 
rates in a steady-state. Equation (3.6) is the so-called simple modified monetary policy rule
68
 
due to the inclusion of the lagged level of policy interest rate term, 1ti , as a third argument. 
Under rational expectations, we can replace expected inflation and output gap with 
their respective actual values, thereby obtaining the following empirical model of policy 




tt uiyci                      (3.7) 
 
where the last term, tu , stands for the expectational errors caused by replacing the expected 
values of variables with actual values of explanatory variables. In Equation (3.7), the 
                                                 
68    Taylor (1993) suggests that the US Federal Funds rate within a given period should be set in response to a 
change in three economic variables: the equilibrium nominal interest rate ),(i the current deviation of inflation from its 
target ),( Tt π-π and the current value of the output gap )( ty . This relationship is popularly known under the name of 
the Taylor rule, which looks as follows:  
 ,5.0+)(5.1+=ˆ t
T
tt yπ-πii where ,+=
Tπri  r : the equilibrium real interest rate. 
 
Since Taylor took the values 2 for r  and for ,T respectively, the value i  is equal to 4 percent. This equation is not 
based on a regression result, but it remarkably well describes the behaviour of the Fed during the period from 1987 up 
to 1992 (which is a considerable period of the Greenspan era: 1987-2006). This ―rule‖ states that the Federal Funds 
rate increases if inflation is above the target rate of 2 percent or if the real output is above the potential output. When 
inflation equals 2 percent and output equals potential output, the Federal Funds rate will be set equal to 4 percent. As it 
can be used for the evaluation of current policies and also to determine those of the future, the Taylor rule has been 
received a lot of attention from academics and policymakers and been much discussed. 
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parameters,  and  , measure the response of the policy interest rate to inflation, t  and 
the output gap, ,ty  respectively. Ultimately, the empirical version of the policy interest rate 
is represented as a weighted average of some desired values. In other words, the policy 
interest rate is dependent on the lagged interest rates and on the state of the economy. 
 
3.4.3.2  Forward-looking Taylor Rules 
Following Clarida et al. (1998, 1999 and 2000), assume that the central bank has at least 
some degree of autonomy over its monetary policy. In other words, the domestic monetary 
policy is not subject to any significant external constraints such as the need to meet 
exchange rate targets. Given this assumption, the central bank sets a target for the nominal 
short-term interest rate, Tti , based on the current state or future condition of the economy. 
Then, the target rate in each period is represented by a function of the gaps between 
expected inflation and output, and their corresponding target levels. Specifically, we have: 
 
  ,}{-}{ tlttTtkttTt yEEii              (3.8) 
 
where Tti  is the target for the policy interest rates at time t . i  is the desired nominal 
interest rates when both inflation and the output gap are at their target levels. kt  denotes a 
forecast of inflation rate in period kt  69. lty   stands for a forecast of the output gap in 
period ,lt  defined as the percentage deviations of the actual GDP from its corresponding 
target. Both forecasts are assumed to be made with all relevant information available at 
time t  by the central bank. T  is the target or desired level of inflation. E  is the 
                                                 
69     Therefore, }{ kttE   is the expectation of inflation in period kt  , which is formed at time t . 
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expectation operator, and t denotes the information set
70
 at the time policy decisions are 
made
71
. Note that the subscripts, k  and l , determine the degree to which policy is forward-
looking and therefore are referred to as the target feedback horizons.  
On the empirical side, numerous earlier studies have emphasised that policy rules 
like (3.8) provide good descriptions of the way central banks behave. It is true that 
Taylor (1993) proposes a rule where the policy interest rate responds to lagged inflation 
and the output gap as opposed to their expected future values. The forward-looking rule 
explained above nests the Taylor rule as a special case; if a linear combination of lagged 
inflation and the output gap is a sufficient statistic for predicting future inflation, then 
Equation (3.8) reduces to the simple Taylor rule. 
The monetary policy rule given by Equation (3.8) may be, however, too limited to 
describe actual changes in the short-term policy rate. It cannot capture the tendency of 
central banks to smooth changes in the interest rate. In order to allow for this behaviour, it 
is assumed that in many earlier studies the actual short-term nominal interest rate ti  adjusts 




tt iii                    (3.9) 
 
where Tti  is given by Equation (3.8), t is a zero-mean exogenous random shock to the 
interest rate, and the coefficient ]1,0[  measures the degree of smoothing in the 
central bank‘s response. Equation (3.9) means that in each period the central bank adjusts 
                                                 
70     This information set contains all past realisations of inflation and the output gap. 
71     As already shown in the previous subsection, this rule can also be derived in a framework where the central 
bank faces a quadratic loss function over inflation and output gap. See, for example, Bernanke and Woodford (1997); 
Svensson (1997); Martin and Milas (2009, 2010); and the references therein. 
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the actual policy rate to eliminate a fraction )1(   of the gap between the current target 
level and its past values. Combining the target model (3.8) with the partial adjustment 




ktt uiyci   )[(             (3.10) 
 
where c  is a constant parameter, i.e. ,ic   and 
 
})]{(}){()[1( tltlttktktt yEyEu     ,t             (3.11) 
 
which is an error term that is the sum of a linear combination of forecast errors of inflation 
and the output gap and a zero-mean exogenous interest rate shock, tv . Equation (3.11) 
implies that forecast errors in curly brackets are orthogonal to the variables considered in 
the information set .t  The notations of other parameters and variables are the same as 
in Equation (3.7). The forward-looking Taylor rule given in Equation (3.10) is now 
expressed in terms of actual values of variables instead of expected values. In practice, 
the central bank policymakers do not respond to the predetermined values of the key 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation and some measure of the output gap, as in the 
standard reaction function like Equation (3.7). Instead, they react to forecasts of those 
values. In this respect, Equation (3.10) is expected to be much more appropriate in 
explaining the central bank‘s behaviour than Equation (3.7). 
 
3.4.3.3  Econometric Estimates 
To examine the degree of smoothness of the observed policy interest rate and to assess the 
nature of actual policy-making in Korea, we can estimate the above rule equations which 
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take a partial adjustment form. For convenience, let us call Equation (3.7) the modified 
standard policy rule model, and Equation (3.10), the forward-looking policy rule model.  
 
A. Data Description 
The data set used here consists of quarterly time series for Korea spanning the period 
1999:q2–2011:q4, covering the period of inflation targeting in Korea72. We employ the 
overnight call rate, headline CPI inflation, and real GDP (seasonally adjusted). The 
actual overnight call rate is the policy interest rate, ti . CPI inflation is measured as the 
rate of change of the CPI )( tP  over the year: .100*)]ln()[ln( 4 ttt PP  Correspond-
ingly, the inflation target T for 1999 and 2000 is 3 and 2.5 percent, respectively, and it 
is 3 percent for each of the years from 2001 to 2011. The output (real GDP) gap ty  is 
measured as 100 times the proportional difference between the logarithm of an ex-post 
measure of actual real GDP and its Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend which was calculated 
by using the smoothing parameter lambda .1600)(   The call rate, real GDP and CPI 
series were obtained from the BOK database (ECOS). 
 
B. The OLS Regression 
In this subsection, we present estimates of the optimal monetary policy rule in (3.7).  
Table 3.5 reports least-squares estimates of the modified Taylor rule in (3.7) for the 
                                                 
72     In order to reflect that the BOK changed its target indicator from core CPI inflation to headline CPI inflation, we 
constructed a hybrid inflation gap, which consists of the core CPI inflation gap for the periods 2000:q1-2006:q4, and the 
headline CPI inflation gap for the period 1999:q3-q4 and for the period 2007:q1-2011:q4 (see Subsection 3.3.2.1 of 
Chapter 3). 
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period of 1999:q2–2011:q4 in quarterly frequency. 73  First of all, the policy rule is 
estimated with only the inflation gap and the output gap as explanatory variables. The 
first row (Model ①) provides estimates of the specification without partial adjustment 
),0(  which has severely serially correlated errors: the Durbin-Watson test shows that 
the absence of serial correlation is rejected. We estimated  = -0.112 and  = 0.339, 
indicating that the regression coefficient on the inflation gap is negative and statistically 
insignificant while that on the output gap is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Next, the policy rule with the lagged variable of interest rate is estimated. The 
difference becomes more remarkable with the partial adjustment specification (Model ②) 
displayed in the second row of Table 3.5. The regression coefficient of   for quarterly 
data is close to 0.8, which confirms a considerably slow adjustment of interest rates in 
practice.
74
 In the same way, we estimated  = 0.05 and  = 0.135, providing that the 
coefficient on the inflation gap is positive but statistically still insignificant while that on 
the output gap is significant at the 1 percent level. For each specification considered, the 
estimate of   is always correctly signed, strongly statistically significant, while the 
estimate of   is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels of 
significance. This is a somewhat weird result in that the central bank does not respond to 
the inflation. All told, the second model has a significantly better fit than the first one, 
even though the estimate of  is not statistically significant. 
 
                                                 
73    Similar estimations are conducted in other empirical studies using US data. See, for example, Sack (1998), 
Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Kozicki (1999), and Rudebusch (2002b).  
74    According to Sack and Wieland (2000), the size of the partial adjustment coefficient in the United States was 
about 0.8 for the period 1980:q1 to 1996:q4. 
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Table 3.5:  Standard Modifided Policy Rules Estimated by OLS, 1999:q2–2011:q4 
 
  c             2R  SEE DW stat. 
Model ①     3.841*** -0.112     0.339*** – 0.15 0.95 0.28 
 (0.137) (0.130) (0.107)     
Model ②     3.392*** 0.050     0.135***    0.812*** 0.94 0.26 1.45 
 (0.714) (0.189) (0.016) (0.033)    
Notes: 1. Asterisks *** denotes significance levels at 1 percent, and ** significance levels at 5 percent. 
2. Figures in parentheses denote coefficient standard errors. 
 
C. The GMM Approach 
Assume that tz  is a vector of instruments within the central bank‘s information set at the 
time policy rate decisions are made, i.e., tt z .  As the elements of tz  contain all past 
realised variables that are potentially useful for making forecasts of inflation and the 
output gap, as well as contemporaneous variables which are not correlated with the 
interest rate shock, tv , Equation (3.10) discussed earlier implies a set of orthogonality 
conditions. More formally, since   0,ttuE z  we have the following orthogonality 
conditions:  
 
  ,0)(1 1   tztltTktt iyciE  ])[(       (3.12) 
 
which gives the prerequisite for estimating the parameter vector },,,{  c , using the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), with an optimal weighing matrix that accounts 
for possible serial correlation in .ut  Since the dimension of the vector tz  is greater than 
the number of parameters being estimated, Equation (3.10) is overidentified, in which 
case it is therefore straightforward to test in order to assess whether the set of instruments 
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used is valid or not (Hansen, 1982)
75
. 
Following previous research, for example, Clarida et al. (1998), Peersman and 
Smets (1998), we take a target horizon of 0l  for the output gap, which means that 
central bank policymakers use current information to get the best estimate of the output 
gap at time .t
76
  The target horizon for inflation, k  is assumed to be 1 through 4 quarters. 
The instrument set contains 1, 2, 3 and 4 lags of variables: inflation gap, the output gap, 
and the call rate which are all available to policymakers.  
Table 3.6 reports GMM estimates of the interest rate rule parameters }~,~,~,
~
{  c  in a 
standard forward-looking rule for Korea. The estimation results provide parameter values 
that are consistent with the results found in the literature (Clarida et al., 1998 and 2000; 
Chadha et al., 2004). The key result is the estimates of the coefficients on inflation, ,  
which are always positively signed, strongly statistically significant, and greater than unity 
except for models ③ and ④. And the estimates of   are also statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. In particular, the estimates of   are greater than those of ,  indicating a 
much stronger weight on inflation than on the output gap in Korea. And the regressive 
parameters of   are around 0.79~0.86, which reconfirms a markedly slow adjustment of 
interest rates as shown in OLS regression. Also, for all of these specifications, the 
overidentifying restrictions pass muster easily, i.e., all the models pass the 
overidentification test provided that the p-value is higher than 5 percent. We cannot 
reject the overidentifying restrictions for all models. Therefore, the Hansen‘s J-test 
                                                 
75     See Chadha et al. (2004) and Clarida et al. (1998) for the interpretation on the results of this test.  
76   The idea behind taking 0l  is that the current output gap contains information about future inflationary 
pressures so that central banks respond to the current output gap. In this case, central banks can be forward-looking 
even when reacting to the current output gap. 
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supports the validity of our specification and the instrument set used in this section. 
Nonetheless, the instruments used may be weak, meaning that they have a low correlation 
with the explanators. Adding a fifth or sixth lag of each variable to the instrument set has 




Table 3.6:  Forward-looking Policy Rules Estimated by GMM, 1999:q2–2011:q4 
 
 Model ③ 
)0( k  
Model ④ 
)1( k  
Model ⑤ 
)2( k  
Model ⑥ 
)3( k  
Model ⑦ 
)4( k  
c      4.013
*** 
(0.110) 




     2.949
*** 
(0.728) 
     3.188
*** 
(0.584) 
     3.428
*** 
(0.673) 
  0.157 
(0.213) 
    0.842
** 
(0.318) 
     1.414
*** 
(0.362) 
     2.093
*** 
(0.369) 
   1.124
** 
(0.555) 




     0.235
*** 
(0.024) 
     0.204
*** 
(0.029) 
     0.088
*** 
(0.019) 
     0.129
*** 
(0.023) 
  –      0.847
*** 
(0.028) 
     0.860
*** 
(0.026) 
     0.830
*** 
(0.025) 
     0.792
*** 
(0.030) 
2R  0.013 0.901 0.903 0.864 0.893 
J-test 
(p-value) 0.244 0.355 0.358 0.487 0.478 
 Notes: 1. The instrument set includes a constant, 1, 2, 3, 4 lags of variables: inflation gap, the output gap, 
and the call rate. 
2. Estimates are obtained by GMM with the optimal weighing matrix obtained from the White  
method. 
3. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
4. Asterisks (***) indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent significance level. 
5. J-test is the test for overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982), which is distributed as 2  under 
the null hypothesis (no overidentification). For this test, only p-values are reported. 
 
3.4.4  Why do Central Banks Smooth Interest-rates? 
 
While the modification approaches taking into account a partial adjustment term 
discussed above can explain some portion of interest-rate smoothing, they do not explain 
                                                 
77    In order to check for possible presence of weak instruments, we performed an F-test applied to the first-stage 
regression: the results confirm that the instruments used are relevant: for the model ⑦, F-statistic = 32.1, with a p-value = 
0.047. The  F-tests for the remaining models yield similar results which are not reported here. 
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sufficiently enough the observed autocorrelation of policy interest-rate movements. As 
Debelle and Cagliarini (2000) stated, such modifications are also somewhat 
unsatisfactory since they are ad hoc.  
In the real world, it is no wonder that central bank policymakers consider the current 
values of macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and real output, as well as their 
evolving behaviour in formulating current and future policy choices. Macroeconomic 
variables, however, respond to monetary policy with a considerable lag and show a strong 
serial correlation, so that smoother path in the key policy rate might be expected to some 
extent even in the absence of an interest-rate smoothing incentive (Sack, 2000). 
Consequently, more explicit identification and explanations for the smoothing 
pattern of interest-rate movements are needed. Indeed, a number of possible explanations 
for the observed smoothness of policy interest rates were suggested. It is sometimes 
argued that central banks‘ behaviour in moving policy interest rates in a gradual and 
predictable way reflects to a large extent the optimal response to various shocks and the 
dynamic behaviour of the macroeconomic variables. 
In this subsection, we briefly discuss four strands of argument to explain why the 




The first argument for interest-rate smoothing is based on the effect of the short-term 
interest rates on the aggregate demand through the effects on long-term interest rates. 
Insight into why gradual target adjustments of limited size in the same direction may be 
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optimal for central banks is initially provided by Goodfriend (1991), and also endorsed 
by Rudebusch (1995). This argument is refined by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) 
and by Woodford (2000 and 2003b). Goodfriend (1991) argues that prices and real 
output respond to changes in long-term interest rates rather than to daily fluctuations in 
the short-term policy rates. Central banks attempt to attain their stabilisation goals by 
targeting their policy instrument rate so as to affect long-term market rates. Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1997) give an explanation for interest-rate smoothing: their idea is that 
inertial monetary policy allows central banks to affect the long-term interest rate, and 
hence aggregate demand, with more modest movements in the short-term rates than 
would otherwise be needed. This kind of adjustment rule is thus desirable because 
central banks may want to avoid excessive fluctuations in short-term interest rates. In 
the same context, Woodford (2000 and 2003b) argues that policy inertia makes the 
future path of short-term interest rates more predictable and thus increases 
effectiveness in policy-making.  
If central banks‘ policy shows a high degree of persistence, and thus their 
reputation for moving policy instruments in a gradual manner is established and intact, 
a forward-looking private sector will anticipate a small change in the short-term 
interest rate to be followed by further adjustments without reversing direction for some 
time. If such expectations are well formulated, then central banks can achieve their 
goals to stabilise inflation and output without excessive volatility in short-term interest 
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Financial (Market) Stability 
A second explanation relies on the fact that a gradual policy move may reduce risks to 
financial market stability. Some researchers argue that a pattern of gradual adjustment 
reflects the attention that central banks pay to promoting financial stability. Cukierman 
(1991) shows that when commercial banks pay a flexible interest rate on deposits while  
receiving fixed payments for loans, high volatility in interest rates may trigger bank 
failures since their liabilities may exceed their available assets. Therefore, gradual moves 
of the short-term policy rate by the central bank allow commercial banks to adjust 
smoothly to changes in the costs of short-term funding, thus leading to the increasing 
stability of bank profits. Slow adjustment of short-term rates can reduce financial stress 
for businesses with a great need for short-term financing as well. In the same context, 
Sinclair (2000) argues that sharp and large changes in short nominal interest rates may 
add to uncertainties in financial markets. In particular, when policy is delayed, the 
magnitude and duration of the alterations in short nominal rates are greater than would 
otherwise be the case. In this case, interest rate swings tend to increase the likelihood of 
business failures, and subsequently bring about a negative impact on the balance sheets 
of banks in periods of a credit crunch. This is because a low degree of interest-rate 
smoothness may cause excess volatility in financial markets. In contrast to this case, 
timely and modest adjustments in interest rates can contribute significantly to long-run 
financial market stability. 
More specifically, Bernanke (2004) points out that central banks choose to alter 
interest rates moderately to avoid the risk of shocking the bond market. Sharp changes in 
the short-term policy rate and the resulting large movements in long-term rates due to their 
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implications for private-sector expectations about the future path of short-term rates may 
risk generating wide swings in bond prices and thereby potentially large capital gains or 
losses for bondholders. As a consequence, they can pose high risks for financial sectors 
such as banks and other financial institutions that hold bonds, further increasing financial 
market volatility. Hence, in order to keep financial markets orderly and well-functioning, 
other things being equal, central banks tend to come to choose policies that preclude undue 




The Central Bank’s Reputation 
This explanation states that frequent changes in the direction of interest rates make 
central bank policymakers look poorly-informed, accordingly lowering their credibility. 
Caplin and Leahy (1997) emphasise that if the central bank lacks credibility, frequent 
reversals in interest rates could further undermine confidence in it. Goodhart (1999a) also 
argues that central bankers do not like to take the risk of making reversals in interest rates, 
which he relates to the difficulty of explaining to outside observers why the monetary 
policy stance is determined by something approaching a so-called random walk.
79
 Given 
the random walk nature of news about inflation and output, there is a considerable 
chance that an interest rate change that is optimal today will have to be reversed 
tomorrow (Eijffinger et al., 1999). This might give the public the impression that the 
central bank is badly-informed as to the relevant policy directions, thereby provoking 
                                                 
78    Nevertheless, Bernanke (2004) states that even if the financial-stability argument has some merit, the case is 
not as straightforward as it may seem at first: a problem with the argument is that policy gradualism does not 
necessarily insulate bondholders from capital gains and losses. 
79    Lowe and Ellis (1997) state that a smoother interest rate path is easier for the central bank to explain to the 
wider public. 
  
  Page | 111 
criticism. Therefore, policymakers may avoid large swings in interest rates in response to 




The most persuasive argument for why central banks choose a more gradual path of 
interest rates than theory would predict is that monetary policy decisions are undertaken 
in a largely uncertain environment. Uncertainty about the current state and the structure 
of the economy can lead to slower response of the interest rate to current or future shocks. 
Notwithstanding the progress in macroeconomic modelling, developments in economic 
conditions and especially in the highly integrated global environment, pose difficulties 
for central banks‘ policy-making. As Goodhart (1999a) points out, the uncertainty that 
central banks face in practice is so complicated and pervasive that it cannot be expressed 
by the additive error terms alone in standard models. 
A large number of existing papers have argued that monetary policy gradualism 
may be justified if there are various uncertainties over the key relationships between 
involved variables and/or relevant economic data
80
. Highlighting the significance of 
uncertainty as a rationale for gradual adjustment in setting the policy rate, Bernanke 
(2004) remarks that: 
Many central bankers and researchers have pointed to the pervasive 
uncertainty associated with analysing and forecasting the economy as a reason 
for central banks‘ caution in adjusting policy. Because policymakers cannot be 
                                                 
80     See, for example, Goodhart (1999a), Sack (2000), Martin and Salmon (1999), and others. 
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sure about the underlying structure of the economy or the effects that their 
actions will have on economic outcomes, and because new information about 
the economic situation arrives continually, the case for policymakers to move 
slowly and cautiously when changing rates seems intuitive. 
 
To sum up, in a variable and uncertain world, monetary policymakers do not know 
the exact impact that policy changes will have on inflation and real economic activity. 
And, it is difficult for them to assess with precision the current state of the economy (data 
uncertainty). Moreover, they do not know the true structure of the economy perfectly 
(parameter or model uncertainty). 
 
3.5   Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with some stylised facts in policy rate adjustment practices and has 
attempted to present the empirical evidence that gradual adjustment behaviour exists for 
the policy interest rates in Korea.  
As in the advanced countries, some salient features in the policy interest rate path 
have appeared in Korea: (i) infrequent moves in the policy interest rate; (ii) successive 
changes of the interest rate in the same direction; (iii) asymmetric adjustments in terms of 
the size of interest-rate changes for continuation and reversal periods; and (iv) a long 
pause before reversals of the policy interest rate. These patterns are referred to as 
‗interest-rate smoothing‘, which is regarded as an appropriate result for developments in 
macro-economic conditions, particularly in the highly integrated global environment, 
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where central bank policymakers inevitably have great difficulty in setting the policy 
interest rate. 
As a result of estimation of policy reaction rule equations using the OLS and GMM 
techniques, the regression coefficients of partial adjustment term, the lagged interest rate 
variable turns out to be around 0.80~0.86, indicating a considerably slow adjustment of 
the interest rate for quarterly data in practice in Korea. Likewise, we found that the 
modification approaches having a partial adjustment term as a third argument in the 
policy reaction function could explain interest-rate smoothing to some extent. As shown 
in Subsection 3.4.3, monetary policy rules augmented with a partial adjustment term can 
be optimal at conducting monetary policy.  
It seems, however, that such augmented policy rules are not in themselves sufficient 
to explain the autocorrelation of policy interest rate movements. For this reason, we 
attempted to investigate more explanations for the smoothing movements. Some degree 
of interest-rate smoothing may be desirable or optimal. Central bank policymakers could 
deviate from the equilibrium interest rate randomly, or set their policy instruments such  
that there was the same probability of the next adjustment being up or down. But this sort 
of policy choice is not likely to be optimal. Rather, optimal policy might lead to 
systematically positive autocorrelations in changes of the key policy rate. 
The arguments surveyed in this chapter to explain the reasons why the observed 
degree of interest-rate smoothing may be optimal behaviour on the part of central banks are: 
(i) enhancing central banks‘ policy effectiveness; (ii) maintaining financial (market) 
stability; (iii) safeguarding the central bank‘s credibility and reputation; and (iv) central 
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banks‘ confronting uncertainty in conducting monetary policy. In this way, central banks‘ 
smoothing of policy interest rates may be optimal behaviour for a variety of reasons, not 
least of which is that monetary policy is conducted in a largely uncertain world. When 
formulating the policy strategy and choosing interest-rate levels, central bank policymakers 
are always confronted with considerable uncertainty regarding the evolution of economic 
activity. Furthermore, they may be uncertain about the effect of their policy actions on the 
ultimate goal variables such as inflation and real output. 
In this chapter, we showed that the degree of interest-rate smoothing can be optimal 
through theoretical derivation of policy reaction function with a partial adjustment term. 
Yet, the task of thoroughly assessing whether or not the interest-rate smoothing seen in 
actual policy-making is optimal lies beyond the scope of this chapter. The impact of 
uncertainty on the operation of monetary policy in Korea, and the optimal interest rate 
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Chapter 4  
Monetary Policy under Parameter Uncertainty 
in Korea: a VAR Approach 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
Diverse uncertainties are rife in the economy, and thus they influence the behaviour of 
monetary policymakers. Economic conditions have a tendency to change over time in 
response to various external shocks. Accordingly, there are a lot of difficulties in 
conducting efficient monetary policy.  Even though policymakers try to reduce economic 
instability in the face of uncertainty, it is impossible for them to cope with it immediately 
and completely. The econometric models central banks rely on have a limitation in 
reflecting the actual economy‘s dynamics sufficiently as well as forecasting the 
movements of key economic variables exactly. After all, the presence of uncertainty 
shortens the scope of policy choices that policymakers can make in the real economy. 
During the early 1960s, a number of studies on the effect of uncertainty on 
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monetary policy were conducted. However, such studies have not received much 
attention, because they assume there is solely additive uncertainty under which the 
certainty equivalence principle holds. Unlike additive uncertainty, multiplicative 
uncertainty is known to affect the process of optimal policy-making. According to the 
existing literature, under additive uncertainty, the policymakers can achieve the objective 
of the central bank by setting their interest rates in an active fashion. In contrast, 
multiplicative uncertainty such as parameter uncertainty, which is the uncertainty on the 
monetary transmission mechanism, induces the policymakers to prefer conservative 
monetary policy reaction when deciding the interest rate instrument. 
In formulating monetary policy, it is very important that central banks should take 
into consideration uncertainty coming from diverse matters related to the evolving 
economic situations. According to the Brainard conservatism principle (BCP) discussed in 
Chapter 2, the central bank ought to exhibit more conservative behaviour in its formulation 
of policy in the presence of multiplicative uncertainty. This tendency can be found in the 
adjustment of policy interest rates in the US and other major developed countries. For 
instance, the US Federal Funds rate has been adjusted gradually and cautiously. This fact 
implies that the Fed‘s interest rate policy poses a timid pattern of movements, compared to 
that derived under the absence of uncertainty. This feature tends to be notable especially 
when policy rates need to be adjusted in the opposite direction. 
As already explained in Chapter 3, an inflation targeting (IT) regime in Korea was 
adopted in the aftermath of the Korean currency crisis of 1997–1998.  As a result, the 
Bank of Korea (BOK) shifted the instrument of monetary policy from monetary 
aggregates to interest rates. The BOK has historically carried out monetary policy 
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adjustments in a gradual fashion. Indeed, the BOK is judged to have kept a conservative 
posture in moving the Bank of Korea Base Rate, the equivalent of the US Federal Funds 
rate target, since the implementation of interest rate-oriented monetary policy. However, 
there is a lack of research supporting this finding concerning the movements in policy 
interest rates under uncertainty in Korea.  
The objectives of this chapter are threefold: the first objective is to investigate 
whether gradual movements in policy rates (conservatism) can be explained quite a few by 
the existence of parameter uncertainty even in the absence of the interest-rate smoothing 
motive in the central bank‘s objective function. The focus on the conservatism might be 
justified by the attempt of explaining interest-rate smoothing behaviour by the central bank; 
the second one is to examine the effect of parameter uncertainty upon monetary policy in 
Korea. As discussed in the literature review, it is often accepted that it is desirable to adjust 
policy instruments gradually in the presence of uncertainty; and the last is to assess the role 
of actual monetary policy conducted by the BOK in an uncertain environment since the 
adoption of inflation targeting in the late 1990s.  
The main findings of this chapter are: firstly, uncertainty can provide a rationale for 
the central bank to smooth its policy interest rates in Korea. In particular, since the 
introduction of an interest rate-oriented monetary policy in the late 1990s, the actual policy 
rate (say, the call money rate) has shown similar movements of the optimal rate under 
parameter uncertainty. Therefore, the analysis result suggests that monetary policy has 
been implemented in a similar fashion to the optimal policy derived under the assumption 
that such uncertainty exists; secondly, in the absence of parameter uncertainty, the 
calculated optimal policy rule responds more actively to changes in the economy than the 
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actual policy rule, leading to higher fluctuations in policy rates than the actual rule; and 
thirdly, gradual movements in the policy rates do not necessarily mean that the central 
bank has an objective function with an explicit interest-rate smoothing incentive. 
Uncertainty and the dynamic structure of the economy can account for a considerable 
portion of the observed gradual movements of interest rate. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the theory and 
methodology employed for analysis on the optimal monetary policy rules under additive and 
parameter uncertainty. The model used here for solving dynamic programming problems is 
almost identical to the framework used by Sack (2000), taking a vector-autoregressive (VAR) 
model of the economy and deriving the optimal rules under alternative assumptions as to the 
presence of uncertainty. Section 4.3 describes the data for empirical analysis, and provides 
some empirical issues such as the VAR model identification and policymakers‘ preference 
weights. In particular, this section expounds identifying restrictions on the VAR model. The 
VAR identification for the conduct of impulse response analyses follows the structural VAR 
model, not the unrestricted VAR. Section 4.4 sets out empirical results. This section 
compares optimal policy rules under different uncertainties, and then shows the impulse 
responses of policy interest rates to economic shocks in the presence of uncertainties for the 
Korean economy. Lastly, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter and draws out possible 
implications for monetary policy in Korea. 
 
4.2  Theory and Methodology 
This section discusses the consequences of parameter uncertainty for optimal monetary 
policy in an inflation targeting framework in a closed economy by employing a stylised 
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model in the literature (Svensson, 1997 and 1999a; Rudebusch and Svensson, 2002; 
Rudebusch, 2001 and 2005). 
 
4.2.1 Parameter Uncertainty under Inflation Targeting: a Static One- 
          period Problem 
4.2.1.1  The Structure of the Economy 
First of all, prior to examining how parameter uncertainty has an impact on monetary 
policy, let us consider the following two equations: a backward-looking Phillips curve 








tttt ryy                    (4.2) 
 
where autoregressive coefficients   and   fulfill ,1,0    and the parameters   and 
  are positive. And the error terms 
s
t  and 
d
t  are i.i.d. innovations with the means 
zeros and variances 
2
  and 
2
 , respectively. All variables are expressed in percentage 
deviations from their steady-state values.  It is assumed that the inflation gap and the 
output gap at equilibrium state (say, the targets for the inflation gap and the output gap, 
respectively) are normalised to zero, and so is the equilibrium real interest rate.
81
  In 
Equation (4.2), therefore, the real interest rate gap, tr , is just defined as the subtraction 
of equilibrium real interest rate from the difference between the short-term nominal 
                                                 
81     The equilibrium real interest rate, nr  is defined as the rate consistent with the output being at the natural rate 
and inflation being at its target. 
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interest rate, ti  (i.e., the central bank‘s policy instrument) and expected inflation over the 
,1t 1ttE  by the Fisher identity, i.e., .1 tttt Eir   This term is a simple 
representation of the monetary policy transmission mechanism
82
 for the central bank 
(Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999). 
In fact, both equations are fairly general models in the literature: Equation (4.1) 
assumes that inflation depends on the lagged values of inflation and the output gap, and  
(additive) supply shocks, st ; and Equation (4.2) assumes that the output gap is affected 
by the lagged output gap, the real interest rate and (additive) demand shocks, .dt  
For simplification of the discussion, following Martin and Salmon (1999), assume 
.0  And, then eliminating the output gap, ty , in Equation (4.1) and (4.2) gives: 
 
,11 tttt ubr            (4.3) 
 
where 0 b  and .1 tttu     Equation (4.3) gives the basic reduced-form 
process for inflation. The last additive term, ,tu  assumed to obey i.i.d. with zero mean 
and variance, 
2
uσ , is interpreted as contemporary shocks confronted by central bank 
policymakers. But they do not observe those shocks. In Equation (4.3), the parameter 
0  measures the inflation persistence, and the parameter 0b  captures the policy 
multiplier effect in the model. 
The central bank chooses the nominal interest rate, ti , with the aim of attaining the 
inflation target.  To do so, it needs to compute the desired monetary policy stance and the 
                                                 
82     The interest rate channel is the key monetary policy transmission mechanism in the basic Keynesian model. Of 
course, there are a variety of channels relating to movements in asset prices such as exchange rates, real estate prices, 
and the so-called credit channel (Mishkin, 1995). 
  
  Page | 121 
associated expectation of inflation. Assume that the central bank knows with certainty 
the parameter values (  and )b  describing the relationship between variables in the 
economy. The optimal rule for real interest rates in response to deviations of inflation 










         (4.4) 
 
This policy rule is certainty-equivalent optimal reaction function in an economy with no 
uncertainty about additive shocks. To understand the dynamic path of the real interest 
rate in this model and its implications, it is worth finding the equilibrium process for 
inflation. This can be obtained by plugging (4.4) into (4.3) to yield: 
 
.tt u                  (4.5) 
 
Equation (4.5) is the inflation process for the central bank‘s desired path for the real 
interest rate. This equation implies that inflation is driven solely by the new shock in 
each period. Given this equilibrium inflation process, the corresponding desired path for 








                      (4.6) 
 
In practice, the central bank moves the nominal interest rate to achieve its policy 
                                                 




1 )(min   tttttt ubrEE 
 
Taking the partial derivative with respect to 
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objective. Given the desired path of the real interest rate, the policymaker sets the 










          (4.7) 
 
Notice that since 011   tttt uEE  under additive uncertainty, inflation expectations at 
time t  are zero. Therefore, the nominal interest rate is equal to the real rate, implying that 
the nominal interest rate moves only in response to the shock. 
Following this rule, the central bank could accurately offset the impact of external 
shocks upon inflation. Hence, the next period‘s inflation expectation at time t  would 
always be the same as its target. 
In this simple model, parameter uncertainty arises when policymakers do not know 
how changes in one variable are supposed to affect another. Assume that the central bank 
knows the functional form of the economy, but does not know the magnitude of policy 
multiplier, b . Then, he will be uncertain how changes in real interest rates would have 
an impact on inflation through movements in the output gap. The effect of parameter 
uncertainty on monetary policy will be discussed below. 
 
4.2.1.2  The Central Bank’s Objective Function and Optimal Policy 
Following Svensson (1997 and 1999a), consider the simple version of the inflation 
targeting problem. Inflation targeting is interpreted as monetary policy conducted by 
central banks with a long-run inflation target, and in the short-run central banks want to 
reduce inflation variability around the long-run inflation target; inflation rate stabilisation 
is only one goal in the objective function. But, inflation targeting may in practice be 
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understood by central banks as involving additional goals such as output or employment 
stabilisation.  Suppose the central bank faces the following intertemporal optimisation 
problem; the central bank‘s objective is to minimise the expected discounted sum of 
future value of a loss function, which is quadratic in the inflation gap and the output gap 
deviations from their respective targets subject to the constraint as implied by Equation 




















tt yyL               (4.9) 
 
where )·(tE  represents expectations conditional on the set of all relevant information 
)( CBt  available to the central bank at time t . The parameter,  , is the central bank‘s 
relevant discount factor satisfying .10    t  and 
T  are the inflation rate gap at time 
t  and the inflation gap target, respectively (normally, T  is assumed to be 0).  And, ty  is 
the output gap defined as the difference between the level of actual output and its 
potential, estimated under the assumption of full utilisation of resources and 
Ty  is its 
target (normally, assumed to be 0).  The parameter,  , with a positive value denotes the 
subjective weight assigned to stabilising the output-gap relative to stabilising inflation
84
. 
Therefore, parameters (1,  ) for each goal variable reflect the central bank‘s preferences.  
As defined in Svensson (1999a), a ―strict‖ inflation targeting refers to the case where 
                                                 
84     Note that   is a parameter which determines the degree of flexibility in inflation targeting. Therefore, when 
0 , the central banker is a strict inflation targeter. 
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only the inflation goal enters the loss function, which implies that ,0  while a 
―flexible‖ IT allows other goal variables, that is, 0 . 
It is assumed that policymakers do not know the exact values of parameters in 
Equation (4.3), but they know means )(E  and ),(bE  and variances )(Var  and 
)(bVar  of the parameters.  Hence, the policymakers determine the policy choices based 
on a prior belief about the probability distribution of parameters   and b . To examine 
how uncertainty about the parameter b  influences the monetary policy stance, however, 




bbN  , tu ~
),0( 2uN  , and ,0),(  b
bbCov  
 where 
b  is the correlation coefficient and   
and b  are standard deviations of parameters   and b , respectively. The problem in 
this kind of multi-period model can be solved using the dynamic programming method. 
But, following Svensson (1997 and 1999a), the solution to this simple case can be 
obtained by solving a sequence of one-period problems
85
 where the central bank‘s 















1+ ttttt yλπVarπE                      (4.11) 
 
In turn, this equation implies that the policymaker cares about the variance of inflation 
                                                 
85    According to Svensson (1997, p. 1117), the multi-period problem reduces to a sequence of one-period 
problems where the current period‘s interest rate is assigned to returning the next period‘s inflation rate to the target. In 
other words, as the interest rate affects the inflation rate with a one-period lag, 
tr
 will have an impact on the inflation 
rate only in period ,1t ,2t  …, and 1tr  will influence the inflation rate only in period ,2t ,3t  …, and so on. Hence, 
the central bank can find the optimal interest rate in period t  as the solution to the simple period-by-period problem. 
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(uncertainty about future inflation) as well as the bias in inflation (expected deviations of 
future inflation from its target, T ) 86 . For simplification, assume ,0  i.e., that a 
central banker is a strict inflation targeter (one-target and one-instrument case). And 










α1tt ++=)( +  Equation (4.11) can be 















tt +++][          (4.12) 
 
Then, the optimal policy rate in the presence of parameter uncertainty, ,opr  which 













             (4.13) 
 
Equation (4.13) implies that as the degree of uncertainty about a parameter b  increases, 
the central bank should react less vigorously to the policy instrument relative to the case 
where there is no parameter uncertainty. This result reflects Brainard‘s insight that the 
optimal policy reaction should take account of the uncertainty about policy multiplier in 
the transmission mechanism. 
Throughout the chapter, it is important to note that the objective function does not 
include any explicit reason to smooth interest rates, since the purpose of this research is 
to examine whether gradual adjustment in interest rates can be explained even in the 
absence of the assumption that the central bank prefers to act less aggressively. 
                                                 
86    This is a result of Jensen‘s inequality, which implies that the expected squared value of a variable equals the 
square of the bias plus the variance: )()]([)( 22 xVarxExE  . 
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4.2.2  The Optimal Policy Rules under Parameter Uncertainty: a Dynamic 
           Multi-period Problem 
The models we set up here follow Sack (2000) who, by using a VAR, incorporates 
initially additive uncertainty, and then parameter uncertainty into the optimisation 
problem. The heart of this approach is to allow interest rates to have an influence on the 
economy over a number of periods under uncertainty, and to calculate the variance-
covariance matrix for the coefficients indicating the extent of parameter uncertainty. 
 
4.2.2.1  The VAR Model 
The static one-period case we discussed in Subsection 4.2.1 is a simple model 
comprising inflation and interest rate variables. In a VAR, we model an n -vector of 
endogenous variables including inflation, which follows a linear autoregressive process 
with q  lags. Correspondingly, this approach reflects uncertainty about more parameters 
than the simple model discussed in the previous subsection.  
In order to answer the question of how the central bank conducts monetary policy in 
the face of uncertainty, first of all, suppose that the economy can be described by the 







∑              (4.14) 
 
where boldface letters are used to denote vectors or matrices of variables or coefficients, 
and the subscript q  is the number of lags in the VAR system. tY  is an )1( n  vector of 
the state variables predetermined at time t . Assume, for example that the state vector is 
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given by ,],,
'
[ tttt iy Y  in which each element corresponds to the output gap, the rate of 
inflation and policy interest rates, respectively. 0B  is an )( nn  coefficient matrix which 
tells us how the endogenous variables are contemporaneously linked to each other. The 
identification of this matrix allows us to understand the relation between the structural 
and reduced form of VAR. iΓ  is an )( nn  coefficient matrix for the lagged variables. 
And, tμ  is an )1( n  vector of i.i.d. ),0( IN  correlated structural shocks. C  denotes an 
)1( n  vector containing all the deterministic components (if any). D  is an )( nn  
matrix that contains zeros except for the main diagonal elements with ones.  
Unfortunately, we cannot estimate this system of equations directly due to 
identification issues, but it is possible to transform this system into a reduced-form 












 0  ,
1
i0i ΓBΦ
  and  .tt DμBe 0
-1=  Q  is an )1( n  vector of deterministic 
components. An additive term te  is a reduced-form VAR pure innovation vector (i.i.d. 
),0( N ). Now we can estimate the random stochastic residuals t0 DB
1  from the 
mutually uncorrelated regression residual te  of the reduced form of VAR.  
Correct identification of the structural model (4.14) gives n  structural equations 
with the additive vector tμ  of disturbances to the VAR system. That is, we get the first 
1n  equations describing the dynamic structure of the economy. Given this estimated 
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dynamic behaviour of the non-policy variables, we can estimate the n-th equation, the 
policy reaction function that shows how the optimal path of policy rate depends on 
current and lagged non-policy variables and lagged policy variables, as well as on 
additive shocks. 
 
4.2.2.2  Calculation of Optimal Policy Rules with Additive Uncertainty 
The central bank‘s objective function, for simplicity, can be rewritten in a quadratic 
matrix form in the state and control variables. The fully-specified linear-quadratic control 























   ,10                   (4.16) 
 
where )·(tE  denotes the expected value operator conditional on time t  information; 
*
X  
is a vector which is composed of the targets of the state variables; and the symmetric 
matrix R  represents a weight that the central bank places on each state variable and 
contains zeros except for the diagonal elements corresponding to the contemporaneous 
output gap and inflation rate. That is, R  summarises the preferences of the policymaker 
by assigning weights to each policy objective. 
To solve the dynamic programming problem, let ;...,,,[ 1 q-tttt yyy X ;...,,, 1 qttt    
]'...,,1 qtt ii   be the vector of predetermined state variables at time t . This vector set includes 
all current and lagged values of the non-policy variables and lagged values of the policy 
interest rates. Then, the state-space representation of the economy is given by: 
 
.i 1ttt1t ++ +++= ξJBAXX       (4.17) 
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In Equation (4.17), which is called a transition equation, the linear dynamics of the state 
variable vector are determined by the matrix A  and the vectors B  and ,J  whose 
elements are comprised of the point estimates of the coefficients from the VAR model 
described above. More specifically, the matrix A  denotes the dynamic structure of the 
model and the vector B  describes how the economy responds to the policy instrument. 
Uncertainty is embedded in the form of an additive vector 1t+ξ . In the analysis under 
additive uncertainty, policymakers are assumed to know for sure the dynamic structure of 
the economy, to such an extent that they regard the point estimates obtained from the 
VAR estimation as being the ―true‖ parameters. Therefore, when incorporating additive 
uncertainty into the model, certainty equivalence holds. 
Let  )( tV X  denote the value function at time .t  The optimal policy of the central 














XXXRXXX               (4.18) 
                               subject to   .i 1ttt1t ++ +++= ξJBAXX   
 
where some notations are repeated here for convenience: R  is an )( nn  symmetric 
matrix of a weight of the state variables; tX  an )1( n  vector of the state variable; ti  a 
)1( k  vector of the control variable; A  an )( nn  matrix; B  an )( kn  matrix; J  an 
)1( n  vector of constants; and  1t+ξ   an )1( n  vector of random shocks.   
We know that since the objective function is quadratic and the constraint is linear, 
                                                 
87    See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), Chapter 4 of ―Recursive Macroeconomic Theory‖; and Sack (2000) for the 
methods solving this Bellman equation of dynamic programming. 
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the value function will be of the form: 
 
,2)( dV ttt  XPXXX t       (4.19) 
 
where P  is a symmetric matrix,   is a vector and d  is a scalar, all of them yet to be 
determined.  In particular, since P  is idempotent, PP  . 
For the sake of simplicity, we drop the time subscripts. In all cases, X  and i  refer to 
time t  dated variables. Then, substituting the form of the value function (4.19) into the 













































   (4.20) 




















































































X           (4.21) 
 
The expected value of stochastic shocks is zero so terms of the form ξ'' PAX , PBi  , 
PJ  , PAX , PBi , PJ ,  P  and   drop out. We are left with: 
 
  





































































X                   (4.22) 
which gives the necessary first-order condition for the minimisation problem with respect 
to i  as88: 
 








           (4.23) 
 
Solving the above equation in terms of i  yields the following policy reaction function: 
 
),()( 1 BPJBPAXBPBB  ai    (4.24) 
 
which implies that the solution to this problem under additive uncertainty is a linear 
function of the state variable X . 
More succinctly, we have: 
 
 ZFX ai              (4.25) 
 
where the matrix  ,PABPB)BF  1(  and  .( 1 BPJBPB)BZ     Economically, 
this policy reaction function is independent of the stochastic shocks t . 
Substituting the optimal policy rule (4.25) back into the right side of Equation (4.20), 
we obtain: 
                                                 
88    Use the rules ,/,2/ BzyBzyAxxAxx  ,/ yBzBzy   and note also the fact that P  is a symmetric 
matrix. See, for example, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000). 
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       (4.26)   
 
Rearranging Equation (4.26), thus the matrix P  is determined by the following equation: 
 
.PABPBBPBAPAARP  1)(             (4.27) 
 
And the vector   satisfies: 
 
].))(([)])(([ 1*11 JPBPBBBIPARXBPBBPBIAI           (4.28) 
 
Equation (4.25) illustrates the well-known result that in a linear-quadratic 
framework the optimal feedback rule is linear in the state variables. The feedback 
parameters can be obtained from (4.25) by iterating on Equation (4.27). Moreover, 
Equation (4.25) implies that the optimal policy rate is a function of all current and lagged 
values of the non-policy variables and lagged values of the policy rates. In this regard, 
the derived optimal policy rule here is less restrictive than the Taylor-type rules in which 
the policy rates are commonly constructed to respond only to the current inflation 
deviations from its target and the output gap, or the lagged interest rate which captures 
the interest-rate smoothing. 
The optimal policy will not be affected by additive uncertainty – the certainty 
equivalence principle holds as the objective function is assumed to be a quadratic form. 
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4.2.2.3  Calculation of Optimal Policy Rules with Parameter Uncertainty. 
In the economy where there is only additive uncertainty, the policy choices are assumed 
to be independent of the variances of target variables; accordingly, the optimal policy 
focuses solely on minimising squared deviations of expected target variables from their 
respective target levels. Contrary to the case of additive uncertainty, however, the 
optimal policy with parameter uncertainty considers the information given by the 
variance-covariance matrix of the estimated VAR coefficients. By using the variance-
covariance matrix, we can measure the parameter uncertainty generating from estimates 
of the model. Under the assumption that the dynamic structure of the economy is 
invariant over the sample, we can analyse its effect on optimal policy. 
In order to investigate the effect of parameter uncertainty on the optimal policy, we 
first show how parameter uncertainty has an impact on the state variables. Due to the 
complexity of the optimisation problem in the presence of uncertainty about the dynamic 
evolution of the state variable, we need to simplify the problem. To this end, Sack (2000) 
replaced the state variable vector tX  with the predicted values of the state variables given 
all information available at time ,1t  that is, ].[ˆ 1 ttt E XX   This restriction implies that 
the central bank cannot respond to contemporaneous shocks to the non-policy variables. 
This assumption is probably adequate: when policymakers choose the key policy rate, they 
do not know the true values of the state variables, rather, they use forecasts. 
Under this assumption, the path of the new state variable is identical to that in the 
case of only additive uncertainty, except replacing tX  with tXˆ . That is, the law of 
motion will be given by Equation (4.29), repeated here for convenience: 
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,ˆˆ 11   tttt i J BX AX        (4.29) 
 
where ][ˆ 1 ttt E XX  . As in the additive case, the matrix ,A  and the vectors B  and J  
determine the path of the expected state variable vector, consisting of the point estimates 
obtained from the VAR model estimation. 
As in the simple case under parameter uncertainty discussed in Subsection 4.2.1, the 
per-period loss function is affected both by the squared deviations of expected state 
variables from their targets and by the conditional variances of targeted variables.
89
  This 
is because, in the presence of parameter uncertainty, the variances of target variables will 
affect the policy choice. Therefore, the solution to the optimisation problem faced by the 












XNXXMXXXRXXX       (4.30) 
      subject to   .ˆˆ 11   tttt i J BX AX   
 
It is important to note that the above loss function is decomposed into two terms: the first 
term, )ˆ()ˆ( ** XXRXX  tt  is the weighted sum of the squared values of the expected 
deviations of the state variables from the targets; and the second term, )ˆ2ˆˆ( NXXMX ttt   
is the weighted sum of the conditional variance of the targeted variables. This second 
term captures the effect of parameter uncertainty, accounting for the variances of the 
targeted variables arising from the setting of the central bank‘s policy rate. The matrix 
                                                 










VarE where   is the expected 
inflation and the variance is conditional on the information available at time t . 
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M  is defined as ,1y   where )1,(  is the weight that the central bank places on the 
goal variables in the policy objective function, and y  denotes the variance-covariance 
matrix of the coefficients on the state variable in the output gap equation. And, the matrix 
N  is the weighted sum of covariance vector of the state variables with the estimated 
constant in each equation. 
As seen in Equation (4.25), the solution to this optimisation problem, seeking the 
optimal interest rate path (
p
ti ) in the presence of parameter uncertainty is given by a 
linear function of the new state variable ( tXˆ ), such that: 
 
).ˆ()( 1 BPJBXPABPBB   t
p








.]))(([)])(([ 1*11 JPBPBBBIPANXRBPBBPBIAI         (4.33) 
 
The optimal policy under parameter uncertainty takes the same form of the path (
a
ti ) 
under additive uncertainty. However, the presence of the matrices M  in Equation (4.32) 
and N  in Equation (4.33) highlights the difference in the two problems. Both matrices 
now depend on both estimates from the VAR and the variance-covariance matrices of the 
estimated coefficients from Equation (4.15). 
 
4.3   Data and Some Empirical Issues 
 
4.3.1    Data 
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In this chapter, quarterly data for Korea are used. The choice of this frequency rather 
than the monthly one does not reduce the study relevance, under the condition that the 
Bank of Korea attempts to attain a medium-term objective of price stability
90
, and 
output data is compiled on a quarterly basis. The data is collected from the BOK 
database (ECOS) for the second quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2011.  In fact, 
an inflation targeting policy in Korea started in April 1998. Nevertheless, the reason 
we use data from the second quarter of 1999 is that in Korea a specific figure for the 
overnight noncollateralised call rate, an equivalent of the US Federal Funds rate, 
began to be used as a target from May 1999 onwards.
91
   
Three macroeconomic variables, the inflation rate gap, the output (real GDP) gap 
and policy interest rates, are analysed in this chapter. The first two variables are 
included as non-policy variables in the VAR. Both variables are represented as 
deviations of actual values from their desired levels. More specifically, the inflation 
gap is measured by )( Tt ππ - , where t  is the CPI inflation rate, compared with the 
same period of the previous year, as a percentage, and Tπ  is the target for annual 
inflation rate. The inflation target is announced by the Bank of Korea at the beginning 
of every three year period, so that they can be time-varying rather than fixed as 
assumed in the theoretical literature. The output gap, ty , is defined as the percentage 
deviations of the level of real GDP (seasonally adjusted) from its potential level, 
                                                 
90    In the medium-term objective horizon, sufficient flexibility for monetary policy can be allowed to take into 
account stabilisation of short-run economic fluctuations, leading to temporary deviations of inflation from the target. 
Therefore, central banks normally do not adjust interest rates every month. In this regard, quarterly data can be used to 
analyse the actual conduct of monetary policy. 
91     Hitherto, without announcement of any specific figures, a vague expression such as ―the downward stability of 
the call rate is to be induced‖ had normally been employed. 
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calculated by multiplying 100 times the natural logarithm of the ratio of real GDP to 
potential real GDP. The potential GDP is, as in other studies, assumed to be 
determined by the HP filtering method
92
. Before we applied the HP-filter, the sample 
period was extended with ARIMA-based forecasts of the real GDP series (Kaiser and 
Maravall, 1999), to take the end-of-sample problem into consideration
93
. And the 
target output gap, 
Ty , was set to zero over the whole sample period. Finally, for the 
last variable, i.e., policy interest rates, we chose to use the detrended interest rates
94
. 
Detrending the call rate data is made by using the HP filtering method. 
As in much literature, the central bank‘s loss function (4.16) mentioned above 























           (4.34) 
 
The inclusion of the output gap variable, along with the inflation gap in the loss 
function, is based on the grounds that output stability is widely regarded as an 
important goal of the central bank together with price stability.  The central bank‘s 
discount factor ,  in line with other researchers (for example, Söderström (2000)), is 
                                                 
92     For the measurement of potential output, the filtering method of Hodrick-Prescott (HP) is often used.  HP 
filtering is a good estimation method since it minimises the output fluctuation around its trend.  For quarterly data 
such as real GDP, the choice for lambda (  ), which means the value of smoothing parameter, is normally 1600. 
93     It is quite easy to use an HP-filter to estimate the potential GDP.  But, there are, in fact, several drawbacks in 
using this filter: it is completely mechanistic, i.e., it has no explicit foundation in any economic theory; and a long lasting 
positive (or negative) output gap is ruled out a priori by the HP-filter. Moreover, there is an end-of-sample problem when 
a HP-filter is applied to estimate a potential GDP. See Chagny and Döpke (2001) for more explanation. 
 
94     Entering interest rates as deviations from their trend in the model means that the neutral rate is defined as the 
trend in nominal rates.  Therefore, when objectives equal target values, the nominal interest rate should be set to their 
neutral level. See, Martin and Salmon (1999) for more explanation. 
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set to 0.987 per quarter, which implies a quarterly discount rate of around 1 percent. 
Panels A to C in Figure 4.1 plot three data series that enter the VAR model and the 
loss function, and Panel D depicts the nominal policy interest rate. 
 
Figure 4.1:  Plots of Variables, 1999:q2–2011:q4 
 
A. Inflation gap                                                     B. The Output gap 
   
C. The call rate gap                                               D. The call rate  
     
 
4.3.2    Unit Root Test and Lag Selection  
Since all the variables, which enter the VAR, are defined as the gaps between the actual 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and standard Phillips-Perron (PP) tests, which both 
have the null hypotheses of nonstationarity (a unit root), are employed in order to test the 
stationarity of these variables. The test statistics in Table 4.1 clearly indicate the rejection 
of the null-unit root hypothesis at the usual levels of significance. We obtain similar 
results from the KPSS test, which has a null hypothesis of stationarity, so that we do not 
report the KPSS test result. We find the output gap and inflation gap, and interest rate 
gap to be )0(I  processes at the 1 percent and 5 percent significance level, respectively, 
which imply that they are stationary series 
 
Table 4.1:  Unit Root Tests, 1999:q2–2011:q4 
 
ADF t-statistic  PP t-statistic 
)0(:0 IH  )1(:0 IH     )0(:0 IH  )1(:0 IH  
Output gap -4.49 **    -3.95 **
 
  
Inflation gap -3.59 **    -2.98 * -9.46 ** 
Interest rate gap -4.18 **    -4.50 **   
Call rate -2.66 † -4.85 **  -2.00  -4.84 ** 
Notes: 1. The superscripts **, * and 
†
 indicate rejection of the null-unit root hypothesis (
0H ) at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels of significance, respectively.    
           2. An intercept term is included in the ADF and PP regressions for the unit root tests. When an intercept  
term is only included, Mackinnon critical values for the ADF and PP tests are  -3.57, -2.92 and -2.60  
at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
And, two lag lengths of each variable in the VAR model are chosen following the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) which is generally known to be less conservative in 
terms of lag length than the Schwarz criterion (SC) — the results of which are 
presented in Table 4.2. This is because such lag lengths allow the VAR model to reflect 
a sufficiently rich dynamic structure generated by the implementation of monetary 
policy. 
  








-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Table 4.2:  VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Lags Schwarz criterion (SC) Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
0 9.41 9.29 
1   4.86* 4.40 
2 5.20   4.39* 
3 5.72 4.57 
4 6.08 4.58 
5 6.51 4.65 
Note: The superscripts * indicate a lag order selected by each criterion. 
 
The inverse roots of the characteristic polynomial as in Lütkepohl (1991) are 
reported in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2.  None of the root values lie outside the unit circle, 
which implies that the VAR model satisfies the stability condition. 
 
Table 4.3:  Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Root                        Modulus 
 0.843781 0.843781 
 0.717127 - 0.364823i  0.804591 
 0.717127 + 0.364823i 0.804591 
 0.139938 0.139938 
 -0.036462 - 0.028908i 0.046531 
 -0.036462 + 0.028908i 0.046531 
 















Note:  No root lies outside the unit circle. 
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As reported in Table 4.4 for the output gap equation, the test statistic shows the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of normality at the 1% significance level. The normality 
assumption is violated in the output gap equation.  However, as Hamilton (1994, p.298) 
notes, even if the innovations are non-normal, OLS estimators of population parameters 
are consistent.  Therefore, this should not pose a serious problem in our analysis.  
 
Table 4.4:   Test Results for Normality 
Component Jarque-Bera statistic   d.f.   Prob. 
Output gap equation 23.9850 2    0.0000
***
 
Inflation gap equation 1.74885 2 0.4171 
Policy interest rate equation 1.62892 2 0.4429 
Joint 27.3628 6     0.0001
***
 
Note: The superscript *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis (
0H
) at the 1% level of significance. The null 
 hypothesis of normal distribution is that residuals are multivariate normal. The Jarque-Bera statistic 
 asymptotically follows the chi-squared( 2 ) distribution. Its critical value is 9.21 at the 1% signific-
ance level. 
 
4.3.3    VAR Model Identification 
In contrast to Sack (2000)
95
, we employed a structural VAR (SVAR) to estimate the 
policy reaction rules. For impulse response analysis, this approach applies non-recursive 
restrictions to the contemporaneous relationships among the economic variables.  
In general, the SVAR model with two lags and three variables can be expressed as 
the state-space representation, which can be written as: 
 
,22110 tttt DμYΓYΓCYB                         (4.35) 
                                                 
95     Sack‘s method used the unrestricted VAR model, which decomposes the variance-covariance matrix of 
residuals into its lower triangular square root for identification of the VAR equation. This decomposition is called a 
triangularisation, which is also known as a Choleski decomposition. This imposes a recursive response to the disturbances 
(See Sims (1980)). 
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where vectors of endogenous variables tY , 1tY  and 2tY , a constant term vector ,C  
coefficient matrices ,0B 1Γ , 2Γ  and ,D  and a vector of disturbances (or pure innovations) 






















































































































































































































Equation (4.35) represents a VAR in primitive form. Premultiplication by 10B  allows 
us to obtain the VAR model in a standard form, i.e., a reduced form of equation so that: 
 
.22110 t-t-tt eYYY         (4.36) 
 







 , and .10 tt DμBe
  
Given estimates of the regression residuals ( te ) of an n-equation VAR in reduced 
form, a necessary condition for the identification of the structural innovations ( tμ ) in the 
primitive form can be obtained by imposing (n
2-n)/2 restrictions on the 10

B  matrix 
(Enders, 2004), p.323). We can easily verify that a Choleski decomposition which 
requires all elements above the principal diagonal to be zero, always results in an exactly 
identified system. However, the ordering used in the Choleski decomposition may not be 
in accord with economic theory. Bernanke (1986) and Sims (1986) developed a 
procedure that allows one to impose (n
2-n)/2 or more restrictions on the structural model.  
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If more than (n
2-n)/2 restrictions are imposed, the system is overidentified and the 
overidentifying restrictions need to be tested. According to the Sims-Bernanke 
decomposition, we need to indicate the pattern of the 10

B  matrix. Using the notation 
from Equation (4.35), the relationship between the regression residuals, te  
and the pure 




0=       (4.37) 
 
which implies that we can estimate the random stochastic residual tμB
-1
0  from the 
regression residuals te  of the estimated unrestricted VAR.  Here, notice that D  in the 
equation tt DμBe
-1
0=  is a )33(   matrix that consists of ones on the principal diagonal 
elements and zeros off the diagonal. 
In this section, the SVAR identification follows the method that applies non-recursive 
restrictions to the contemporaneous relationships among the variables (see Sims, 1986; 
Leeper et al., 1996; and Martin and Salmon, 1999).  Accordingly, the output gap ty  responds 
to all other shocks with a lag, and inflation t  responds to within-period output gap shocks 
while it responds to interest rate shocks with a lag. Finally, the nominal interest rate ti  
responds to output gap shocks with a lag, but to inflation shock within period.
96
  Therefore, 
note that the ordering of the variables as ][ ttt i,π,y  in the VAR is such that interest rate 
responds contemporaneously to shocks in inflation gap and its own shocks. Inflation 
responds contemporaneously to shocks in the output gap and its own shocks. However, the 
output gap responds contemporaneously to its own shocks only. 
                                                 
96    For identification of the VAR model, we can consider the method to decompose the variance-covariance matrix of 
residuals into its lower triangular square root (Sack, 2000) or Choleski factor following Sims (1980).  
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Under this identification scheme, by imposing a structure on matrix 10

B  in Equation 
(4.37), we can model contemporaneous relationships between the regression residuals and 
































































B . The restrictions on a matrix 10

B  is a lower 
triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal and with zero on the 31b . Notice that we 
have restricted four elements of 10

B  to be zero on the .jkb   In a three-variable system, 
since ,32/)3(3
2   three restrictions need to be imposed if the structural model is to be 
identified exactly:  hence, the system contains one overidentifying restriction. 
 
4.3.4    The Policymaker’s Preference Weights 
The optimal policy rule, which is derived from the objective function subject to 
constraints, is affected by the relative weights that the central bank places on variables in 
the objective function. For instance, when the central bank places a high weight on the 
output gap movements, it would react more strongly to this.  A grid search technique 
over the policy rule coefficients is widely employed to find various combinations of 
policy weights. The optimal policy rate can be calculated under each combination of 
weights. We can find the relative weights that minimise the mean squared error (MSE) 
between the actual interest rate and the optimal interest rate (Martin and Salmon, 2000). 
For the Korean models, the weight on the inflation gap was normalised to 1, and 
then the weight on the output gap was calculated by the grid-search technique. As a result, 
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the weight on the output gap was found to be 0.4 
97
. These findings reflect the fact that 
the BOK takes price stability as the most important objective of its monetary policy, and 
also seeks to bring about output stability.
98
  
After all, it can be said that the BOK takes sustainable economic growth as well as 
price stability as its primary objectives. Of course, it is argued that after the revision of the 
Bank of Korea Act in 1998 that stipulates an inflation targeting in which price stability is 
regarded as the most important goal, the BOK‘s legal responsibility and direct roles in 
boosting economic growth might be weakened. But, it is also true that because the 
consistent restructuring in the financial and corporate sector has led to the economic 
instability, the BOK has also placed stress on economic growth or real economic stability 
in the practical conduct of policy. To sum up, the weight on the output gap, 0.4 is satisfied 
with ,10    meaning that the BOK responds to output, but it does less than inflation. 
 
4.4   Empirical Results 
4.4.1  Optimal Policy Rule under Parameter Uncertainty 
 
Before proceding, it is worth performing the VAR lagrange multiplier (LM) test which is 
used to check for serial correlation in the residuals of the estimated VAR. The LM test 
did not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation up to lag order 2: this result 
clearly implies that the VAR models employed in this chapter are specified fairly well (F 
                                                 
97    This weight is a bit smaller than the value found by Chang and Lim (2011) who obtained a weight of 0.5 for 
the industrial production gap instead of the GDP gap. 
98    Before the revision of the Bank of Korea Act in 1998, the BOK‘s policy objective was to achieve price stability 
and economic development and the efficient usage of national resources. 
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statistic = 8.47 with a p-value = 0.49; F statistic = 9.34 with a p-value = 0.41).
99
 
Therefore, it can be said that the measure of parameter uncertainty represented by the 
variance-covariance matrix of the VAR is suitable for carrying out our analysis. 
Panel A and Panel B in Figure 4.3 plot the values of the optimal call rates under 
additive and parameter uncertainties, respectively, given the true state of the economy in 
each quarter.  In both cases, the optimal policy rule responds more vigorously to changes in 
the state of the economy than the actual policy rule does.  As a result, the Korean call rate 
is more volatile under the optimal policy rule than that under the observed policy rule. 
Panel A displays the optimal interest rate path, obtained by Equation (4.24) under 
only additive uncertainty. As shown in Panel A, the central bank can take immediate 
measures in order to offset the deviations of economic variables by moving the interest 
rate aggressively. In the economy where there is only additive uncertainty, this type of 
uncertainty does not have an influence on policy decision-making processes since the 
certainty equivalence principle (CEP) holds. Therefore, when taking the policy-decisions, 
the central bank does not need to care about future shocks (uncertainty).  This implies 
that if there is a high possibility of deviations from the policy targets, the central bank 
having the incentive to adjust macroeconomic variables around their targets can just 
respond to those deviations as quickly as possible. Hence, the optimal monetary policy 
rule can be expected to move more aggressively than the actual policy rule. 
In reality, monetary policymakers always face a wide range of uncertainties when 
choosing policy at each period of time. In this context, it is unrealistic to imagine the 
                                                 
99    Under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of lag order, the LM statistic is asymptotically distributed 
2χ  
with 2k degrees of freedom. See Johansen (1995, p.22) for the formula of the LM statistic. 
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economy where policymakers can ignore uncertainty. After all, as plotted in Panel A in 
Figure 4.3, a large difference between the actual policy rule and the optimal rule under 
additive uncertainty comes from the unrealistic assumption that there exists only additive 
uncertainty in the monetary policy environment. It is important to note that Panel A just 
witnesses that the analysis of policy rules under additive uncertainty might ignore an 
important element, that is, parameter uncertainty when conducting monetary policy. 
Turning to Panel B in Figure 4.3, it depicts the optimal interest rate path obtained by 
Equation (4.30) under parameter uncertainty.  The optimal policy rule is a path for policy 
rates under parameter uncertainty. Although there are still some differences, the red, 
solid line of optimal policy rule is much closer to the actual policy rates followed 
throughout one and a half decades than that under additive uncertainty seen in Panel A. 
Based on this evidence, it can be said that the optimal policy interest rule in the presence 
of parameter uncertainty is much more successful in matching the actual level of the call 
money rate than when there is only additive uncertainty over the sample period. 
 
Figure 4.3:  Actual Policy Rule and Optimal Policy Rule under Uncertainty 
(1999:q2 to 2011:q4)  
 






  Page | 148 
Panel B.  Path of optimal policy rule under parameter uncertainty 
 
Note:  Actual policy rule is the path of the overnight call rate. 
 
For convenient comparison, Figure 4.4 draws three superimposed interest rate paths.  
We can easily see that the optimal rate path assuming solely additive uncertainty is greatly 
jagged, displaying more reversals of direction than the case under parameter uncertainty. It is 
also evident that the optimal interest rate path under parameter uncertainty is much closer to 
the actual interest rate movements than to that under only additive uncertainty.  In other 
words, the optimal policy rule under parameter uncertainty explains more effectively the 
actual behaviour of the policy rate than when only additive uncertainty is considered. 
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From Figure 4.4, we can assess the actual monetary policy conducted by the 
BOK in Korea. As is evident, the prescriptions of the optimal policy rule under 
parameter uncertainty follow the broad contour of the actual policy interest rate but 
the optimal rule sometimes lie above or below the actual rate over the entire period. 
However, from the second quarter of 2005 to the first quarter of 2008, the difference 
between the optimal policy rule prescriptions under parameter uncertainty and the 
actual policy rate showed to persist longer: the former prescriptions lie below the 
latter for about twelve quarters. This finding means that monetary policy was 
markedly too tight during that period. On average, the actual policy rate is about 25 
bps above the optimal rule prescriptions. However, starting in the second half of 2008, 
the actual policy rate followed the optimal rule prescriptions fairly well except for 
some periods, especially from the third quarter until the fourth quarter of 2009, 
during which the optimal policy rule indicated more accommodative monetary policy 
in order to respond to the global financial crisis. 
Table 4.5 presents the values of each mean, standard deviation and volatility for 
three policy rules over the sample period. It might be useful to compare the standard 
deviation and volatility for the optimal policy rule under parameter uncertainty with 
those under additive uncertainty. As can be seen, the former values are all smaller 
than the latter values, getting closer to those in the actual policy interest rate. These 
findings are consistent with the idea that policymakers in the face of uncertainty will 
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Table 4.5:   Comparisons of Standard Deviation and Volatility of Policy Rate under 
Uncertainty: The inflation targeting period, 1999:q2–2011:q4 
 
 
■ Actual policy interest rate 
Mean 3.885 
Standard deviation 1.016 
volatility 0.261 
■ Optimal interest rate  under additive uncertainty 
Mean 3.501 
Standard deviation 1.458 
Volatility 0.416 
■ Optimal interest rate  under parameter 
uncertainty 
Mean 3.904 
Standard deviation 1.155 
Volatility 0.296 
Note: Volatility is measured by the ‗coefficient of variation‘, i.e., ‗the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean‘. 
 
4.4.2  A Difference of Policy Responses under Uncertainty 
 
Aggressive movements of the call money rate become evident by comparing the impulse 
response functions of the two policies to various shocks in the economy.  Following the 
identification assumptions on the VAR, which are non-recursive restrictions, the matrix 
(denoted as )10

B , describing the contemporaneous interaction of the variables with the 
ordering of the variables as ][ ttt i,π,y  in the VAR system, was estimated as: 
 






































Table 4.6 reports the off-diagonal coefficient estimates ( 21b  and 32b ) and their 
respective corresponding standard errors, and the likelihood ratio (LR) test of the 
restrictions. According to the LR test of the restrictions, the overidentifying restrictions 
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cannot be rejected, meaning that the restricted models for additive and parameter 
uncertainties can be accepted at conventional significance levels. 
 
Table 4.6:  Off-diagonal Coefficient Estimates and the Likelihood Ratio Test of the 
Restrictions 
 
<Additive Uncertainty Case>                         <Parameter Uncertainty Case> 
Coefficient Estimates for Structural Decomposition  Coefficient Estimates for Structural Decomposition 
Row  Col       Value        Std. Error 
2     1     -0.10838        0.07609 




Row  Col      Value        Std. Error 
2     1     -0.10831        0.07595 
3     2     -0.25025        0.64948 
LR Test of Overidentification LR Test of Overidentification 
Chi-square(1) = 0.0376   Signif. Level=0.8463 Chi-square(1) = 0.3248   Signif. Level=0.5701  
 
Under this restriction, impulse response functions (IRFs) of the actual policy rate (or 
the ―observed‖ policy rule) and the optimal policy rate to a shock to each of the three 
variables in the VAR are calculated.  Here, notice that the IRFs of the actual policy rate 
are the ones from the simple VAR with no allowance for uncertainty. Figure 4.5 plots 
these results.  
The IRFs of the actual policy rate to each of the three shocks in the economy imply 
the tendency for the central bank to conduct gradual and persistent adjustments in the 
policy rate. We found that the Bank of Korea chose to move the policy interest rate very 
gradually: it seems reluctant to respond to shocks aggressively. Moreover, the responses 
get back to initial levels very slowly, so that it takes more than three years to complete 
the whole response to a one-time shock. In response to a positive output gap shock, the 
policy rates rise. But this change occurs after the first quarter since it is assumed that 
output gap shocks have no contemporaneous effect on the policy rates in the VAR 
identification.  The actual policy rate reverts to be negative from the third quarter while 
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the optimal policy rate remains positive for about six quarters.  
Notably, the extent of the response of the actual policy rate is smaller than that of 
the response of the optimal policy rate under additive uncertainty. This finding implies 
that the central bank tends to implement the monetary policy in a conservative manner. 
Similar results are also found in the reaction of the policy rate to inflation shocks: 
the actual policy rate initially rises in response to a positive inflation shock, and from the 
second quarter the actual policy rate becomes negative, while from the fourth quarter the 
optimal policy rate under additive uncertainty becomes negative counter-intuitively. 
These negative responses build over many periods before slowly returning to their initial 
levels. However, the changes in the policy rates occur immediately following the 
inflation shocks. This is because we assume that policymakers respond immediately to 
the inflation shocks in the VAR identification.  Likewise, the extent of changes in the 
actual policy rate is slightly smaller than that of the optimal policy rate derived from the 
additive uncertainty model. 
 
Figure 4.5:   Impulse Response Functions under Additive Uncertainty 
 
Panel A.  Responses to output shock                   Panel B.  Responses to inflation shock 
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Panel C.  Responses to policy rate shock  
 
Note: The solid lines are the impulse responses of actual policy interest rates to shocks of the output gap, the inflation 
gap and the policy interest rate, respectively. The doted lines around the impulse responses mark two standard 
error bands (95% confidence intervals). The dashed red lines are the impulse responses of optimal policy rates 
under additive uncertainty to shocks of the output gap, the inflation gap and the policy interest rate, respectively. 
 
These findings indicate that the optimal policy adjusts the interest rate more quickly 
than the observed policy and induces a much larger interest-rate response. Overall, there 
are substantial differences between the two policy rules. The additive uncertainty model 
fails to fully describe the gradual policy rate adjustments that are observed in the real 
policy practice. As can be seen in the figure above, the VAR model under additive 
uncertainty fails to explain the dynamic movements of the actual policy rate. Why? One 
of the possible explanations is that when we set up the model, we did not consider the 
interest-rate smoothing motive in the central bank‘s loss function. However, it is more 
plausibly rational that the model with only additive uncertainty cannot fully describe the 
real economy. Accordingly, it cannot reflect fully the problems the central bank may face 
(a misspecification problem). The analysis under additive uncertainty assumes that the 
structure of the economy is known with certainty, while the knowledge on disturbances 
with an additive form is not perfect.  The policymaker normally does not know the real 
structure of the economy, but conducts policy on the basis of imprecisely estimated 
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values concerning the structure of the economy. As a consequence, the actual economic 
phenomenon cannot be explained by the simple model assuming solely additive 
uncertainty. 
In a similar manner under only additive uncertainty, we calculated the impulse 
responses of the actual policy rate and the optimal policy rate under parameter 
uncertainty to three shocks identified in the VAR model. The behaviour of the optimal 
policy rate with parameter uncertainty is more successful in describing the actual policy 
rate movements. Figure 4.6 displays these results. It shows both the impulse response 
functions from the optimal policy rule assuming parameter uncertainty and those 
discussed in Figure 4.5 under additive uncertainty. Overall, the impulse responses of 
actual policy rate and the optimal policy rate under parameter uncertainty appear to be 
quite similar. 
As seen in the IRFs below, parameter uncertainty reduces the volatility of policy 
interest rate, caused in response to macroeconomic variable shocks. For instance, once 
parameter uncertainty is considered, the optimal interest rate reaction to output gap 
shocks appears more drawn out than that under only additive uncertainty (Panel A in 
Figure 4.6). And, it is evident that the response of the optimal policy rate under 
parameter uncertainty is much closer to that of actual policy rate than to that under 
additive uncertainty. This evidence is consistent with the notion of conservatism in the 
conduct of monetary policy, i.e., central banks move the policy interest rate less 
aggressively in response to shocks under parameter uncertainty. 
In the case of the optimal policy rate response to inflation shocks, as seen in Panel B, 
similar results are found as well. Conservatism in the actual response is again apparent. 
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Notably, the response of the optimal policy rate with parameter uncertainty matches well 
with that of the actual policy rate. Its response becomes negative from the second quarter 
like that of actual policy rate, and remains negative for a long time contrary to our 
knowledge. It converges quite slowly to the equilibrium level. Of course, these 
movements in policy interest rates are the same as in the case where only additive 
uncertainty is considered.  
 
Figure 4.6:   Impulse Response Functions under Uncertainty 
 
Panel A.  Responses to output shock                  Panel B.  Responses to inflation shock 
 




  Page | 156 
In terms of negative response, it is also found that the optimal policy rate under 
parameter uncertainty still reacts more aggressively than the actual policy rate. This 
means that the actual monetary policy is implemented in a timid way when compared 
with the monetary policy under parameter uncertainty. 
In short, the optimal policy rate path accounting for parameter uncertainty is much 
closer to the actual policy rate path than to the optimal policy rate path under only 
additive uncertainty. This empirical evidence might imply that monetary policy in Korea 
has been conducted in consideration of the possibility of future (parameter) uncertainty. 
In other words, policymakers have not implemented the monetary policy in an aggressive 
fashion considering solely additive uncertainty, but they have instead given much 
attention to the possibility of occurrence of multiplicative uncertainty (say, parameter 
uncertainty) and thus conducting the monetary policy cautiously and gradually. 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have attempted to examine whether the parameter uncertainty matters 
in the conduct of monetary policy in Korea. To this end, we constructed a VAR model 
based on Sack (2000), and solved the dynamic programming problem in order to 
scrutinise the effect of uncertainty on monetary policy in Korea. And we calculated the 
impulse response functions based on the SVAR identification scheme. We focused on 
whether the gradual movements of policy rates can be explained by the parameter 
uncertainty that the central bank faces in choosing its policy instruments. As discussed in 
the literature review, it is found to be desirable for the central bank to operate its policy 
instruments gradually when there are considerable uncertainties. 
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We have found that parameter uncertainty might provide a possible explanation for 
a smoother path of the policy interest rate in Korea. In particular, since the introduction 
of an interest rate-oriented monetary policy in Korea, the actual policy rate has shown a 
similar movement to the optimal policy rate path under parameter uncertainty. Therefore, 
the analysis in this chapter might confirm that monetary policy in Korea has been 
conducted in a similar way to the optimal policy derived under the assumption that much 
uncertainty on parameters exist. In addition, it is found that gradual adjustment in the 
policy rates does not necessarily indicate that the central bank has an interest-rate 
smoothing incentive. Uncertainty and the dynamic structure of the economy can account 
for a considerable portion of the observed gradual movements of interest rates in Korea. 
From the analysis, we obtained several implications of particular interest for 
monetary policy in Korea. First of all, it is found that there exists substantial difference 
between the actual (observed) policy interest rate and the optimal policy rate. In 
analysing monetary policy, when we consider exclusively additive uncertainty, it is 
nearly impossible to explain the actual behaviour of monetary policy conducted by the 
central bank. There are diverse types of uncertainty in the real economy, and 
consequently, ever-occurring shocks to the economy last for a considerable amount of 
time. Therefore, it is unrealistic to assume that the policymakers need no longer concern 
about future uncertainty. 
The second implication is that the optimal policy rate path taking parameter 
uncertainty into account is even more similar to the actual policy rate path than to the 
optimal policy rate path under only additive uncertainty. This empirical evidence might 
imply that the central bank in Korea has conducted the monetary policy in consideration 
  
  Page | 158 
of the possible existence of parameter uncertainty, which means that policymakers have 
implemented monetary policy in a cautious fashion having paid much attention to the 
possible occurrence of parameter uncertainty instead of having conducted the monetaty 
policy in an aggressive manner considering only additive uncertainty.  
Finally, the implication we obtained from the analysis is that there appears an 
interest-rate smoothing tendency in monetary policy in Korea owing to the consideration 
of parameter uncertainty. This evidence is the case with most major developed countries. 
Moreover, the optimal policy interest rate under parameter uncertainty is successful in 
explaining the actual interest rate movements. This means that even though there is no 
interest-rate smoothing motive in the central banks‘ objective function, when we assume 
that parameter uncertainty exists in the economy, central banks tend to behave as if they 
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Chapter 5  




5.1   Introduction 
The availability of relevant data is one of the important issues in the implementation of 
monetary policy. In conventional econometric analysis, it is assumed that the relevant 
data are available to policymakers in real time. However, in reality, much 
macroeconomic data, for example on real output are only available with a considerable 
lag and are often subject to frequent and large revisions at a later date. Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, some key macroeconomic variables such as the output gap and 
equilibrium real interest rate are unobservable and must be estimated. Moreover, 
estimates of these differ considerably according to the estimation period, econometric 
methods and a sample size.
100
  There is, therefore, likely to be substantial measurement 
                                                 
100    Orphanides (2003) illustrates that mismeasurement in the output gap reflects two types of errors: errors in the 
measurement of actual and potential GDP. Main errors of the output gap are due to errors in measurement of potential output.  
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errors in both actual and potential output, leading to inaccurate estimates of the output 
gap. Similarly, the equilibrium level of real interest rate varies over time as it rests on a 
number of factors such as the growth rate of potential output and fiscal policy stance 
(Kohn, 2007).  
In addition, there are various alternative measures of the inflation rate. Although a 
single measure of inflation is required for monetary policy analysis, it is often not clear if 
the possible alternatives, such as consumer price (CPI) inflation, PCE inflation, GDP 
deflator inflation, core CPI inflation and so on, should be used
101
 (Kozicki, 1999). 
Correspondingly, central bank policymakers face a large amount of uncertainty 
about the current state of the economy at the time they choose interest rates. In this 
context, three questions will be investigated, as follows. Firstly, what is the nature of data 
uncertainty and the implications of this for the conduct of monetary policy? Secondly, 
what measurement issues are faced by policymakers, and how large are measurement 
errors (especially, in the case of Korea)? Thirdly, how are optimal Taylor rules affected 
by data uncertainty? 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 investigates the nature 
of data uncertainty that may influence monetary policy-making when using simple policy 
rules.  In Section 5.3, the Taylor rules with noisy data and the central bank‘s loss function 
will be presented. Section 5.4 discusses the measures for the output gap, which are 
frequently used by central bankers, and inflation data series. In Section 5.5, we attempt to 
                                                 
101    The price index used by Taylor (1993) in the Carnegie Rochester paper was the GDP deflator. In the Taylor 
rule, the measure of inflation is the percent change in the GDP deflator over the previous four quarters. Other 
researchers have used the inflation measure based on the consumer price index (CPI). Over the past fifteen years, the 
Federal Reserve has emphasised the inflation rate as measured by changes in the price index for personal consumption 
expenditures (PCE) (Kohn, 2007). 
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estimate the optimal policy rule and calculate the central bank‘s loss values under data 
uncertainty, and present the results. And, conclusion will be given in Section 5.6. 
 
5.2   The Nature of Data Uncertainty Faced by Central Banks 
Following Orphanides (2003), consider the simple monetary policy rules, in which the 
stance of monetary policy is expressed by comparing the short-term real interest rate, tr , 




tt yyrr                          (5.1) 
 
This rule specifies that the central bank sets the short-term real interest rate as a linear 
function of the difference between the actual inflation rate, t  and its target level, 
T , 
and deviations of the output gap, ty , from its target level, .
Ty   Based on the Fisher 
equation, i.e. 1 tttt Eri  , the short-term real interest rate, tr  can be defined as the 
short-term nominal policy interest rate, ti , minus the expected future inflation, ,1ttE  
that is, .1 tttt Eir   
Assuming that tttE  1 , and rewriting Equation (5.1) in terms of the nominal 






tt yyi                    (5.2) 
                                                 
102   The classic Taylor rule is expressed as ,)( t
T
ttt byari   where 2
Tr   and 5.0 ba .  
And, ti denotes the actual values of US Federal Funds rate (short-term), t  the rate of inflation, ty  the output gap, 
r  the equilibrium or natural rate of interest, and T  the inflation target. See Taylor (1993) for a more detailed 
explanation. 
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where the constant term   stands for the long-term nominal equilibrium interest rate 
level, which is defined as  ,
Tri    and ).+1(= γθ  
The data uncertainty associated with this simple policy rule is that the performance 
of the reactive rules is normally examined under the assumption that the central bank 
knows for sure the true values of inflation, t  and the output gap, ty , when setting its 
policy interest rates. However, there may be errors in measuring both inflation and 
(especially) the output gap are normally measured with considerable errors. In 
consequence, inflation, t
~  and the output gap, ty
~  which are observed by the central bank 
when its policy choices are made, may be different from the true underlying levels of 
inflation, t , and the output gap, ty . 
Following Rudebusch (2001) and Orphanides (2003), let t  denote the measure-
ment error in true inflation, t , and t  denote the error in the true output gap, ty . Then, 
we get: 
 
,~ ttt                (5.3) 
and 
,~ ttt yy               (5.4) 
 
where t
~  and ty
~  represent noisy observations (real-time estimates of inflation and the 
output gap); and the errors, t  and t , have means zero, standard deviations,   and  , 
respectively, and they are by construction correlated with t  and ty  while assumed 
uncorrelated with t
~  and ty
~ . The errors, t  and t , contain data revisions as well as 
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forecast errors. 
In addition, as mentioned earlier, the true real interest rate, tr , is not the observed 
difference between the nominal interest rate, ti  and real-time observed inflation, ,
~
t  but 
the unobserved difference between the nominal interest rate, ti  and true inflation, t . 
Hence, in the presence of measurement error, it is evident that the proper form of a 
simple policy rule specified to set the policy interest rate in terms of observed inflation 




tt yyii            (5.5) 
 
When there is no measurement error, of course tt 
~  and tt yy
~  in which case 
Equations (5.2) and (5.5) are identical. Assuming 0=Ty
103
 and rearranging Equation 
(5.5) in terms of the true values of inflation, t  and the output gap, ,ty  the interest rate 




tt yii                                      (5.6) 
 
where the size of noise is measured as '.' tt    The nature of data uncertainty 
problem is revealed by Equation (5.6). Setting the policy rate positively in reaction to an 
increase in inflation or the output gap since it is judged that such policy choices are 
needed for the stabilisation of inflation or the output gap, may cause undesirable 
                                                 
103    In the model, since the variable Ty  means the output gap not output, the target output gap 
Ty  is normally 
assumed to be ‗zero‘. 
  
  Page | 164 
fluctuations in the interest rate, which could have an adverse impact on inflation or the 
output gap again. Consequently, an efficient policy that takes into account the existence 
of data uncertainty might call for less aggressive stance in policy-making than would be 
the case in the absence of data uncertainty, so that policy rule parameters might be 
affected by possible data uncertainty. 
 
5.3   The Model 
To consider substantial data uncertainty confronting policymakers, it is appropriate to 
incorporate data uncertainty directly within the model. To this end, we set up the model 
that is a slightly modified version of the canonical model of Svensson (1997 and 1999a), 
which is composed of two structural equations describing the economy, and the interest-
rate rule equation. 
In this section, first of all, we introduce two equations: a Phillips curve and an IS 




5.3.1  The Structure of the Economy 
Consider two equations that represent the transmission mechanism of monedtary policy 








t εbyππaππ --            (5.7) 
and 
,+)(= 1+1+ tttt ηrrdcyy --          (5.8) 
                                                 
104    The derivation of the optimal policy rule relys largely on Srour (2003). 
105   Both equations are quite a standard model in the literature – that is, they are also used, for example, in Ball 
(1997), Rudebusch (2001 and 2005) and Rudebusch and Svensson (2002), and others. 
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where coefficients a , b , c  and d  are assumed to be positive; t  and t  are disturb-
ances drawn form independent normal distribution with zero means and variances 2  
and 
2
  (i.e., white noise random shocks); the real interest rate is defined as 
1 tttt Eir  , where ti  is the short-term nominal interest rate and 1ttE   is expected 
inflation over time ,1t  which is formed at the end of time t ;  r  is the equilibrium real 
interest rate (assumed to be constant). Equation (5.7) is a Phillips curve assuming that 
inflation, 1t , depends on the lagged inflation, t , the lagged output gap, ty  and a 
supply shock, 1t .  Equation (5.8) is an IS curve assuming that the output gap, 1ty , is 
affected by the lagged output gap, ty , the lagged real interest rate, tr , and a demand 
shock, .1t  Of  course, the output gap is assumed to be inversely related to the lagged 
real interest rate. 
 
5.3.2  The Optimal Policy Rules 
The objective of monetary policy is to minimise in each period t  a discounted weighted 

























tt yλππL - ,   10   .            (5.10) 
 
                                                 
106   In other words, it is assumed that monetary policymakers have a twofold objective of minimising of deviations 
of actual inflation from its target level, 
T  and variation in the output gap from its desired level, .Ty  
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subject to the constraint expressed by Equation (5.7) and (5.8). The parameter,  and  , 
are the same as in Chapter 4. The above loss function is fairly standard in the literature 
(for example, Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999; Smets, 2002; Rudebusch, 2001 and 2002a; 
Williams, 2004; Orphanides and Williams, 2008).  
In the model, the monetary policy instrument determines the (expected) output gap 
with a one-period lag, and in turn the output gap affects inflation with a one-period lag as 
well. This causal chain of relationships among variables means that monetary policy has 
an impact on inflation with a two-period lag. Hence, when 0  the central bank as a 
strict inflation targeter should set the instrument in each period so that the two-period 






ttE         (5.11) 
 
Given structural constraint equations (5.7) and (5.8), 2ttE  can be expressed as a 
function of the state variables and the monetary instrument in each period t : 
 




tt ----         (5.12) 
 
                                                 
107 This central bank‘s decision is identical to Svensson (1997)‘s result. Since the key policy rate chosen in each 










The first-order condition for minimising the above loss function with respect to 
































tt ππbdEδ  
 
It follows that the F.O.C. can be written as .2
T
ttE    
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In practice, IT countries are concerned with both inflation and output gap stability, 
and so 10   . If the output gap could be controlled directly by the central bank, its 
policymakers can determine the output gap in the following period by setting the real 
interest rate and the output gap in the current period, i.e., =1+tt yE ).( rrdcy tt --  This 
implies that the policymaker chooses 1tt yE , taking 1ttE   as given. 1tt yE  chosen by the 
policymaker can be expressed as a function of 1ttE  . Since the model is linear-quadratic, 




tttt ππEyE -      (5.13) 
 
where 0  is a positive parameter to be determined
108
. Taking the expected value of the 






tt EE     ,       (5.14) 
 
where 0 ba   measures the optimal speed at which the central bank should bring 
inflation back to the target following a shock
109
. 
Using Equations (5.7), (5.8), (5.12) and (5.14), the optimal rule can be expressed as: 
                                                 
108   The parameter, 
0 , depends on the models‘s parameters, a  and b , the discount factor,  , and the policy-










 .  
 
See Svensson (1997) and Lansing and Trehan (2003) for the derivation of this term. 
109   The basic algebraic manipulation shows that   is a constant between 0 and a , and it increases with a  which 
measures inflation persistence. And, the response coefficients op
r
  and op
r
  in the optimal rule also increase with a : a 
larger coefficient, a , implies that inflation is more persistent, and therefore   will become greater. See Srour (1999, 
and 2003) for a more detailed explanation. 
  








































rt yχππθrr --      (5.16) 
 
Or, alternatively, the optimal rule can be written in terms of the nominal interest rate, ti  
















n  and ,+=
Tπri  where i  denotes the long-term 
nominal equilibrium interest rate level. In Equations (5.16) and (5.17), the subscripts, r  
and n  denote parameters for the the real and nominal interest rates, respectively. The 
optimal policy rule in Equation (5.17) has the same form as the one proposed by Taylor 
(1993), except of course that the reaction parameters may differ. 
 
5.3.3  The Taylor Rules with Noisy Data 
Given the aggregate demand and supply relationships in Equations (5.7) and (5.8), 
suppose that the policymaker uses the real-time Taylor rule based on Equation (5.17), 








nt yconsti           (5.18) 
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where the constant term ,= iconst  the state variables t
~  and ty
~  are inflation and the 
output gap measured by the central banks in real time
110
. Following Rudebusch (2001) 
and Orphanides (2003), we assume that ttt  
~  and ,~ ttt yy   where t  and t  
are measurement errors in inflation and the output gap, respectively. In other words, the 
real-time inflation t
~  measured by the central banks when deciding its interest rate 
instrument may deviate from the true inflation, t , and in the same manner, the real-
time output gap, ty
~ , measured by the central banks may deviate from the true output 
gap, .ty  
 
5.4   Data and Measurement Issues 
It is unrealistic to pretend that policymakers can react to the true values of current-period 
realisations for nominal and real GDP, or the current inflation rate. Furthermore, 
measures of the underlying state of the economy, for example, the output gap and 
inflation, are subject to measurement problems unlike interest rate data series. In this 
section, the measures for the output gap, which are frequently used by central bankers, 
will be constructed, and inflation data series will be generated as well. 
 
5.4.1  Measuring the Output Gap 
Precisely speaking, real-time data refer to data available to policymakers when they 
make their policy decisions. But it is difficult to obtain real-time data that are used in 
                                                 
110    The target output gap Ty  is assumed to be ‗zero‘, so that .iconst   
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policy decision making. In many cases, hence, alternative variables of potential output 
and the output gap are construced by usng estimated techniques. There exists a lot of 
uncertainty regarding the measurement of potential output and the accompanying 
output gap
111
. These uncertainties are reduced only slowly but perhaps never 
completely in terms of their measurements. Therefore, data of the output gap are 
revised necessarily and frequently. 
There are two types of uncertainty, which are related to the problems with the 
measurement of the output gap: model uncertainty and data uncertainty. In this section, 
model uncertainty is defined as uncertainty regarding the appropriate definition of 
potential output and the output gap. Data uncertainty occurs because data such as actual 
and potential output are not available in real time and these data are revised frequently 
until their final publication: the data available in real time might not be the same as the 
final published data. Much of the previous literature, including Taylor (1993) and 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), use deviations of real GDP from its fitted time trend 
for the output gap. Their methods rely on the implicit estimation of potential output as 
the fitted linear time trend. But, the problem is that potential output can be defined in 
many different ways and their estimation methods are highly controversial.
112
  The two 
different approaches to determining potential output are often used: the production 
function approach and the HP filitering estimation. The former that uses production 
functions
113
 to determine potential output and the output gap requires a lot of 
                                                 
111    Existing literature, for example, Orphanides and van Norden (1999), and Gerlach and Smets (1999), has 
shown that the output gap is estimated with a considerable margin of uncertainty. 
112     These are very important issues. But this chapter will not pay attention to them, because they are beyond of 
the scope of this chapter. 
113    One example of production function is a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, y* = A 
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information: an assumption on the production technology, information on the 
equilibrium levels of capital stock and employment. Therefore, this method may not be 
used frequently, or in real time. Due to this practical reason, many central bankers rely 




When constructing real time data, both model uncertainty and data uncertainty 
should be taken into account. But model uncertainty is ignored because it is beyond the 
scope of this capter. Following Adema (2004) and Fujiwara et al. (2007), real time 
estimates for potential output and the corresponding output gap are constructed. Above 
all, the real-time estimate of potential output at a certain quarter is obtained by 
applying a HP filter to real GDP time-series up to that quarter. Prior to applying the 
HP-filter, the sample is extended with ARIMA-based forecasts of the real GDP series 
in order to address the end-of-sample problem of the HP filter. 
And then, the filtering span is extended by one quarter when a new observation is 
added to the previous data set. This new data set is used to compute the next quarter‘s 
potential output. This process is repeated until all the sample points are used in 
sequence. The last quarter‘s estimate obtained at each step becomes the potential output 
at that quarter. Collecting in time order these estimates yields the recursive estimates of 
potential output. In this chapter, they will be called real time data
115
 that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kα L1-α, where y* is the level of potential output, and A, K and L denote trend total factor productivity, the equilibrium 
capital stock and employment, respectively. 
114    The use of this filter has several problems in that it has no explicit foundation in any economic theory; a long 
lasting positive (or negative) output gap is ruled out a priori by the HP-filter; and there is an end-of-sample problem when 
a HP-filter is applied to estimate a potential GDP (Chagny and Döpke, 2001). 
115    In Adema (2004) and Duarte et al. (2003), these data are called quasi-real time estimates because the sub-
samples are drawn from the final dataset. 
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policymakers rely on. For example, the real-time data for the potential output in 
2008:q1 is measured using the real GDP up until 2008:q1, and that for the potential 
output in 2008:q2 is measured by using the real GDP up until 2008:q2, and so on. Next, 
the final data of potential output are obtained by simply applying the HP filter to real 
GDP time-series data for the period of 1970:q1 up to 2011:q4. 
Figure 5.1 depicts two types of time-series estimates for the log value of potential 
output, *
t
z  and *~
t
z  (Panel A), and the output gaps, ty  and ty
~  (Panel B), respectively. 
These two types of estimates for potential output are plotted in Panel A of Figure 5.1 
from 1991:q1 to 2011:q4. 
 
Figure 5.1:   Potential Outputs and Measurement Errors of the Output Gaps 
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Note: The lower portion of Figure denotes the time-series estimates of measurement errors, 
 
t , which are calculated by the subtraction of real-time estimates of the output gap from 
final estimates of the output gap.  
 
These two types of estimates for potential output are used to calculate their 
corresponding two types of output gaps: 100*)(= *ttt zzy -  and ,100*)
~~(=~ *ttt zzy -  
where tz  stands for the log value of final actual output, 
*
tz  the log of final estimates of 
potential output, and tz
~  the log of real-time actual output and *~tz  the log of real-time 
estimates of potential output. The resulting data series of deviations from trend, ty  and 
ty
~ , constitute the final estimates and the real-time estimates for the output gap, 
respectively. Since ,+~= ttt μyy  this retroactive revision in the output gap from the real-
time estimates to the final estimates generates the measurement errors, .t  In general, 
the real-time estimates of the output gap may be greatly revised retroactively when 
applying the HP filter again after the arrival of new data. 
As seen in Panel B of Figure 5.1, the real-time estimates of the output gap differ from 
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changes
116
 pertaining to measures of actual output. Together with these factors, historical 
revisions and conceptual changes in potential output are also reflected in revisions of the 
output gap since output-gap estimates reflect measures of both actual and potential output 
at the same time. Notably, the lower portion of Panel B displays the historical degree of 
error in measures of the output gap. From this, we know that the output gap has a tendency 
to show systematic one-sided measurement errors in some sample, especially in the periods 
of between economic contraction and recovery: for example, in the aftermath of Korean  
currency crisis of 1997–1998 and the GFC of 2007–2009.117  
 
5.4.2  Measuring Inflation 
As already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, inflation can be defined and 
measured in a variety of methods such as CPI inflation, core inflation and GDP deflator 
inflation. Inflation measurement has been a particularly difficult and controversial issue in 
terms of research and economic policy.
118
 There has been much discussion on the suitable 
measures of overall inflation in Korea as well. In many cases, these measures of inflation 
can be used complementarily one another for the actual conduct of monetary policy. The 
Bank of Korea (BOK) uses CPI inflation rate for a basic measure of the inflation rate. 
There are three sources for the real-time inflation data based on CPI in Korea. The 
first source is the ―Monetary Policy Report‖ which is published by the BOK and 
submitted to the National Assembly on a semi-annual basis, that is, every March and 
                                                 
116    Note that before 1992, the measure of output was GNP (gross national product), not GDP (gross domestic product). 
117    Rudebusch (2001) also found that data-measurement errors, in particularly the output gap, are quite persistent 
over time. He argued that this is not surprising because the main source of uncertainty as to the output gap is the 
inability to determine the trend growth of potential output, and because errors in setting this trend affects the level of 
the output gap in adjacent quarters. 
118    See Lebow and Rudd (2006) for implications of inflation measurement for research and policy. 
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September. The second is the ―Economic Outlook‖ which is normally released by the 
BOK in every June and every November. The last one is the ―Current Economic 
Developments in Korea‖ which is prepared for the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 
meeting every month. Referring to these three sources provides the real-time estimates 
for CPI inflation data that the policymakers rely on in setting the interest rate instrument. 
In this regard, it is much easier to obtain real time data on the inflation rate relative to 
those on the output gap. Notice that these three reports do not contain real-time data on 
the output gap, instead providing only real-time data for growth rates. 
Figure 5.2 compares the time-series of estimates of t
~  which were made in real time 
by the policymakers in Korea with those of final estimates for inflation, t  which is 
released by the Statistics Korea. These two data provide the time-series estimates for t , 
which are assumed to be the noise in the inflation measures faced by the central bank 
policymakers in every quarter from 1991:q1 to 2011:q4.  
 















Note: The lower portion of Figure denotes the time-series estimates of measurement errors, 
 
t , which are calculated by the subtraction of real-time estimates of inflation from final 
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As plotted in the lower portion of Figure 5.2, the noise in inflation data series 
appears to be a relatively minor issue in comparison with that in the output gap. 
However, measurement errors in inflation data are not trivial for the central bank 
policymakers at all in that inflation traditionally enters with bigger weights in the 
monetary policy rule, i.e., inflation goal is more important than output goal. The real-
time data series sometimes overstate or understate the final inflation estimates. 
Moreover, any discrepancy between the real-time and final estimates often exceeds one 
percentage point, especially in the period of 1997–1998 and in the mid-2008. Hence, 
these spreads between the two estimates can possibly lead to large differences in the 
policy rule prescriptions based on the real-time and the final data. 
 
5.4.3  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics for the time-series of the output gap, inflation and 
their noises from 1991:q1 to 2011:q4. As would be expected for noisy data, the 
standard deviations (2.103) of real-time data series t
~  are slightly greater than that 
(2.003) of the final data series t , while the standard deviations (1.419) of real-time 
data series, ty
~ , is smaller than that (2.353) of the final data series, ty .  The noise in the 
inflation data, t  is different from zero on average, ranging from -1.423 to 1.552 
percentage points. However, any significant serial correlation patterns cannot be found: 
the first order serial correlation coefficient is -0.157. 
In contrast to inflation data, the output-gap noise exhibits a different pattern. The 
difference between the final and the real-time output gaps, t , is quite considerable at 
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times, ranging from -4.674 to 4.697 percentage points, and exhibits strong serial 
correlation in the sample of data series. The noise process for the output gaps exhibits 
considerable persistence stemming from both persistent errors in the measurement of 
actual output and potential output: the first order serial correlation coefficient is 0.894. 
The existence of this persistence can be confirmed by the estimation result of a first-




,901.0 1 ttt   
 
.662.0ˆ),0(~ 2   Ni.i.d.where t
 
The 0.901 point estimate for the output-gap noise persistence parameter reveals the 
substantial serial correlation in the output-gap noise. Interestingly, this regression 
coefficient is larger than those of the output gaps (0.818 and 0.806, respectively). In 
other words, the measurement errors of the output gap are more serially correlated than 
the output gap itself. This means that we can predict, to some extents, data revisions in 
the measurement errors of the output gap, given that the measurement error follows an 
AR(1) process, ttt   1 . 
Moreover, the measurement errors in the output gap during 1991:q1–2011:q4 have 
a relatively larger standard deviation of 1.541 percentage points, which is a sizeable 
number in comparison with that of the actual output gap itself for the same period, 
2.353 percentage points. This fact implies that it is extremely hard to measure the 
output gap accurately and robustly in real time, particularly around the end of the data 
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sample. As in most other countries
119
, one of the important sources regarding data 
uncertainty in Korea is the errors in the measurement of the output gap.  
 
Table 5.1:  Descriptive Statistics, 1991:q1–2011:q4 
 
       t
y         ty
~        t         t          t
~         t  
Mean 0.013 0.270 -0.257 4.140 4.267 -0.127 
Std Dev 2.353 1.419 1.541 2.003 2.103 0.523 
Minimum -7.488 -5.527 -4.674 0.594 0.200 -1.423 
Maximum 4.707 3.012 4.697 9.744 10.200 1.552 




y  is the final estimates of the output gap, defined as actual output minus potential, in percent, based 
on data available at the fourth quarter of 2011. 
t
y~  is the corresponding real-time measure. And t  is 
the difference between the final and real-time output gaps. 
2.  
t
 is CPI inflation, compared with the same period of the previous year, in percent, based on data 
available at the fourth quarter of 2011. 
t
~  is the corresponding real-time measure. And 
t
  is the 
difference between the final and real-time inflation series. 
3.  The statistics shown for each variable: Mean, the mean; Std Dev, the standard deviation; and AR(1), 
the first-order serial correlation coefficient. 
 
 
5.5   Estimation of Optimal Policy Rules and Results 
5.5.1   Parameter Estimation 
In order to sketch parameter values for inflation and the output gap equations, Equations 
(5.7) and (5.8) are estimated with a least-squares regression (OLS), using the quarterly 
Korean data for the sample period of 1991:q1 to 2011:q4.  
 
 
                                                 
119   According to Orphanides et al. (2000), the standard deviation of the output gap measurement errors in the 
United States was 3.77 percentage points during 1966:q2–1994:q4 and 1.77 percent during 1980:q1–1994:q4. The 
standard deviation of the measurement error in output gap for Japan during 1986–1995 is 1.9 percentage points 
(Fujiwara et al., 2007). 
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where the figures in parentheses denote coefficient standard errors, and εζˆ and ηζˆ  are 
the standard errors of the residuals for inflation and the output gap equations, 
respectively. The estimation is conducted by using the final data series since the 
objective of the model is to capture the movements of inflation and the output gap 
process. Overall, the empirical fits of the models are considerably good. All 
regression coefficients on each explanatory variable are statistically significant. 
Despite their simplicity, the models characterise quarterly Korean data over the 
sample period. These coefficients are helpful to provide rough information on prior 
distribution of parameters for the following Bayesian estimation. 
Before estimating the models with Bayesian method, four types of monetary policy 
rules are constructed as below: 
 
Rule  I  :  ,)( 1111 t
T
tt yconsti    
Rule  II :  ,~)( 2222 t
T
tt yconsti    
Rule  III : ,)~( 3333 t
T
tt yconsti    
Rule  IV : .~)~( 4444 t
T
tt yconsti    
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Four policy rules are all variants of the conventional Taylor rules discussed in 
Subsection 5.3.2.  ‗Rule I‘ uses ex-post final data series for the inflation and the output 
gap, while ‗Rule IV‘ uses real-time data for the inflation and the output gap. ‗Rule II‘ 
consists of the final inflation data and real-time output gap data, and vice versa for 
‗Rule III‘. Each policy rule constitutes the small system of model with inflation and the 
output gap equations, Equations (5.7) and (5.8) discussed above. For convenience, let 
us call each system of model Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 and Case 4, respectively: for 
example, Case 1 consists of the Phillips curve, the IS curve and ‗Rule I‘, Case 2 
consists of the Phillips curve, the IS curve and ‗Rule II‘, and so on. 
Turning to the Bayesian estimation, the key reason for adopting this approach is 
that it easily allows us formalise the use of prior information obtained from previous 
macroeconometric studies, and as a result, it provides an explicit link with the previous 
calibration-based literature.120 The Bayesian approach yields estimates of the policy 
reaction parameters along with the structural parameters within the model system at the 
same time. This method initially maximise the posterior distributuion around the mode, 
and use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw from the posterior distribution in 
order to approximate the moments of the distribution and calculate the mean.
121
 
As stated in An and Schorfheide (2007), in principle priors can be gleaned from 
one‘s introspection to reflect one‘s firmly-held beliefs on the validity of economic 
theories, but in practice most priors are chosen based on some observations considering 
                                                 
120   Besides, from a practical perspective, it is known that the use of prior distributions over the structural 
parameters makes the highly nonlinear optimisation algorithm more stable. See, for example, Smets and Wouters 
(2003) and An and Schorfheide (2007) for a more detailed discussion. 
121     To this end, we rely on a software dynare, which can be downloaded from the website www.dynare.org. 
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the possible domains and shapes of parameter distribution. The priors on parameters for 
the Phillips curve and the IS curve are initially set following the values corresponding 
to those in existing studies122. The value of slope coefficient on the Phillips curve, b , is 
assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a mean of 0.15 and a standard error of 
0.01. The value of slope coefficient on the IS curve, d , is also assumed to be gamma 
distributed with a mean of 1.5 and a standard error of 0.2. The gamma distribution 
helps to guarantee the positive values of corresponding coefficients. The priors on the 
parameters },{ ca  for variables of the Phillips curve and the IS curve are assumed to be  
beta distributed with a mean of 0.5 and a standard error of 0.2. The beta distribution 
allows the coefficients to take a positive value between 0 and 1. These specifications 
are all quite standard calibrations. The prios for the coefficients in the monetary policy 
rules, opjθ  
and opjχ , are both assumed to be gamma distributed, and they are chosen 
based on values typically associated with the standard Taylor rule. Particularly, the 
long-term coefficient on inflation guarantees a unique solution path when solving the 
model. 
On the whole, the estimated posterior parameters appear to be reasonable. The 
estimated posterior means of the structural parameters and policy reaction parameters 
are close to the means of the prior assumptions. By and large, most posterior estimates 
of the parameters are not different from OLS estimates except for the slope parameter, 
b  of the Phillips curve. 
The prior distributions and posterior estimates of parameters along with OLS 
                                                 
122     See, for instance, Luoto (2009), Smets and Wouters (2003), Taylor (1993), and Rudebusch (2002a,b). 
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results are reported in Table 5.2. 
 




Prior Posterior estimates (Mean) 
Domain Dist. Mean St. Error Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
a  0.756 [0,1) beta 0.5 0.2 0.703 0.753 0.531 0.574 
b  0.089 + gamma 0.15 0.01 0.154 0.149 0.153 0.149 
c  0.849 [0,1) beta 0.5 0.2 0.504 0.541 0.500 0.541 
d  1.656  + gamma 1.5 0.2 1.500 1.500 1.499 1.501 
op
n  -  
+
 gamma 1.5 0.2 1.703 1.619 1.495 1.496 
op
n  -  
+
 gamma 0.5 0.1 0.597 0.541 0.551 0.503 
i  
(constant) 
-  normal 0.05 0.01 0.050 0.051 0.049 0.050 




 percentiles) of the posterior distributions for the  
Parameters are not reported in Table 5.2. 
 
5.5.2   The Central Bank’s Loss Values and Data Uncertainty 
Before calculating expected loss values, it is useful to simplify loss function (5.9)-
(5.10). As ,1  the intertemporal loss function, (5.9)-(5.10), can be represented by 
the unconditional mean of the period loss function, ][ tLE  which is equal to the 




tt yVarλππVarLE       (5.19) 
 
This is the standard loss function in the literature (Rudebusch, 2005; Froyen and 
Guender, 2007). 
Given each relative weight on the output gap stabilisation, the policy rule (5.17) or 
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(5.18) assuming the models (5.7)-(5.8) and the loss function (5.9)-(5.10) yields the 
corresponding loss values. We plug (ex-post) final data for the inflation rate and the 
output gap into Rule I, and also into loss function, while pluging real-time data for 
them into Rule IV and the corresponding loss function. In the case of Rule II, we plug 
ex-post data for the inflation rate and real-time data for the output gap, and vice versa 
for for the Rule III. 
Table 5.3 provides the efficient (or optimal) feedback parameters for each of the 
four policy rules under different assumptions about the degree of data uncertainty, and 
the expected values of the loss function associated with changes of weights on the goal 
variables. Notice that policy reaction parameter values came from Table 5.2 that 
reported posterior means estimated by Bayesian methods within the model systems. 
Under these parameter values and the relative weight on the output gap stabilisation to 
inflation rate stabilisation, we calculated the expected loss values. The feedback 
parameters are said to be optimal as they are the values that minimise the central bank‘s 
loss for each case of policy interest rule.  
 
Table 5.3:    Optimal Policy Rules and Loss Values under Data Uncertainty 
 
  Data Noise  Rule Parameters  Expected Loss 
   
  
 
   
  
op
j    
op
j   75.0  50.0  25.0  00.0  
I Rule   0.00 0.00  1.703 0.597  4.36 3.28 2.34 1.35 
IIRule   0.00 1.54  1.619 0.541  4.45 3.38 2.51 1.51 
IIIRule   0.52 0.00  1.495 0.551  6.58 4.76 3.13 1.31 
IVRule   0.52 1.54  1.496 0.503  6.60 4.88 2.75 1.45 
Notes: 1. 
 and  denote the degree of data noise, measured by standard deviations of the noises of infl- 
ation and the output gap, respectively. 
2.  In the notation of rule parameters, the subscript, j takes 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the corresponding model. 
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Comparing the policy rule parameters, it is by and large found that the greater the 
degree of data uncertainty, the smaller the size of the optimal rule coefficients. For the 
case with no data uncertainty, i.e., the (0, 0) pair, the optimal policy rule has 
coefficients 703.1=1θ  and .597.0=1χ  However, for the case with data uncertainty, i.e., 
the (0.52, 1.54) pair, the optimal rule has coefficients 496.1=4θ  and 503.0=4χ . The 
cases of the (0, 1.54) and (0.52, 0) pairs on data noises mean the policy rules assuming 
uncertainty about only one variable, thereby yielding 619.1=2θ  and 541.0=2χ , and 
495.1=3θ  and ,551.0=3χ  respectively. 
These results imply that when the policymaker faces an economy like Equation (5.7) 
and (5.8), he has to choose the op
j  and 
op
j  parameters of the each policy rule so as to 
minimise the loss value in the presence of such data uncertainty. For comparison, the last 
four columns for the expected losses show the results according to the degree of data 
uncertainty. The increasing amount of data uncertainty on the whole leads to the larger 
expected loss for changes of weights on the goal variables. For instance, in the case with 
75.0 , the Rule IV with data uncertainty in both the inflation rate and the ouput gap has 
an expected loss of 6.60, while the Rule I under data certainty has an expected loss of 4.36. 
In summary, it is found that the greater the output-gap uncertainty, the smaller the 
output-gap response coefficients in the optimal rules, and in a similar vein, the greater the 
inflation uncertainty, the smaller the inflation response coefficients. These findings are in 
accord with the literature on data uncertainty (for example, Rudebusch, 2001; Svensson 
and Woodford; 2003; and Orphanides, 2001 and 2003, among others), implying that the 
central bank under data uncertainty should less actively respond to fluctuations in the 
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output gap or inflation rate with uncertainty  
 
5.6  Conclusion 
Over the past decade and a half, monetary policy guided by simple policy rules has 
shown good results in simulated models of the macroeconomy, and accordingly much 
quantitative evidence has continued to accumulate. It may be true that simple policy rules 
appear to have offered useful baselines for monetary policy discussions. However, it is 
also true that some researchers have argued that the usefulness of simple rules for policy 
analyses may collapse when we introduce informational problem pertaining to some of 
the advocated policy rules. 
In this context, on Korean data, we introduced data uncertainty into the derivation of 
optimal policy rules, and examined how the optimal policy rules change when 
uncertainty on data increases. 
We have shown that it is of great importance for the central bank to consider 
incomplete information for the conduct of monetary policy. The main finding is that the 
greater the output-gap uncertainty, the smaller the output-gap response coefficients in the 
optimal rules, and in a similar vein, the greater the inflation uncertainty, the smaller the 
inflation response coefficients. Another finding is that the optimal policy rules derived by 
using data without errors showed the larger size of the output-gap and inflation response 
coefficients. These findings, in accord with the existing literature on data uncertainty 
reviewed in Chapter 2, imply that the ideal monetary policy behaviours by the central 
banks under certainty might be more responsive to economic conditions. In fact, however, 
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central banks face a large amount of uncertainty about the actual state of the economy 
when setting their policy interest rates at each period of time. The evaluation of monetary 
policy in most empirical studies relies on the unrealistic assumption that policymakers 
know for sure the current state of the economy with no errors. But, the actual monetary 
policy always involves decisions and judgments that are based on real-time data which 
are incomplete. As discussed earlier, some measures, especially macroeconomic data 
such as the output gap and inflation rate, are subject to large and frequent revisions 
following the initial data release. 
In this respect, data uncertainty may be one of the sources explaining the reasons 
why monetary policymakers react less aggressively in setting their interest rates 
instrument. Intuitively, in an environment where data uncertainties are rife, an 
excessively aggressive policy response would induce unnecessary variations in interest 
rates, leading to undesirable fluctuations in inflation and output. Hence, it is quite natural 
that central bankers choose a gradual adjustment of policy rates to avoid undue 
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Chapter 6  




6.1   Introduction 
For several decades before 2007, many advanced countries were relatively successful in 
keeping inflation at a low and stable level. As a consequence, some central bankers 
became more confident that they could control economic fluctuations including inflation. 
During the period from the 1990s through to the early 2000s, many countries adopted an 
IT regime for their monetary policy framework. Its successful outcomes in curbing 
inflation led central bankers to believe that they had conquered inflation, moreover to 
think that they could even flatten business cycles. 
Notwithstanding these good outcomes, there was a growing concern that heightened 
risks of financial instability had been accumulated in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
dot-com bubble since the late 1990s. In fact, financial imbalances might be hidden 
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behind low and stable inflation. Rapid financial liberalisations and developments 
hindered the detection of distortions in the financial markets. During the period of 1980–
2007, inflation in the real sector was largely stabilised. However, the prices of assets 
such as real estate became more volatile than ever before, fluctuating sharply with 
economic conditions. Consequently, central banks were given a new task to conduct an 
effective policy to stabilise the financial sector and to minimise macroeconomic 
instability stemming from large swings in asset prices even in a low and stable price 
environment (see Allen and Rogoff (2011), among others). 
After the summer of 2007, the global economy was faced with more severe financial 
turmoil than it had ever experienced before. Booms and busts in asset prices led to 
financial crises and economic recession in many countries. The recent financial crisis 
gave a chance to revisit an old question: should central banks take into account the 
changes in the prices of assets – in particular, housing and land – in the conduct of 
monetary policy? Excessive fluctuations (i.e., booms and busts) in asset prices become a 
more crucial source of macroeconomic instability in both advanced and emerging 
countries. 
Asset prices are conceptually somewhat different from the prices of current goods 
and services: they are inherently forward-looking variables in that they reflect the 
expectations of market participants about the value of future streams of their underlying 
pay-offs, which implies that they include useful information about future supply and 
demand conditions. Shifts in asset prices affect household wealth and firms‘ market 
valuation, and hence have an impact on consumer spending and firms‘ investment 
expenditures, as a result affecting aggregate demand. Consequently, asset prices include 
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important information regarding the current and future state of the economy and can play 
an important role in the monetary policy framework aimed at attaining the goals of price 
stability while also minimising fluctuations in the real economy123. 
In general, prices are determined by the fundamentals of supply and demand in the 
economy. Growth in demand relative to supply comes to be reflected in rising prices. For 
the assets, we cannot directly observe many of these fundamental factors that affect the 
market‘s expectations of future supply and demand. At times, asset prices seem to drift 
further away from their underlying fundamental determinants. Such a circumstance may 
indicate that there is a developing bubble in the asset market that will burst at some time 
in the future. Since historical experience124 indicates that boom-bust cycles in asset prices 
can be damaging to the economy, the following question arises: should central banks 
directly act earlier to control the sharp increase in asset prices, i.e., prick the bubble? 
In this chapter, we build a forward-looking structural model that consists of the 
Phillips curve, the IS curve and monetary policy reaction rules, forming a small dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The advantages of DSGE models are that 
they can be solved in a system and they allow us to compare the performance of 
alternative monetary policies under different assumptions. By using them, it is possible 
for us to see what should be the best response of central banks to changes in asset prices 
in order to make a positive contribution to achieving economic stability. In this context, 
the purpose of this chapter is normative differently than Capters 4 and 5 which had a 
                                                 
123     In the conceptual context, this policy framework is commonly known as a flexible inflation targeting. See, for 
instance, Svensson (2002) and Walsh (2009), among others. 
124      Most notable examples are the US stock market bubble associated with the advent of a New Economy in the 
late 1990s, the Japanese real estate market boom-bust in the early 1990s, and the global financial crisis triggered by the 
US sub-prime market defaults in 2007. 
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positive intent. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 looks into major discussions 
on what implications asset-price volatility has for monetary policy and how monetary 
policy authorities should respond to this. Before turning to modeling monetary policy 
actions, Section 6.3 briefly discusses the concept of ―excess liquidity‖ and its measure 
and examines the relationship of excess liquidity to house-price bubbles; subsequently 
dealing with a brief overview on the movements of asset prices, and presenting the 
dynamic correlation between inflation and prices of assets including mainly house and 
land prices in order to see if there is the precedence of asset prices to inflation in Korea. 
Section 6.4 formulates the structural model and discusses the model solutions, and 
explains the estimation procedures. This modelling process here is designed to seek 
optimal policy actions under the assumption that the central bank responds to house 
prices. Section 6.5 compares and analyses the effect of monetary policy by using optimal 
control analysis, to examine which policy choice is more effective in terms of validity 
between the one pursuing price stability only and the other one considering price stability 
and asset price volatility together. Section 6.6 concludes and draws policy implications 
based on the empirical results.  
 
6.2   House Prices and Monetary Policy  
 
6.2.1    The Roles of Housing in the Economy 
Regarding the role of asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy, particular attention 
has to be paid to housing. This is justified by the importance of housing for economic 
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activity: first of all, housing assets function as durable goods and production factors. That 
is to say, they provide residential services to households and can be input into production 
for firms; second, in the case that financial institutions (banks) offer credit to lenders, 
housing plays a role as collateral for the households, which may be a key factor for a 
potential amplifying channel on the effects of monetary policy. Likewise, the availability 
of bank credit to households depends significantly on the collateral of households, which is 
why credit provision has a positive relationship with house-price movements. In this regard, 
housing stimulates households‘ spending activity in line with the improved bank loan 
availability thanks to the increased value of collateral. In contrast, if the value of a house as 
collateral declines due to falls in prices, house assets could have a negative impact on 
consumption of households. This implies that real estate like housing is a transmission 
channel which not only passes on external shocks into other economic variables through 
fluctuations in real estate prices, but also acts as a factor leading to business fluctuations; 
and lastly, the house as an asset in households‘ investment portfolios provides a potential 
capital gain for them when its prices rise. In reality, it accounts for a much larger 
proportion of wealth that households own. 
 
6.2.2    How Important are House Prices in the Monetary Transmission?  
Changes in interest rates caused by monetary policy actions have an impact on the 
domestic aggregate demand both directly, by affecting residential construction and 
households‘ spending plans via the changes in availability and cost of credit, and 
indirectly by leading to changes in house prices (Mishkin, 1995 and 2001; IMF, 2008). 
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The indirect channel can be described in more detail as follows. Firstly, an 
expansionary monetary policy that lowers interest rates leads the costs of financing 
housing to decline, as a result of which the demand for housing increases and thus house 
prices rise. When expansionary monetary policy results in declines in interest rates 
(return on assets), the demand for a substitute grows. This brings about rises in the price 
of real estate (i.e., buildings and land owned by households or firms). From the 
perspective of construction firms, significant rises in house prices compared to the cost of 
housing construction lead them to increase their supply of housing because the firms‘ 
profitability improves (Tobin's Q)
125
. As a result, economic agents increase their 
investment in and consump-tion of housing, raising aggregate demand and aggregate 
output. Mishkin (2001) calls this channel a direct effect on housing expenditure.  
Secondly, fluctuations in real estate prices affect economic activity through an asset-
price channel. In this channel, wealth effects play an important role in consumption 
theory. According to Modigliani (1966 and 1971)‘s life-cycle hypothesis, in periods 
when there are growing prices in real estate such as home and land, due for example to 
expansionary monetary policy, households tend to regard their lifetime income (wealth or 
permanent income) as increasing (wealth effects). And, real estate plays a crucial role as 
collateral that households can offer when they borrow from financial institutions. 
Household borrowers who have a good financial status (in terms of balance sheets) can 
be offered larger loans with relatively low cost (collateral effects). Accordingly, 
households who witness increased permanent income and an improved borrowing 
                                                 
125     Strictly speaking, this is a variant of Tobin‘s Q-theory in which Q for housing investment is the price of housing relative 
to its replacement costs (Mishkin, 2001). According to Tobin's Q, the profitability of property investment depends on the ratio 
between house prices and construction costs.  
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condition, tend to expand their current consumption by cutting their savings or increasing 
borrowings even if their income is not on the rise at present. 
 
Figure 6.1:    House Prices and the Monetary Transmission Channels 
                   (The case of Declines in Policy Interest Rates) 
 
Note: For simplicity, the figure does not show all interactions between variables. 
Source: Adapted from IMF (2008), Mishkin (1995, 2008) and others. 
 
Thirdly, fluctuations in real estate prices affect the macroeconomy through the bank 
balance-sheet channel. When declines in interest rates lead to rises in real estate prices, 
the value of real estate held as collateral by financial institutions (banks) grows, thereby 
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soundness of financial institutions is enhanced, their lending capacity may expand, 
enabling banks to respond well to the demand for money from households or firms. This 
results in an expansion in consumption and investment in the economy.  On the contrary, 
decreases in real estate prices reduce collateral values, which contracts the supply of credit 
by financial institutions (banks), and this leads to decreases in consumption and investment 
by economic agents. As a consequence, aggregate output declines. In this context, 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) introduce the concept of the ‗financial accelerator‘ in order to 
prove the fact that the credit supply by banks is closely related with the business cycle of 
the housing markets. The transmission channel, which appears when real estate prices 
sharply fall, is also referred to as the ‗capital crunch‘, which could act as a critical factor 
behind stagnation. Such stagnation occurred in the early 1990s and the late 2000s in the US 
while it took place in Japan from the early 1990s throughout the 2000s. 
 
6.2.3   Fluctuations in Real Estate Prices and Monetary Policy: Two 
  Views 
 
As fluctuations in the prices of assets including real estate have deepened worldwide 
since the late 1990s, there have been contrasting views on the necessity of monetary 
policy responding to these fluctuations. 
 
6.2.3.1   Indirect Responses  
Most central banks including the US Federal Reserve Bank and many economists point 
out that central banks should respond to fluctuations in asset prices only when there is a 
much higher concern that asset prices are accelerating and as a consequence, threatening 
price stability. They argue that central banks should not use monetary policy just to 
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eliminate bubbles in asset prices. This view is known as the so-called ―benign neglect‖ 
approach. 
More specifically, this view reflects the following thoughts. First of all, the 
correlation between asset prices and interest rates is uncertain, and central banks do not 
hold appropriate tools to eliminate bubbles only from asset prices. That is, the adjustment 
of interest rates, which is one of the representative policy tools used by central banks, 
affects the economy across the board, not just in asset markets. Monetary policy may be 
too blunt a tool for effectively dealing with bubbles per se126. 
Secondly, it is also important to consider that central banks are faced with 
uncertainty in assessing the level of asset prices and judging whether there are bubbles in 
them. Determinants
127
 of asset prices can be also affected by individual subjective 
expectations as to the degree of uncertainty.  For this reason, it is difficult to separate 
expectation factors from the value of the asset, which is why there cannot help but exist 
various contrasting views regarding appropriate levels in asset prices. Moreover, as 
stated by Bernanke and Gertler (1999), it is nearly impossible to know for sure whether 
given changes in asset prices come from economic fundamentals or not. Greenspan 
(2002) frequently emphasises the uncertainty in assessing asset prices, thus arguing that 
it is an illusion for central banks to tackle bubbles in asset prices through policy such as 
appropriate increases in interest rates, and that it is difficult to distinguish a bubble only 
                                                 
126   Regarding this problem, Bernanke (2002) points out: ―Certainly there is no way to direct the effects of 
monetary policy at a single class of assets while leaving other financial markets and the broader economy untouched. 
One might as well try to perform brain surgery with a sledgehammer.‖ 
127    For instance, flow of expected return on assets (for example, dividend, land prices), flow of expected return on 
investment substitute (government bond), the prices an asset owner expects when reselling assets in the future, and 
relative risk resulting from owning a specific asset and liquidity.  
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even if central banks carry out preemptive monetary policy. In the presence of growing 
uncertainty, it poses a limitation in responding to large surges in asset prices with 
monetary policy. This is because, as there is a significant bias within an expectation 
factor which is one of the determinants of asset prices, monetary policy in response to 
fluctuations in asset prices cannot help but be carried out under uncertainty, which 
could result in the wrong policy being selected (Greenspan, 1998).  
Lastly, it cannot be said that central banks are more capable of interpreting 
information contained in fluctuations in asset prices than market participants. Moreover, 
it is unclear if central banks can figure out whether rises in asset prices originate from 
improved fundamentals or from speculative bubbles
128
. 
Poole (2001) argues that the performance of the stock market should not be a 
direct object for monetary policy of central banks, and insists that any policy measures 
targeting the stock market per se would be self-defeating. Regarding this, he points out 
the reason that, although it is true that there is useful information on future profitability 
of firms, fluctuations in stock prices can be affected also by an unreasonable 
component such as ―irrational exuberance‖, which does not reflect economic 
fundamentals (Greenspan, 1996). In other words, as the stock market itself does not 
always provide reliable information, stock prices should be used in complementing and 
confirming the information obtained from other sources. Therefore, he argues that, 
unless it is the case that there is a concern that the market mechanism could be put at 
risk on account of disorder in financial markets caused by fluctuations in asset prices, 
                                                 
128     See, The New York Times (15 November 1998), ―Inside the Head of the Fed; Alan Greenspan's Journey to the 
New World Economy.‖ Greenspan argues that there exists a fundamental problem in market intervention, which is that 
the agent who intervenes assumes that he knows better than the market does. 
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central banks should not target asset prices per se
129
.  This view is often referred to as 
the ―Greenspan doctrine‖ 130. 
Bordo and Jeanne (2002a,b) argue that central banks should intervene in bubbles of 
asset prices in a selective way only when the utility gained by preventing bubble bursts in 
the future are considered larger than the costs generated by tightened monetary policy. In 
other words, when bubble formation can be prevented through other policy measures such 
as supervision and regulation, it is desirable for central banks to refrain from carrying out 
the tightening of monetary policy  doeswhich could provoke economic recession. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999 and 2001) and Bernanke (2002) argue that it is 
undesirable for central banks to respond to fluctuations in asset prices as monetary policy 
should be concentrated on stabilising expected inflation. But they point out that central 
banks should consider asset price movements as long as they are helpful in predicting 
inflation.  And they argue that the best policy measure is an adoption of flexible inflation 
targeting (IT), claiming that, except in situations where fluctuations in asset prices are 
expected to affect inflation and output, central banks should not respond to fluctuations 
in asset prices. The reason behind this argument is based on the fact that it is difficult to 
identify clearly whether rises in asset prices originate from improved economic 
fundamentals, from non-fundamental factors such as speculative activity, or from both. 
Rises in asset prices tend to spur aggregate demand while declines in asset prices tend to 
contract aggregate demand. Therefore, under the IT regime strongly focusing on 
stabilising aggregate demand including inflation, central banks can pre-emptively 
                                                 
129    In fact, for example, the Federal Reserve Bank responded immediately after a plunge in stock markets in October 
1987, Russia's declaration of moratorium and bankruptcy of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in August 1998. 
130    Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Greenspan often argued that central banks should not try to 
‗lean against asset-price bubbles, but rather should clean up after they burst‘ (Greenspan, 2002). 
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respond to asset prices at the early stage in which instability in asset prices occurs (this 
strategy is also called ―leaning against the wind‖ with respect to booming asset prices). 
This automatic reaction can achieve to some degree stabilisation of financial markets, 
together with stabilisation of the economy.131 
Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) argue that, as asset prices are endogenous variables 
affected by capital stock and industrial productivity, as a whole representing economic 
conditions, monetary policy should respond directly to the determinants of asset prices 
rather than to asset prices themselves. 
 
6.2.3.2   Direct Responses 
In recent years, it has frequently been witnessed that bubbles in asset prices accelerate 
inflationary pressures and the bubble bursting generates financial instability, deepening 
economic recession. For this reason, there are increasing arguments that, even during the 
period when general prices appear stable, central banks should actively and pre-emptively 
respond to sharp fluctuations in asset prices in order to stabilise financial markets.  
The background behind this view is based on three arguments: first, asset prices 
become misaligned from underlying fundamentals, and if the misalignments persist for a 
long time, macroeconomic stability as well as the financial soundness of households and 
                                                 
131   In this regard, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) point out three reasons: firstly, macroeconomic stability under the 
circumstances in which there is neither inflation nor deflation contributes itself to financial market stability; secondly, 
when asset prices decline, central banks‘ financial stability-policy can help to offset to some degree the deterioration in 
balance sheets of households and firms, reducing vulnerability of the economy to negative shocks; and finally, if financial 
market participants expect central banks to carry out policy focusing on the effects of aggregate demand pressures on 
inflation, thereby raising (cutting) interest rates in a period of sharp surges (crashes) in asset prices, such a strategy will act 
as a warning against economic overheating (recession), consequently alleviating overreactions in asset prices arising from 
non-fundamental forces and market psychology such as investors‘ irrational behaviour, for example, herd behavior, 
excessive optimism or short-termism. 
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firms could be seriously threatened. In reality, it has been often witnessed that bubbles in 
asset prices aggravate inflationary pressures and that financial instability worsens when the 
bubble bursts. Looking into the cases of advanced countries such as the US and Japan, 
rapid rises in asset prices are commonly based on expansionary monetary policy through 
banks‘ excessive credit expansions (Cecchetti et al., 2000). Bubbles in asset prices occur in 
the following process: escalating prices in assets which are used as collateral for loans, this 
expands the capacity to lend, leading to increases in credit. Therefore, there is a growing 
argument that it is necessary to cut the circular linkages of asset-price rises and consequent 
credit expansion by using tools such as financial system regulation and supervision along 
with monetary policy (Kent and Lowe, 1997). It implies that a monetary policy response is 
necessary to prevent the side effects of bubbles in asset prices, even when expected 
inflation is lower than its target in the short-run. Moreover, bubbles would burst anyway, 
and notably, when the bubbles burst after growing for a long time, it could have a negative 
effect on the whole financial system, and this could lead to lower economic growth and 
deflation, ultimately resulting in a worse recession. And when central banks aggressively 
respond to fluctuations in asset prices by raising policy rates, this can lower the possibility 
of the bubble occurring at an early stage, and by doing so, central banks can prevent a 
worst situation developing, such that fluctuations in asset prices affect inflation and growth. 
Notably, once a bubble occurs, it is difficult to tackle this with monetary policy only, and 
when the bubble bursts, it brings about imbalances in the balance sheets of financial 
institutions and firms, causing the financial system to deteriorate. All these things 
considered, it is necessary for central banks to take measures to prevent the occurrence of 
bubbles in asset prices in advance (Goodhart, 1999b). 
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Second, asset prices play an important role in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
As bubble booms and busts destabilise financial markets and institutions, which play a 
crucial function in the transmission channels of monetary policy, and moreover constrain 
policy effects, it is argued that central banks should actively respond to fluctuations in 
asset prices. Rises in asset prices expand consumption expenditure through wealth effects 
and boost firms‘ investment expenditure through the effects of loans increasing, resulting 
from the rising value of collateral. Such an expansion of consumption and investment, 
i.e., increases in aggregate demand may provoke inflationary pressures in the economy. 
In particular, Blanchard (2000) argues that, it is more desirable for central banks to 
conduct tighter monetary policy in the presence of bubbles than is implied by inflation 
targeting, considering the so-called ‗composition effects‘, implying that asset bubbles 
have larger effects on investment than on consumption.132 
Third, the consumer price index (CPI) is theoretically imperfect as an indicator for 
measuring inflation in that not just current but also future consumer prices of commodities 
and services have an impact on currency value (Kent and Lowe, 1997). Since physical or 
financial assets are claims to future consumption, fluctuations in their prices reflect 
changes in expected future returns which can be gained from those assets. Regarding this, 
                                                 
132    According to Blanchard (2000), under the circumstance that aggregate demand pressures aggravate owing to 
expanded bubbles, the central bank can choose one of two policies: first, it can maintain aggregate demand to a certain level 
by raising policy rates in order to keep the inflation target. However, such a policy has a problem that brings about a change in 
the composition of output: investment goes up, but consumption decreases as output may be constant. Bubbles lead to 
excessive capital accumulation; second, the central bank can target constant investment by increasing interest rates in order to 
avoid excessive capital accumulation. Because this policy is more aggressive than the first, a recession may be inevitable: 
investment remains constant, but consumption decreases due to higher interest rates, and so do demand and output. 
For the first strategy, once bubbles suddenly burst, it leads to a lot of useless capital, serious collateral problems for 
firms, and economic recession for some time after the collapse of bubbles. The second strategy may not give rise to this 
problem. But, such a result is obtained at the expense of tightened policy, and severe recession may occur due to too 
tightened a policy. Therefore, he claims that the central bank should choose the strategy that is likely to be somewhere in 
between the two strategies: to take a bit more aggressive policy stance than is suggested by inflation targeting. 
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Alchian and Klein (1973) argue that, when asset prices fluctuate sharply, the existing 
consumer prices which do not reflect their fluctuations, distort the signs of prices and 
consequently provoke an inefficient allocation of resources, adding that it is necessary to 
create a price index which includes asset price movements. Goodhart (1995, 1999b) and 
Filardo (2000) also raise similar arguments to those of Alchian and Klein (1973). They 
argue that central banks‘ policy goals should be broadened to reflect asset prices. Central 
banks should give more attention to future fluctuations in prices of commodities and 
services, whose fluctuations cannot be measured directly. They claim that it is possible to 
grasp fluctuations in prices of services and commodities by creating a broader measure of 
inflation that reflects asset price movements. 
 
6.3   House Prices and Bubbles in Korea 
This section reviews an explanation of the concept of ‗excess liquidity‘ and its measure. 
After analysing house-price bubbles using Korean data, we briefly analyse the relationship 
of excess liquidity to house-price bubbles. Next, we investigate the relationships among 
house prices and macroeconomic variables such as inflation and the GDP gap in Korea. 
 
6.3.1   The Concept of ‘Excess Liquidity’ 
The ‗liquidity‘ is an elusive term that can be interpreted in different ways. It can be used 
to describe the presence of money stock in financial markets like money and equity 
markets. In addition, it also refers to the total quantity of money supplied by the central 
bank in an economy. In this regard, liquidity is often used to depict the central bank‘s 
monetary policy stance (IMF, 2007).  
The term ‗excess liquidity‘ is also ill-defined. In fact, excess liquidity has an 
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immense impact on financial conditions in the economy. It has in particular recently 
drawn great attention from central bankers and market participants regarding the latest 
financial crisis. In this case, the concept of liquidity is used to mean ―monetary liquidity‖, 
associated with low interest rates or much easier borrowing conditions caused by the 
accommodative stance of monetary policy
 133
. 
Monetary liquidity, which is often regarded as linked to conditions in short-term 
credit markets, is closely connected with short-term interest rates or the aggregate 
quantity of money. In general, monetary liquidity can be measured as a growth rate of a 
monetary aggregate (for example, the broad money or M2), or its relative ratio to a base 
like GDP (for a more detailed discussion, see Baks and Cramer (1999)). 
In this context, we can define some terminologies concerning the concept of liquidity. 
According to existing literature, monetary liquidity is measured as the ratio of a monetary 
aggregate to nominal GDP, that is, Lf/GDP
134, which is called a ‗liquidity/GDP ratio‘ 
(hereafter referred to as the ‗liquidity ratio‘). Then, the liquidity ratio gaps are defined as 
the deviations of the liquidity ratio from its long-term trends which are commonly 
calculated by Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filters.
135
  If the values of the liquidity ratio gaps are 
greater than those of their long-term trend, it can be said that there exists excess liquidity. 
                                                 
133    In the literature, multiple definitions of liquidity, for example, monetary liquidity and market liquidity, are often 
used without careful discernment in their meanings. However, the concept of monetary liquidity is different from that of 
market liquidity which usually refers to the ability of financial markets to absorb transitory changes (shocks) in supply and 
demand, accordingly leading to no large swings in prices or no significant loss of value. Nonetheless, these two concepts 
are intimately related to one another in that monetary liquidity supports market liquidity: for instance, abundant monetary 
liquidity tends to bring about increases in market liquidity by lowering the cost of funding (Baks and Cramer (1999). See 
also BIS (1999) for an overview of the definition and measuring issues of market liquidity.  
134    Here, Lf denotes the liquidity aggregates (stock) provided by all the financial institutions. To get this ratio, 
seasonally adjusted series of Lf and GDP are used. 
135    Because of quarterly data, λ=1600, the smoothing parameter is applied for obtaining long-term trends in the H-P 
filtering. 
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Finally, we define only the positive values of the liquidity ratio gaps as ‗excess liquidity‘. 
In periods when there exists excess liquidity in the economy, in other words, when the 
liquidity ratio is above its trend in the long-run, and ceteris paribus, there is a high 
possibility that asset prices will come to rise, leading to an increase in the return on assets. 
Figure 6.2 plots the evolutions of the call rates, excess liquidity and house-price 
change rates from 1987:q1 to 2011:q4. It is apparent that the Korean economy has 
experienced at least four occasions of excess liquidity since the late 1990s. The collection 
of house prices is relatively easier than that in other countries (e.g., U.S.) since they are 
released every month by a nationwide commercial bank, Kookmin Bank (KB). 
 
Figure 6.2:    Trends of Call rate, Excess Liquidity and House Prices 





Note: The return of house prices is calculated as change rates in house prices compared with the same 
periods of the previous years. 
Sources:  ECOS database, The Bank of Korea; and Kookmin Bank Survey. 
 
6.3.2.   Excess Liquidity and House-price Bubbles  
Similar to the calculation of the liquidity ratio gaps, the house-price gaps are calculated 
by subtracting the log values of long-term trends, obtained by the H-P filtering, from the 
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defined as house-price bubbles because central banks generally care more about them.
136
 
The bubbles are displayed in Figure 6.3, in which there are roughly four occasions when 
bubbles have occurred in Korea since the late 1990s like the case of excess liquidity. 
 
Figure 6.3:   Excess Liquidity and House-Price Bubbles 




Cross-correlation coefficients at various leads and lags up to 16 quarters are 
calculated in order to investigate the relationships between excess liquidity and house-price 
bubbles. Cross-correlations, albeit incomplete, show some dynamic relationships between 
variables. As reported in Table 6.1, although plus (+) signs of contemporaneous cross-
correlations are in line with theoretical predictions, they are not statistically significant. 
However, as seen in the first column of Table 6.1, the maximum cross-correlation is 
achieved at a lead of four quarters, and correlation coefficients in the ranges of the fourth 
and fifth quarters show a statistical significance, turning negative thereafter. This implies 
that excess liquidity tends to lead by four or five quarters ahead of the house-price bubbles. 
Here, it is important to notice that the ‗minus‘ (-k) and ‗plus‘ (+k ) signs mean ‗leads‘ and 
‗lags‘ of excess liquidity (Xt±k) to house-price  bubbles (Yt), respectively.  
                                                 
136    Of course, the formation of ―negative‖ bubbles is also possible. However, such bubbles are inclined to stem 
from a process of collapse of positive bubbles (ECB, 2005).  See also Semmler and Zhang (2007), Goodhart and 
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Interestingly, the cross-correlation analysis reveals that reverse relationships 
between the two variables occur, that is, house-price bubbles reversely move ahead of 
excess liquidity. It is evidently possible that an increase in house-related lending by 
financial institutions can be caused by escalating house prices and bubbles. This can be 
seen in the second column in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1:    Cross-correlations between Excess Liquidity and House-price Bubbles 
                     (1987:q1–2011:q4) 
Quarter (k ) 
Excess liquidity (Xt-k)
2)  
 House-price bubbles (Yt) 
House-price bubbles (Yt) 













































































     Note:  1) ** indicates that cross-correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The approximate critical value of the cross-correlation coefficient at the 5% two-tailed significance  
level is plus or minus N/2 , which is roughly 0.20, where N  is the length of the series. 
           2) The ‗minus‘(-k) and ‗plus‘(+k ) signs mean leads and lags of excess liquidity(Xt±k) to house-price  
  bubbles (Yt), respectively. 
 
In short, the exorbitant growth of monetary aggregates may, via changes in credit or 
excessive liquidity, convey some useful information on house prices which matter for the 
stability of the real economy and the financial system in Korea. It is found that house-price 
bubbles were all but accompanied by excess liquidity over the period after the late 1990s. 
 
6.3.3   Trends of House Prices and Inflation 
This subsection investigates the relationship of house and land prices to 
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macroeconomic variables such as inflation and the GDP gap in Korea. In order to 
compare the relationship among asset-price movements, changes in stock prices 
together with real estate prices are both considered. Due to the problem of data 
availability (particularly, house prices), the graphical analyses are conducted for the 
period after the late 1980s, and quarterly data are used considering that the evolutions 
of changes in GDP gaps, inflation and real estate prices are calculated on a quarter-on-
quarter basis. 
House prices are one of the representative real estate prices in Korea. Hence, we 
review the trends of asset prices focusing on the effects of house prices on inflation.  The 
inflation rate became a bit higher at the start of the 1990s but thereafter showed a general 
downward-trend. House and land price movements, on the whole, have shown similar 
patterns, while they differ in accordance with the extent of the rises and falls at different 
times. Figure 6.4 plots the trajectory of asset-price movements and inflation.  
As plotted in Panel A of Figure 6.4, both house and land prices fluctuated considerably 
in the late 1980s when the so-called ―three-lows prosperity‖ caused by low interest rates, low 
oil prices and the low dollar value resulted in excess liquidity, thereby leading to large surges 
in real estate prices and inflation. But they dropped sharply in the turmoil of the Korean 
currency crisis of 1997–1998. Since the early 2000s when the currency crisis was about to 
end and asset prices soared due to low interest rates, both prices again showed upward rises 
except for the two periods of 2003–2004 and 2007–2008137. 
                                                 
137   The first episode of downturns in house prices since 2000 is related to the economic downturn caused by the 
bursting of credit card bubbles in 2003. After the Korean currency crisis of 1997–1998, the government encouraged banks 
to issue credit cards to promote consumer spending, which resulted in the rise in the delinquency rate by over 14 percent at 
the end of 2003. The excessive indebtedness affected the real economy by weakening the private consumption expenditure 
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Their movements have varied over time: in the early 1990s, the land-price volatility 
showed more rapidly than that of house prices, and since the early 2000s, the volatility of 
house prices has been larger than that of land prices. Overall, the magnitudes of real 
estate price fluctuations are larger than those of inflation except for some periods of time. 
 
Figure 6.4:   Trends
1)
 in Inflation Rate and Changes in Asset Prices (1987:q1–2011:q4) 
(X-axis in quarters) 
 
Panel A:  Real Estate Prices and Inflation  
 
 
        Notes: 1) All the change rates except for GDP gaps are compared with the same periods of the previous years. 
2) Each of ‗P‘ and ‗T‘ denotes a peak and a trough in business cycles, respectively, in Korea, so that 
shaded areas represent economic recession periods. 




                                                                                                                                                 
and the housing purchases. The second is attributable to the 2007-2009 GFC that hit the world economy. Outbreak of the 
GFC contracted the domestic credit market which, in turn, decreased consumption, output, and house prices. 
House prices in nominal terms have 
risen dramatically over the past 20 
years. The figure in the right hand side 
plots the trajectory of house price and 
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Panel B:  Stock Prices and Inflation  
 
   
Source:  ECOS database, The Bank of Korea. 
 
Panel B of Figure 6.4 shows the movements of stock prices and inflation since the 
mid 1980s. It is noticeable that stock price changes repeatedly fluctuate without showing 
a clear relation with the inflation rate. In 1998, the CPI inflation rapidly rose while stock 
prices resurged immediately after a deep plunge. Hence, the theoretical predictions that 
wealth effects owing to rising stock prices would stimulate consumption, and accordingly 
lead inflationary pressures to accelerate is not clearly proven by the figure. This means 
that the effect channels of stock-price increases on inflation are not singular, and that it is 
difficult to explain clearly the relationships between the two variables due to the other 
effects caused by exchange rates, economic fundamentals like unit labor cost changes, 
and other variables.  
In order to examine how real estate prices move ahead of inflation rates, cross- 
correlation coefficients between house and land prices and inflation, and the GDP gap are 
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gap and are also positively correlated with inflation. In particular, house prices 
significantly lead inflation, while they are more concurrently correlated with the GDP 
gap than leading them. For land prices, they display more concurrent correlation with the 
GDP gap like house prices, and show positively strong correlations with inflation for a 
long time lag. Like house prices, land prices lead inflation as well. This result thereby 
makes it difficult for us to choose a certain lag of time. Stock prices appear to have 
statistically significant precedence over the GDP gap to some extent and therefore move 
in advance depending on predictions of future economic changes. But they do not seem 
to have statistically positive significant correlations with inflation. On the whole, real 
estate prices lead inflation while stock prices do not. This is mainly because real estate 
prices may be directly reflected in the price index as one of its components like rent, 
coupled with the high possibility that they affect prices through various channels such as 
wealth effects, cost channels associated with wages or rent, and inflation expectations. 
 
Table 6.2:   Dynamic Correlations
1)
 among Asset-price Changes and Inflation 
 (1987:q1-2011:q4) 
 
    Xt±k       Yt 
 ` k  = --6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 k  =  1 2 3 4 5 6 
House prices 
GDP gap   -0.14 -0.05 0.04 0.16 0.28 0.39 0.44 0.43 0.33 0.18 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 
Inflation   0.37 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.35 0.28 0.18 0.06 -0.02 -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.22 
Land prices 
GDP gap   -0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.35 0.38 0.33 0.23 0.14 0.05 0.01 
Inflation   0.60 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.53 0.47 0.38 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.07 
Stock prices 
GDP gap   0.12 0.13 0.22 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.18 -0.03 -0.30 -0.51 -0.60 -0.52 -0.29 
Inflation   0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.03 -0.13 -0.26 -0.37 -0.41 -0.33 -0.13 0.03 0.13 0.12 
Notes: 1) measured by cross-correlation coefficients between the GDP gap and CPI inflation at time t and percent 
changes in prices of house, land and stock assets at time t±k, respectively. 
2) The numbers in shaded areas indicate that correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The approximate critical value of the cross-correlation coefficient at the 5% two-tailed significance level is 
is a plus or minus N/2 , which is roughly 0.2, where N  is the length of the data series (i.e., 100N ). 
Sources:  Kookmin Bank Survey; and The Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs.  
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6.4   The Model 
In what follows, we introduce the basic New Keynesian (NK) model presented in the 
existing literature. This is followed by the discussions on the theoretical framework of a 
hybrid version of the NK model. And then, we show the state-space representation of the 
baseline model and explain the model solution method. In addition, we discuss the optimal 
control problem focusing mainly on the central bank‘s objective function which will be used 
to compare the central bank‘s responses. Finally, we will discuss the structure and feature of 
the alternative model which is of great importance in contrast to the baseline model. 
 
6.4.1   The Basic New Keynesian Framework 
The basic New Keynesian (NK) model introduced herein is taken from existing papers, for 
example, in Clarida et. al. (1999 and 2000), Woodford (2003a,b), and Giordani and 
Söderlind (2004). The basic NK model can be derived as log-linear approximations to 
equilibrium conditions of an underlying dynamic general equilibrium model with price 
stickiness
138
. While the model is very simple, it incorporates forward-looking private-
sector behaviour in three respects: households and firms‘ optimisation; rational 
expectations; and nominal price rigidity. In that sense, the NK model is a kind of 
―miniature‖ of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Appendix A 
shows explicit derivations of the basic NK model.
139
 The model‘s two key equations are 
the forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve (henceforth, ‗NKPC‘) of the form: 
                                                 
138     See Chapter 4 in Woodford (2003b). 
139    See also the textbooks by Woodford (2003a), Galí (2008) and Walsh (2010) and a paper by Galí and Gertler 
(2007), for a deeper discussion of the NK model, including the derivation of the first two equations. On the empirical 
sides, the majority of the existing literature focuses on the NKPC. However, there are also some studies on the 
optimising IS curve, for example, Fuhrer (2000) and Kara and Nelson (2004), among others. 
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,κyπδEπ tttt  1             (6.1)  
 
and the dynamic IS curve (or ‗DISC‘ for short, following Galí (2008))  of the form:  
 




1           (6.2) 
 
where t  stands for the inflation rate at time t , ty  denotes the output gap, defined as actual 
output relative to the equilibrium level of output under flexible prices, and ti  is the short-
term nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank. All three variables represent 
percentage deviations around their steady-state values. The last term 
n
tr  is the natural interest 
rate, defined as the equilibrium real rate of interest that equates actual output to its natural 
level.
140
  tE  denotes the rational expectations operator given the private sector information 
set at time t  which contains t , ty , ti  and all the lags of these variables.  The first Equation 
(6.1), the NKPC, describes the short-run dynamics of inflation arising from the process of 
wage-setting between firms and workers,
141
 while the second Equation (6.2) relates 
household spending decisions to the interest rate. 
As seen in Appendix A, the basic NKPC is a log-linear approximation to the first-
order condition for the optimal price-setting decisions by the representative supplier, 
combined with an equation relating marginal cost to real activity (Galí, 2008; Chapter 
                                                 
140     Note that the equilibrium real rate of interest is achieved when there is no nominal rigidity (Montoro, 2007). 
141    This curve implies that current inflation is affected by two components: one is expected future inflation that 
enters the curve to reflect price rigidity. The other is the marginal cost which enters due to monopolistic competition. 
This condition is captured by the output gap term which acts as a proxy for labour-market conditions affecting wages 
and thereby marginal cost. 
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3). This curve is often interpreted as an aggregate supply (AS) equation.
142
 The second 
equation of the NK model is the ―optimising‖ IS curve or the basic DISC, (6.2), which is 
often called an aggregate demand (AD) equation. The basic DISC can be interpreted as a 
log-linear approximation to the representative household‘s Euler equation for optimal 
consumption decisions. 
The parameters,   and ,  are both non-negative by assumption. The former, κ, 
which is the slope of (the short-run) Phillips curve, depends on the primitive parameters 
of the model, particularly the parameter that determines the average frequency of price 
changes
143
 and on the elasticity of demand that goods suppliers face. This parameter can 
be seen in Equation (A.35) in Appendix A and Equation (B.10) in Appendix B. Next, the 
latter,   is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The parameter 
1  
acts as the slope of the basic DISC. Finally,  ]1,0(  denotes the time discount factor of 
the price-setters, which is assumed to be the same as the discount factor of the 
representative household. In addition to the above two non-policy equations, in order to 
close the model, we need a block describing how monetary policy is conducted. The 
simplest possible monetary policy rule is given by a version of the so-called Taylor rule 
such as: 
 
ttytπt vyπi ++=  ,              (6.3) 
 
where ti  is the short-term nominal interest, and tv  is an exogenous component with zero 
                                                 
142    Notice that the basic NKPC or the AS curve is a generalisation of the supply specification originally introduced by 
Calvo (1983) assuming the presence of staggered nominal price-setting, and later more developed by, for instance, Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995) employing the overlapping wage contracting model in which relative real wages are regarded as important. 
143    In other words, the slope of the Phillips curve represents a measure of the speed of price adjustment. 
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mean. We further assume π  and y  are non-negative coefficients, chosen by the central 
bank. 
 
6.4.2   The Baseline Model: a Hybrid version of the NK Model 
The baseline model is a variant of the basic forward-looking models discussed above. 
The model is composed of three key structural relationships: the Phillips curve, the 
dynamic IS curve and the monetary policy rule equation. The first two equations 
constitute the non-policy block of the hybrid NK model. The last equation describes 
central banks‘ decision-making behaviour, which closes the NK model. 
Each of the equations includes a forward-looking part, and a lagged variable to reflect 
endogenous persistence of respective variables, which makes it possible to capture 
persistent dynamics in the economic activity. It is important to note that model descriptions 
will be based on the NK approach which stresses the importance of forward-looking 
expectations by economic agents. In addition, it is worth mentioning that there is no 
asymmetric information between economic agents (firms and households) and the central 
bank. Here, the baseline model is assumed to represent a flexible IT regime, mainly 
pursuing price stability. The three key equations will be explained in more detail as follows. 
 
6.4.2.1   The Hybrid Phillips Curve 
We assume that current inflation, t  is determined by three components: private-sector‘s 
time 1t  inflation expectations, 1ttE  conditional on the time t  information set; past 
inflation, 1t ; and the current output gap, ty . Here, it is important to note that the 
inclusion of the lagged term, 1t  into the basic NKPC is to capture inflation persistence 
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which is apparent in the actual data. This variant is referred to as a so-called ‗hybrid 
NKPC‘, which takes the form:  
 
,)(1ˆ 11 tty-tπ+ttπt u+yα+πα-+πEδα=π     (6.4)  
 
Appendix B.1 shows derivations of the hybrid NKPC.
144
 In Equation (6.4), the parameters, 
  and y , are assumed to be positive. From a microeconomic foundation view, the 
parameter ˆ  represents the factor with which goods suppliers discount future real 
income, and the latter, y  is the slope of the Phillips curve, depending on the average 
frequency of price changes and the elasticity of demand that suppliers face.
145
  In the 
simple case which excludes the output gap )( ty  in Equation (6.4)
 
, i.e., ,0y  it implies 
that inflation is affected by expected future inflation, 1ttE  and by past inflation, 1t  
with weights   and ,1   respectively. 
In Equation (6.4), the disturbance term, tu  represents an aggregate supply structural 
shock, assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and 
homoskedastic variance, 2
u . As in, for instance, Clarida et al. (1999), it can be interpreted 
as a cost-push shock captured by a first-order autoregression – or an AR(1) process: 
 
,εuρu ttut  1  where )1,0[u  and t  is i.i.d. N(0,
2
εσ ).      (6.5) 
                                                 
144     See, also the discussions in, particularly, Galí and Gertler (1999), Fuhrer (2000), Steinsson (2003) and Rudd 
and Whelan (2006) for the derivation of the hybrid version of the NKPC. 
145    In Equation (6.3), the parameter,  ˆ  corresponds to the subjective discount factor of the representative 
suppliers,   satisfying ,10   and 
y  corresponds to ,  i.e., )()1)(1(
1
n 
  which both appear in the original 
version of expectations-augmented Phillips curve, i.e., 
1 ttt E  ,ty which is often referred to as the ‗basic‘ New 
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). See more explanations in Clarida et al. (1999) and Walsh (2003 and 2010). 
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6.4.2.2    The Hybrid Dynamic IS Curve 
Again, it is assumed that the current output gap, ty  depends on the expectations as to the 
future output gap based on the information set at time t , 1tt yE , the past output gap, 1ty , 
and real interest rates, 1 ttt πEi , where ti  is a short-term nominal interest rate. Similar 
to the NKPC, note that the lagged term of the output gap is added to the basic DISC in 
order to capture the output gap persistence existing in the actual data. Let us call this 
modified curve a ‗hybrid DISC, yielding the form: 
 
,)()(1 111 t+ttti-ty+ttyt v+πE-iβ -yβ-+yEβ=y        (6.6) 
 
Appendix B.2 shows derivations of the hybrid DISC. In Equation (6.6), ty  is the output 
gap at time t , the parameters 
y  and iβ  are both assumed to be non-negative. In 
particular, iβ  corresponds to the slope of the basic IS curve, .
1  It is important to know 
that the IS curve relates the output gap inversely to the ex-ante real interest rate, which 
represents the monetary policy transmission channel in the IS curve. And, it is worth 
noting that Equation (6.6) will be slightly modified to reflect the simplicity of 
transmission mechanism of interest rates to house prices and to ultimately aggregate 
demand, already discussed in Figure 6.1 plotted in Section 6.2. 
The disturbance term, tv  in Equation (6.6), is an exogenous demand shock
146
, 
assumed to be i.i.d. with zero mean and homoskedastic variance, 2
v . It also obeys the 
stationary AR(1) process: 
                                                 
146     It is useful to know that the exogenous shock 
tv  contains ntir  for simplicity of the equation. 
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,1 ttvt vv     where )1,0[v  and t  is i.i.d. N(0,
2
 ).      (6.7) 
 
6.4.2.3    The Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
In order to close the NK model as stated earlier, we consider the equation describing how 
monetary policy is implemented. Such an equation is called a monetary policy rule in 
which the short-term nominal interest rate is the central bank‘s policy instrument. It is 
assumed that the central bank conducts the monetary policy according to the Taylor-rule 




,+)+)(1(+= 1+1 ttyttπ-tt eyπEρ-iρi     (6.8) 
 
where the disturbance term, te  is a zero-mean exogenous shock, assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed with homoskedastic variance, 2
e . As discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 5, the central bank facing uncertainty shows a tendency to move the 
key policy rate gradually. This tendency is called ―interest-rate smoothing‖. This feature 
can be incorporated in the monetary policy rule by including a partial adjustment term, 
placing a weight of   on the past values of policy interest rate, 1ti . The parameter,  , 
measures the degree of interest-rate smoothing by the central bank. Regarding the 
presence of an interest-rate smoothing component, many authors, for example, Clarida et 
                                                 
147    Since all variables are expressed as log-deviations from their steady-state values, a constant term was delted. 
In Equation (6.8), if there is a constant term 
ic  and when ),-)(-1(=
T
πi πiρc   this reaction function can be divided 
into two parts: 
tttt eiii  
*









are the actual policy 
instrument rate and the policy target rate, respectively. In the first equation, the lagged policy interest rate,
 1ti
, is 
included to capture the tendency of the central bank to smooth interest-rate adjustments; whereas *
ti  represents a 
forward-looking version of the simple Taylor rule whereby the central bank responds to deviations of expected 
inflation from the inflation target and to the current output gap as formulated in the second equation. See the discussion 
in Woodford (1999). 
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al. (1999 and 2000), Sahuc (2002) and Orphanides (2004), have pointed out that the 
above form of monetary policy rule best captures the actual data. Both   and y  are 
positive parameters, chosen by the central bank:   measures the degree of response of 
the central bank to the expected inflation; whereas 
y  gauges its reaction to the current 
output gap. Therefore, Equation (6.8) implies that the central bank responds to the past 
nominal rate of interest, expected future inflation and the current output gap, where the 
first two variables are used to justify the existence of possible monetary policy 
transmission delays to the economy. And it is assumed that the exogenous structural shock, 
te , follows an AR(1) process: 
 
,1 ttet ee     where )1,0[e  and t  is i.i.d. N(0,
2
 ).       (6.9) 
 
Here, it is worth noting that given inflation and the output gap, a positive realisation of te  
can be interpreted as a contractionary monetary policy shock, leading to a rise in the 
nominal interest rate, and vice versa for a negative case. 
 
6.4.3   The State-space Formulation of the Model and its Solution 
Equations (6.4) to (6.9), describing the key aggregate relationships of the economy based 
on the spirit of the New Keynesian approach form a system of difference equations that 
can be solved recursively. This section derives the linear rational expectations solution of 
the model. In order to solve the model numerically, we follow the standard solution 
algorithms for the linearised approximate model described in Sims (2002). 
Let us define a )18(   vector of endogenous variables as: 
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],,,,,,,[ 11   ttttttttttt EyEyievuX  ,    (6.10) 
 
a )18(   vector of variables contains the predetermined variables 1tu , 1tv , 1te , 1ti , 1ty  
and 1t , and the forward-looking variables at time 1t , tt yE 1  and ttE 1 : 
 
],,,,,,,[ 111111111   ttttttttttt EyEyievuX  ,            (6.11) 
 
a )13(   vector collecting the exogenous structural shocks for the predetermined 
variables, 1ti , 1ty  and 1t : 
 
],,[  ttttz  ,           (6.12) 
 
and a )12(   vector of endogenous forecast errors, fulfilling 01  ttE  for all t : 
 
],[   t
y




t yEy 1  and ttt
y
t E  1 . 
Recall that we assume rational expectations and no informational difference 
between the private-sector and the central bank. Hence, combining Equations (6.4)–(6.9), 
we have a system of difference equations, which can be written in state-space form as: 
 
.110 tttt zXCX               (6.14) 
 
where 0 , 1 ,   and   are matrices conformable to tX , 1tX , tz  and t  which are  
explained  above. 
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In this system, the )88(   coefficient matrices 0  and 1 , a vector of constants ,C  




































































































































































































The system can be expressed in a standard state-space form as follows: 
 





   ,1
1
0 
   10
  and  .10 
  
The model can be solved using the methods suggested by Sims (2002). It can then 
be estimated using the Kalman filter. 
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6.4.4   The Central Bank’s Objective Function 
 
In general, the optimal control model for analysing the effectiveness of monetary policies 
with different objectives is composed of the objective function of the policy authority 
and economic system equations that work as a constraint to the optimisation problem.  
We know that the optimal control framework has two useful features for policy 
analysis. One is that it deals with the existence of ‗uncertainty‘ as indicated by the 
terminology ‗expected‘. Since monetary policy works under variable lags, this 
framework is essential for a realistic description of the central bank‘s problem. The 
underlying assumption for this is that policymakers are faced with so-called Bayesian 
uncertainty, i.e., even if they do not know the exact realisation of future shock, they do 
know the characteristics of the probability distribution from which this shock is drawn. 
The other is that as already discussed in Chapter 2, if this shock enters the model 
additively and if the central bank‘s objective function takes a quadratic form, the model 
will display the convenient characteristic of ‗certainty equivalence‘. Alternatively, the 
model may display multiplicative uncertainty, in which case policymakers are uncertain 
about the impact of their actions on ultimate goal variables. 
Following the prior literature (most prominently Clarida et al., 1999), we assume that 













             (6.16)                                                     
 
subject to the constraints implied by (6.4) and (6.6) describing the structure of the 
economy, where ]1,0(  is the discount factor mentioned earlier, and the period loss 
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tt iyL            (6.17) 
 
where the parameters 0  and 0  are the relative weights placed on the output gap 
stabilisation and interest rate stability, respectively with respect to inflation stabilisation, 
and t , ty and ti  are the goal variables. This loss function penalises deviations of 
inflation from its target, ,
T  and variations in the output gap and the level of nominal 
interest rates. Therefore, Equation (6.17) is a case that can be called as a standard flexible 
IT regime. In the loss function, expectations are conditional on the economy‘s state at the 
time when alternative policies are to be evaluated, and assumed to occur earlier than the 
realisation of the exogenous economic shocks at time 0. This is a rather conventional loss 
function with the last term of the interest-rate stabilisation objective.
149
 The expected 
value of the period loss function (6.17) can be expressed conveniently in terms of the 
variances that appear in the loss function. Such an expression may be useful in linking 
the gap between theoretical and empirical analyses where the variance is a general 
statistic for measuring the magnitude of fluctuations of price or quantity variables. The 
transformations of two loss functions are shown as below. 
Suppose that policy horizons of the central bank are limited to only the current 
period. Then we can show easily that the intertemporal loss function turns to the period 
                                                 
148     Woodford (1999 and 2003a) shows that a quadratic loss function like (6.17) can be obtained by a second-order 
Taylor approximation to the expected utility of the representative household in the model that has been used to derive 
the New Keynesian Phillips curve and the intertemporal IS curve discussed in Appendix A.. 
149    Friedman (1969) argues that high nominal interest rates lead welfare costs of transactions to rise. Moreover, 
Woodford (1990 and 1999a) states that it may be desirable to lower their variability as well as the level of nominal 
interest rates. See Chapter 6 in Woodford (2003a) for a more theoretical justification for this objective function, in the 
context of microeconomic foundations of the structural model behind Equations (6.4) and (6.6). 
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loss function (6.17). As the target for the inflation rate is time-invariant, the 
unconditional expectation of the evolution of the inflation rate reduces to .][
T
tE    
The target for the output gap, 
Ty  is 0 since the central bank seeks to keep the actual 
level of real output, a
t
x  at its potential level, ,
p




t xxyyE t  Similarly, 




t iririiE  where 
a
tir  and 
n
tir  are the actual nominal interest rate and its natural rate of interest, respectively. 
With regard to the equality of the unconditional expectation with the three target 
variables, the period loss function can be rewritten as: 
 
.])[(])[(])[( 222 ttttttt iEiyEyEL          (6.18) 
 
Equation (6.18) reflects the fact that uncertainty features in the policy process even in the 
one-period case. After all, the central bank aims to minimise the expected one-period loss 
function, that is, the average loss which corresponds to the sum of the mean squared error 
(MSE) of the inflation rate, the output gap and interest rate. Therefore, we have: 
 
.])[(])[(])[(][ 222 ttttttt iEiEyEyEEELE       (6.19) 
 
Or more succinctly, we obtain: 
 
].[][][][ tttt iVaryVarVarLE              (6.20) 
 
where ][ tXVar  stands for the variance of variable tX . Equation (6.20) implies that the 
unconditional mean of the period loss function equals the weighted sum of the 
unconditional variances of the inflation rate, the output gap and interest rate. 
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The expected value of the intertemporal loss function also reduces to the weighted 
sum of the unconditional variances of the goal variables. However, in order to obtain this 
result, a slight modification of the loss function and subsequently taking a mathematical 
limit are required. The first step of the transformation of the intertemporal loss function 
is to scale Equation (6.16) by :)1(   
 








t iyE   


     (6.21)                                                     
 
The second step involves taking the limit of the above equation as the discount factor  
















    (6.22)                                                     
 
Evaluating this expression enables us to restate the scaled loss function as the weighted 
sum of the unconditional variances of the inflation gap, the output gap and interest rate. 
Here, as ,1  the value of the intertemporal loss function approaches the infinite sum 
of the unconditional mean of the period loss function, ].[ tLE
150
  As explained in 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Rudebusch (2005), among others, we can also define 
the optimisation problem for 1  and then simply interpret the intertemporal loss 
function as the unconditional mean of the period loss function, which is the same as the 
weighted sum of the unconditional variances of the goal variables mentioned above.  For 
convenience, the equation is repeated here as: 
 
                                                 
150    See a more detailed discussion in Froyen and Guender (2007). 
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].[][][][ tttt iVaryVarVarLE       (6.20) 
 
This expression will serve as the welfare criterion for assessing the effectiveness of 
monetary policy strategies in this chapter. 
 
6.4.5   The Alternative Model 
The alternative model is composed of four equations: the Phillips curve; the IS curve; the 
house price equation and the policy rule equation. Following Cardani (2008) and Airaudo 
et al. (2013)
 151
, the house-price determination equation is included to represent financial 
stability regarding house prices. As can be seen below, the first two equations and the 
policy rule equation are basically identical to those in the baseline model in terms of their 
respective structures, except that the variable, tq , denoting the house price inflation gap, 
is included in the IS curve, Equation (6.6)', and in the policy rule, Equation (6.8)'. In 
particular, a slightly modified version of the IS curve implies that changes in house 
prices affect the aggregate demand with a lag through wealth effects .,.( ei ).1 tt yq   
And, following the existing literature
152
, we establish the alternative policy rule, Equation 
(6.8)' in which the central bank also reacts to the changes in house prices, which will be 
discussed later in more detail.  
The alternative model, which consists of four structural equations and 
corresponding shocks is given by:  
                                                 
151   They considered an economy where asset prices affect the real economy through aggregate demand, 
introducing an asset pricing equation as a third equation. But, he assumes that stock prices instead of house prices 
perturb the aggregate demand in the model. 
152    See, for example, Semmler and Zhang (2007), Bauducco et al. (2008), and Kannan et al. (2009). 
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[The Phillips Curve]  ttytπttπt uyαπαπEδαπ ++)-1(+
ˆ= 1-1+                            (6.4)' 
ttut uu   1         (6.5)' 
[The IS Curve]    ttqtttityttyt vqβπEiβyβyEβy ++)-(  -  )-1(+= 1-1+1-1+       (6.6) ' 
ttvt vv   1          (6.7)' 
[The House Price Equation]
 tttti-tqttqt
wπE-iγ  -  qγ-qEγq +)()1(+= 1+11+                 (6.23) 
  ttwt
ww   1          (6.24) 
[The Policy Rule 2]   ttqtyttπ-tt eqφyπEρ-iρi +)++)(1(+= 1+1       (6.8)' 
 ttet
ee   1                     (6.9)' 
 
The notation is the same as in the baseline model. But, some explanation of the house 
price gap effect needs to be added: house prices,
 t
q , are expressed as a gap which is 
obtained by the difference between house price inflation rate and its detrended rate.  In 
Equation (6.23), the parameters q  and i  are assumed to be non-negative. Equation 
(6.23) implies that house prices depend on the expectations of the future house prices, 
the past house prices, and the real interest rate, .1 ttt Ei   This relationship is a key 
assumption in the alternative model: house prices do not depend on either the output 
gap or the inflation gap. But, this assumption can be justified in that house price 
inflation leads CPI inflation and shows a comovement with or precedence to the output 
gap in Korea, as already discussed in the last part of Section 6.4. And, it is important to 
note that Equation (6.23) relates the house prices inversely to the ex-ante real interest 
rate. The real interest rates have an impact on house prices without a lag, and house 
prices have an impact on the output gap with a lag. This sequential transmission 
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channel was discussed in Figure 6.1 in Section 6.2.  
In particular, it is assumed that changes in house prices have an impact on 
aggregate demand, and ultimately on inflation through the transmission channels such 
as wealth effects and balance-sheet effects. This can justify why we include house 
prices in the IS curve. As already discussed in Subsection 6.2.2, a rise in house prices 
tends to create an increase in wealth for households, so that they consume more since 
they feel richer, and vice versa for a fall in house prices (wealth effects). In addition, as 
summarised in Figure 6.1 in Section 6.2, rising asset prices result in increases in 
collateral values that companies and households can provide when they borrow for 
investment and consumption. This makes it easier for them to borrow, or to borrow at 
lower cost (balance-sheet channels). These two effects bring about an increase in 
aggregate demand (IMF, 2008). 
Unlike the monetary policy rule in Equation (6.8), the central bank is now 
assumed to react to house-price fluctuations as seen in modified policy rules, (6.8)' – 
which may be termed an ―augmented Taylor-type rule‖ – in which q  is accordingly 
expected to be positive. Recently, literature has often considered the policy rules with 
such variables as asset prices (Chadha et al., 2004; Semmler and Zhang, 2007; Kang 
and Chang, 2011) and the growth rate of nominal credit (Kannan et al., 2009), in 
addition to inflation rate and the output gap. For convenience, let us refer to the 
augmented Taylor-type rule in the alternative model as ‗Policy Rule 2‘, while the 
standard Taylor-type rule in the baseline model as ‗The Policy Rule 1‘. 
The structural equations above are accompanied by four exogenous structural 
shocks { ,tu ,tv ,tw te } which are all assumed to be independently and identically 
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distributed with zero mean and respective homoskedastic variances, and obey AR(1) 
processes. 
Now, assume that the central bank conducts the monetary policy to minimise the 
loss function subject to the constraints expressed by the economic structural models. 
And suppose that when setting the interest rate, the central bank cares about the 
financial stability, therefore responding to fluctuations in house prices. In the small 
DSGE model, two kinds of policy reaction functions are considered: the conventional 
rule (The Policy Rule 1) in which the central bank does not react to house-price 
inflation; and the variant rule (The Policy Rule 2) in which the central bank directly 
reacts to house-price movements for the purpose of attaining financial stability. We 
want to see how the policy effect varies in the case where a house price variable is 
contained in the policy rule. By computing the respective loss values under two types 
of policy rules, we can investigate which policy position has a better outcome. For 
convenience, the two policy rules are rewritten as below: 
 
(The Policy Rule 1)    111+1111 +)+)(1(+= ttyttπ-tt eyπEρ-iρi   
(The Policy Rule 2)    221+2212 +)++)(1(+= ttqtyttπ-tt eqφyπEρ-iρi   
 
6.5   Analysis Results 
This section presents a brief explanation about estimation methods of structural parameters, 
policy reaction parameters and autoregressive parameters governing the structural shocks. 
Next, the prior distributuions of those parameters are specified, and the main estimation 
results are reported. Finally, we compare the quantitative results regarding the response 
coefficients and loss values, and then we conduct the impulse response analysis. 
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6.5.1   Estimation Methodology 
The models are estimated using Bayesian methods that have become a standard 
workhorse in analysing the NK models (Luoto, 2009). The reasons why we adopt 
Bayesian methods are as follows: firstly, the Bayesian approach easily allows for 
incorporating prior beliefs about the parameters which facilitate numerical maximisation; 
secondly, it is easy to implement and requires less time in posterior simulation than other 
approaches 153 . The Bayesian approach gives estimates of the structural parameters, 
including policy reaction parameters and the discount factor. The Metropolis-Hastings 
algorithm is applied for obtaining the posterior distribution of the parameters under the 
baseline and alternative models, respectively, where the latter model is divided into the 
case without caring about house-price fluctuations, and the case with considering them 
when the central bank decides policy interest rates. The posterior parameters can then be 
used to calculate any posterior function of the parameters: moments, impulse response 
functions, etc.  
Five quarterly macro data series for Korea, which are all demeaned, are used in the 
estimation: inflation; the output gap; house prices; and the short-term nominal interest 
rate from 1999:q2 to 2011:q4. 
 
6.5.2   Prior Distribution of the Parameters 
The prior distributions, means and standard errors of the parameters in the models are 
                                                 
153    Bayesian estimation methods allow us to formalise the use of prior information coming from either 
microeconometric or previous macroeconometric studies and thereby provide an explicit link with the previous 
calibration-based literature. Besides, from a practical perspective, it is known that the use of prior distributions over the 
structural parameters makes the highly nonlinear optimisation algorithm more stable. See, for example, Smets and 
Wouters (2003) and An and Schorfheide (2007) for a more detailed discussion. 
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listed in the first three columns of Tables 6.3~6.5. The value of discount factor, ,  is 
pre-set at 0.987, which implies a quarterly discount rate of around 1 percent. The slope 
coefficient in the Phillips curve, y , is assumed to be distributed as a gamma around a 
mean of 0.15 and a standard error of 0.01. The mean is the value corresponding to that 
in other studies in the literature
154
. The value of the slope parameter in the IS curve, i , 
is also gamma distributed with a mean of 0.05 and a standard error of 0.01. As pointed 
out by Luoto (2009), the priors on standard errors of slope parameters { y , iβ  } are set 
to be small enough to keep the posterior distribution away from economically non-
meaningful values. The prior distribution of the parameters ,{  }y  for expected 
vatiables of the Phillips curve and the IS curve is beta distributed with a mean of 0.5 
and a standard error of 0.2. We set a relatively large but not a unity value on these 
parameters to take into account the existence of considerable persistence in lagged 
variables.
155
 The prior means of the policy reaction parameters  (1.5) and y (0.5) are 
are chosen based on Taylor (1993).
156
 One prior that we give special attention to is the 
parameter that captures the degree of smoothing in the monetary policy reaction 
function,  , which is set at 0.8, and assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a 
standard error of 0.2. This prior is fairly standard in that the interest-rate smoothing 
term in the policy reaction equation tends to show a high persistence. The distribution 
                                                 
154     See, for example, Rudebusch (2002a,b), Orphanides and Williams (2002). 
155   In the conventional forward-looking NK model, the coefficient value of 
1tt yE  
is equal to one, and the 
coefficient of 
1ttE   is close to one. (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1999; Giannoni, 2002) 
156    A high long-term coefficient on inflation gap allows us to have a unique solution path when estimating the 
model (Smets and Wouters, 2003). 
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of autoregressive parameters in the shock processes { ,u ,v w  and e } is assumed to 
follow a normal distribution with a mean of 0.6 and a standard error of 0.1. Here, the 
application of a rather strict standard error is for a clear separation between the 
persistent and non-persistent shocks as in Smets and Wouters (2003). All standard 
deviations of shocks { u , v , w  and e } are assumed to follow inverse-gamma 
distribution with means of 0.5 and standard errors of 0.02. This distribution guarantees 
positive standard deviations with a large domain. 
Turning to the parameters for the alternative model, the prior distribution of the 
parameter )( q  for lagged house prices in the IS curve (6.6)' is assumed to be gamma 
distributed with a mean of 0.02 and a standard error of 0.005, which is a very tight 
distribution as in Kim and Woo (2008). The prior distribution of the parameter )( q  for 
expected variable in the house-price equation (6.23) is assumed to follow a beta 
distribtion with a mean of 0.5 and a standard error of 0.2, as in that of the parameters 
,{  }y . The slope parameter of the house-price equation, i , is assumed to be 
gamma distributed with a mean of 0.05 and a standard error of 0.01. Finally, the prior 
mean of the third policy parameter, q , is pre-set at 0.1, which is somewhat small 
compared to that of the parameter for the output gap as in Iacoviello (2005). 
 
6.5.3   Posterior Estimates of the Parameters 
In addition to the prior distributions, Tables 6.3~6.5 present the results of parameter 





of the posterior distribution of the parameters. Overall, the estimated posterior 
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parameters appear to be reasonable and statistically significant. The estimated posterior 
means of the main behavioural parameters are typically close to the means of the prior 
assumptions. The mean of  , meaning the degree of forward-looking behaviour in the 
Phillips curve, is estimated to be around 0.36, indicating a somewhat significant role in 
the baseline model, and the mean of   of the alternative model is estimated to be a 
rather high value of 0.49. The posterior means of y  are estimated to be from 0.69 to 
0.73, which is higher than assumed in the prior distribution. These estimated results 
support the traditional forward-looking Phillips curve and the Euler equation.  
Turning to estimates of policy reaction parameters, the means of the long-run 
reaction coefficient to inflation,  , are estimated to be 1.61 for the baseline model and 
1.65 for the alternative model, which are a bit higher than assumed a priori. These 
results imply that policy appears to respond very strongly to inflation. The Taylor 
principle is fulfilled in all the models. In contrast, the mean of long-run reaction 
coefficient to the output gap, y , is estimated to be around 0.47, indicating that policy 
reacts less strongly to the output-gap change than to inflation. The mean of the 
coefficient on the lagged interest rate, ,  is estimated to be around 0.89, indicating that 
there is a considerably high degree of interest-rate smoothing. Finally, the stochastic 
processes for the exogenous disturbances for the Phillips curve, the IS equation and the 
house-price equation are estimated to be relatively persistent with an AR(1) coefficient 
of 0.52, 0.48 and 0.58, respectively for the case without considering house-price 
movements, and 0.51, 0.47 and 0.60, respectively for the case considering house-price 
movements in the alternative model, while those for the monetary policy rule equation 
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are estimated to be less persistent with an AR(1) coefficient of 0.39 and 0.40, 
respectively. 
Note that the posterior distributions (in the darker lines) of each parameter are 
contrasted against the given prior distributions (see Figures C.6.1~6.3 in Appendix C). 
 
Table 6.3:  Distributions of the Parameters: Prior Densities and Posterior Estimates 
 
                 (Under the Baseline Model) 
 









Domain  Dist. Mean St. Error Mean 
Confidence interval 
5% 95% 
  + gamma 0.987 0.05 0.9077 0.8310 0.9911 
  [0,1) beta 0.5 0.2 0.3614 0.2017 0.5153 
y   
 + gamma 0.15 0.01 0.1389 0.1250 0.1547 
y  [0,1) beta 0.5 0.2 0.6855 0.6050 0.7687 
i   
+ gamma 0.05 0.01 0.0581 0.0400 0.0750 
   
+ gamma 1.5 0.2 1.6083 1.3404 1.9313 
y   
+ gamma 0.5 0.1 0.4788 0.3245 0.6357 
   
+ gamma 0.8 0.2 0.8942 0.8538 0.9377 
u   normal 0.6 0.1 0.4381 0.3120 0.5690 
v   normal 0.6 0.1 0.4907 0.3925 0.5903 
e   normal 0.6 0.1 0.4214 0.3035 0.5490 
u   
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.5526 0.4664 0.6285 
v   
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.4738 0.4227 0.5261 
e   
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.4525 0.4093 0.4938 
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Table 6.4:  Distributions of the Parameters: Prior Densities and Posterior Estimates 
                 (Under the Alternative Model) 
 
 
(No consideration of house-price fluctuations in the policy reaction rules) 
 
 













+ gamma 0.987 0.05 0.8793 0.8210 0.9409 
  
[0,1) beta 0.5 0.2 0.4918 0.4600 0.5224 
y  
+ gamma 0.15 0.01 0.1375 0.1209 0.1519 
y  
[0,1) beta 0.5 0.2 0.7345 0.6581 0.8122 
i  
+ gamma 0.05 0.01 0.0578 0.0413 0.0758 
q  
+ gamma 0.02 0.005 0.0230 0.0152 0.0298 
q  
[0,1) beta 0.5 0.2 0.5756 0.5319 0.6209 
i  
+ gamma 0.05 0.01 0.0532 0.0366 0.0693 
  
+ gamma 1.5 0.2 1.6475 1.3409 1.9254 
y  
+ gamma 0.5 0.1 0.4807 0.3410 0.6238 
  
+ gamma 0.8 0.2 0.8853 0.8487 0.9228 
u  
 normal 0.6 0.1 0.5205 0.4101 0.6212 
v  
 
+ gamma 0.6 0.1 0.4781 0.3831 0.5853 
w  
 normal 0.6 0.1 0.5847 0.5146 0.6630 
e  
 normal 0.6 0.1 0.3924 0.2718 0.5109 
u  
    
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.4954 0.4483 0.5472 
v  
    
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.4901 0.4304 0.5436 
w  
    
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.5092 0.4426 0.5781 
e  
    
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.4456 0.4061 0.4835 
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Table 6.5:  Distributions of the Parameters: Prior Densities and Posterior Estimates 
                 (Under the Alternative Model) 
 
 
(Consideration of house-price fluctuations in the policy reaction rules) 
 
 














+ gamma 0.987 0.05 0.8767 0.8213 0.9390 
  
[0,1) beta 0.5 0.2 0.4941 0.4586 0.5257 
y  
+ gamma 0.15 0.01 0.1369 0.1226 0.1515 
y  
[0,1) beta 0.5 0.2 0.7236 0.6456 0.7973 
i  
+ gamma 0.05 0.01 0.0568 0.0389 0.0738 
q  
+ gamma 0.02 0.005 0.0237 0.0168 0.0313 
q  
+ gamma 0.5 0.2 0.5806 0.5331 0.6250 
i  
+ gamma 0.05 0.01 0.0514 0.0360 0.0657 
  
 
+ gamma 1.5 0.2 1.6385 1.3284 1.9313 
y  
 
+ gamma 0.5 0.1 0.4680 0.3163 0.6226 
q  
 
+ gamma 0.1 0.005 0.1005 0.0924 0.1088 
   
+ gamma 0.8 0.2 0.8869 0.8486 0.9236 
u  
  normal 0.6 0.1 0.5085 0.4071 0.6120 
v  
 normal 0.6 0.1 0.4698 0.3629 0.5281 
w  
 normal 0.6 0.1 0.6017 0.5281 0.6737 
e  
   
+ inv. gamma 0.6 0.1 0.4045 0.2881 0.5296 
u  
   
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.5009 0.4493 0.5528 
v  
   
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.4852 0.4271 0.5393 
w  
   
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.5051 0.4463 0.5660 
e  
   
+ inv. gamma 0.5 0.02 0.4467 0.4038 0.4876 
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6.5.4   Quantitative Results 
6.5.4.1   The Response Coefficients and Loss Values 
Table 6.6 provides a variety of results for the optimal and estimated policy rules 
where estimated rules are obtained by estimating the structural model with the 
Bayesian approach. All the results for the optimal policy rules are obtained by 
simulating each model. The coefficients of the optimal rules that minimise loss values 
are calculated by a grid-search method: in each rule, the reaction coefficients of the 
inflation gap change by 0.01 in the range of 1.3~2.3, and the reaction coefficients of 
the output gap vary by 0.01 in the range of 0.3~0.6, and those of the house-price gap 
also change by 0.005 in the range of 0.08~0.12. All the loss values are calculated for 
every combination of policy reaction coefficients. The weight on the inflation gap in 
the loss function is normalised as unity. And relative weights on the output gap (   ) 
and the interest rate ( ) are computed by a grid-search method as well: we increase 
them by 0.1 within the range of 0.3~0.6. The chosen weights on the output gap and 
interest rate are 0.5 and 0.2, respectively.  
As shown in Table 6.6, the loss values in the optimal policy rules are all smaller 
than those in the estimated rules. Under the baseline model without a house-price 
variable in the IS curve and the policy rule, the combination (   and y ) of optimal 
reaction coefficients for the inflation gap and the output gap that minimise the loss 
function are 1.99 and 0.41 where the loss value is 15.418, which is smaller than that 
of the estimated rule, 19.220 (see the first and second rows in Panel A). Under the 
alternative model with a house-price variable in the IS curve and the policy rule, the 
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combination (  , y  and q ) of optimal coefficients for the inflation gap, the output 
gap and house-price gap that minimise the loss function are 2.07, 0.36 and 0.12 where 
the loss value is 10.834, which is smaller than that of the estimated rule, 12.879 (see 
the third and fourth rows in Panel B).  In the meantime, under the alternative model, 
to see how the loss value changes in the case where the central bank does not care 
about the house-price fluctuations, we discard the house-price variable from the 
policy rule. As a result, the combination (   and y ) of optimal coefficients of the 
inflation and the output gap that minimises the loss function are 1.77 and 0.47 where 
the loss value is 11.939, which is smaller than that of the estimated rule, 12.594 (see 
the first and second rows in Panel B); and this loss value is bigger than that for the 
case of considering house prices when implementing monetary policy. Particularly, in 
the optimal rule caring about house-price movements under the alternative models, 
the volatility of the interest rate is slightly greater than that of the optimal rule when 
not caring about house prices. But volatilities for the inflation gap and the output gap 
are relatively smaller than those of the optimal rules which do not care about house 
prices. These results imply that when the central bank actively responds to 
fluctuations in house prices, it can decrease the social losses, leading to economic 
stability. However, it is notable that there might be an increasing volatility in interest 
rates. This is because the central bank, by adjusting its policy instruments (i.e., the 
short-term nominal interest rate), directly reacts to movements in house prices when 
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of Goal Variables Min. Loss 
  y  q  Var( t ) Var( ty ) Var( ti ) 





( Policy Rule 1) 
1.99 0.41 – 11.086 6.139 6.313 15.418 
Estimated Rule 
( Policy Rule 1) 






( Policy Rule 1) 
1.77 0.47 – 9.155 4.361 3.017 11.939 
Estimated Rule 
( Policy Rule 1) 
1.65 0.48 – 9.807 4.424 2.873 12.594 
Optimal Rule 
( Policy Rule 2) 
2.07 0.36 0.12 7.975 4.403 3.289 10.834 
Estimated Rule 
( Policy Rule 2) 
1.64 0.47 0.10 10.048 4.524 2.845 12.879 
 
 
6.5.4.2   The Impulse Response Analysis 
We examine the impulse responses of the variables to the structural shocks. As explained 
in Subsection 6.4.2, there are three shocks in the baseline model: the supply shock ( tu ), 
the demand shock ( tv ), and the interest rate shock ( te ). Each shock is given one standard 
deviation of corresponding disturbance terms. Figure D.6.1 in Appendix D plots the 
impulse responses of inflation, the output gap and interest rate over 24 quarters to those 
shocks, respectively, using the estimated parameters. The exogenous supply shock, which 
causes the inflation rate to deviate from its long-run level, is transmitted to three 
variables through the dynamic structure of the model. The positive supply shock (i.e., the 
cost-push shock) directly increases inflation, and immediately leads to a drop in the 
output gap, while it causes the interest rate to rise. The positive demand shock causes an 
increase in the output gap, increases inflation at the same time, and leads to a rise in 
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interest rate. Finally, when the interest rate shock or the monetary policy shock occurs, 
inflation and the output gap decrease immediately. Note that the responses to these 
unexpected shocks die out to zero after all, as the estimated model system is stationary. 
On the whole, the impulse response functions for each structural shock seem to be quite 
reasonable in an economic sense. 
Turning to the alternative model, there are four structural shocks including the 
exogenous shock to the house prices )( tw . Figures D.6.2 and D.6.3 in Appendix D show 
the impulse responses of inflation, the output gap, house prices and interest rate over 24 
quarters to those individual shocks. The difference between the two figures is that the 
former is the case in which the central bank does not care about the house-price 
fluctuations when implementing its monetary policy, while the latter is the case in which 
the central bank does. These impulse responses based on the alternative model are quite 
similar to their corresponding ones in the baseline model. The positive monetary policy 
shock (i.e., an increase in interest rate) leads to a decrease in house prices, as the positive 
supply and demand shocks do. The relationship between the monetary policy shock and 
house prices coincides with economic theory. Responses of house prices to the demand 
shock and the monetary policy shock occur immediately after the shocks, but the 
response of house prices to the supply shock appears after one quarter. This result 
reflects the dynamic structure of the model. 
In order to compare the magnitude of impulse responses of variables to the exogenous 
shock to the house prices, we draw each impulse response in the same panels for the 
alternative model. As plotted in Figure 6.5, each graph contains two sets of impulse 
responses of individual variables: one corresponds to the case where the central bank 
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ignores house-price fluctuations (the blue dashed lines) and the other corresponds to the 
case where it reacts to fluctuations in house prices (the red solid lines). The magnitudes 
of responses of the inflation and the output gap in the model that take into consideration 
house-price fluctuations are smaller than that in the model that does not. In contrast, the 
response of the interest rate in the model that takes into account house-price fluctuations 
is greater than that in the model not taking them into account. This is because the model 
is designed in a way in which the central bank reacts to changes in house prices. The 
findings that come from quantitative simulations are confirmed by the impulse response 
analysis. 
 
Figure 6.5:    Responses to the House-price Shock under the Alternative Model 
 
      
 
      
Note: The blue dashed lines represent the responses from the alternative model that ignores house- 
 price fluctuations in the monetary policy. The red solid lines represent the responses from the 
 alternative model where the central bank reacts to fluctuations in house prices. 
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As compared with in Figure 6.6 below, it is interesting to note that the initial response 
of inflation to the house-price shock is smaller than those to the supply and the demand 
shocks, and that the initial response of the output gap to the house-price shock is smaller 
than that to the demand shock. But, overall, the persistence of the responses to the house-
price shock is longer than that caused by the supply and the demand shocks. 
 




6.6   Conclusion 
Whether central banks should react to asset prices or not is a highly controversial issue, 
both from an academic perspective and from policymakers‘ point of view. 
Before the GFC of 2007–2009, provoked by the US sub-prime mortgage market, it 
was widely accepted that central banks did not need to directly react to asset-price 
fluctuations as long as inflation could be under control, and accordingly they did not 
need to care seriously about asset prices unless the asset prices played an informational 
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role to help forecast future inflation. In addition, it was argued that if central banks 
reacted to asset prices or even further targeted them, the asset markets could be distorted, 
potentially leading to economic inefficiency. Another reason why most central banks 
tend to be cautious in responding to pronounced rises in house prices was that it might be 
difficult to identify whether they were derived from the changes in fundamental 
economic conditions or the formation of the bubble.  As a result, many central banks 
formed a so-called ‗benign neglect‘ view towards a house-price boom in the early and 
middle 2000s. 
In the aftermath of the GFC, however, there has been growing consensus that the 
‗benign neglect‘ view should be reconsidered. In other words, central banks should pre-
emptively try to burst, or at least slow, the growth of asset-price bubbles by raising 
interest rates, even though current or near-term inflation remains subdued, so as to 
minimise damage to the economy after a bubble burst. 
This chapter examined whether the central bank should react directly to movements 
in asset prices such as house prices. We built a forward-looking model that is composed 
of the Phillips curve, the IS curve and monetary policy reaction rules, forming a small 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. This small DSGE framework 
was set up by the hybrid NK model, working as a baseline model where the central bank 
is assumed to aim at attaining price stability as a flexible inflation targeter. In addition, 
we formulated an alternative model where the central bank pursues financial stability as 
well as price stability. In order to do so, we built a hybrid NK model with a house-price 
equation which is included to represent financial instability caused by large swings in 
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house prices.  Essentially, the purpose of this chapter is to explore which policy choice is 
more effective with respect to policy validity between the one focusing mainly on price 
stability only and the other emphasising asset-price volatility in addition to price stability.  
In this chapter, we demonstrated what could be the best response of central banks to 
changes in house prices for the purpose of achieving economic stability. We attempted to 
compare the effectiveness of a policy pursuing price stability to that of policy 
considering changes in house prices in terms of the central bank‘s loss values.  
The main empirical results in this respect are the following: firstly, we found 
evidence indicating that house prices may convey some useful information on conditions 
such as possible financial instability and inflation in Korea; secondly, the house-price 
shock differs from other shocks to the macroeconomy in that it has persistent impacts, 
causing economic volatility in Korea; thirdly, the central bank could reduce its loss 
values in terms of economic volatility, thereby leading to growing economic stability 
when it responds more directly to fluctuations in house prices. In the absence of policy 
reaction, the resulting loss of the central bank could be larger. This finding is also 
confirmed by the impulse response analysis. The third finding, especially, provides a 
rationale for why central banks should pay much attention to movements in asset prices, 
especially house prices in the conduct of monetary policy. In other words, the central 
bank policymakers should respond to possible house-price misalignments associated with 
credit bubbles because their busting could result in episodes of financial instability as 
witnessed in the process of global financial crises. 
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Chapter 7  
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
7.1   Introduction 
Central banks always face uncertainties, and thus must take them into account when 
conducting their monetary policy. In Greenspan‘s famous phrase, uncertainty is not just 
an important feature of the monetary policy landscape, but also a salient characteristic of 
that landscape. Uncertainty influencing the implementation of monetary policy comes 
from various sources including imperfect knowledge about the ever-changing economy, 
and from unexpected internal or external shocks. This uncertainty faced by the monetary 
policymakers is normally classified into three types: data uncertainty; parameter 
uncertainty; and model uncertainty. 
In this context, this thesis attempted to find answers on the following issues: i) what 
are the different types of uncertainty confronting central banks, and how can these be 
formally introduced into econometric models for monetary policy analysis? ii) is the 
behaviour of monetary policymakers in practice consistent with the predictions made by 
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the theoretical models of monetary policy under uncertainty? iii) how has such 
uncertainty affected the actual operation of monetary policy in Korea? and iv) should 
central banks directly respond earlier to the sharp increase in asset prices? 
In order to answer the above questions, this thesis dealt with: i) setting up 
theoretical and empirical models of monetary policy under uncertainty; ii) exploring the 
effect of uncertainty on the operation of monetary policy since the adoption of interest 
rate-oriented policy in Korea; iii) investigating whether gradual adjustment in policy 
rates can be explained by uncertainty; and iv) examining whether central banks should 
take into account house-price fluctuations in formulating monetary policy in Korea. 
 
7.2   Summary: main findings and implications 
The main findings and implications from theoretical and empirical research from 
Chapters 3 to 6 are summarised in the following: first of all, Chapter 3 discussed some 
stylised facts in policy rate adjustment practices and attempted to show the empirical 
evidence that there exists gradual adjustment behaviour in policy interest rates in Korea. 
We found that there are four stylised facts regarding the policy interest rate path in Korea: 
infrequent changes in policy rates; successive changes in the same direction; asymmetric 
adjustments in terms of the size of interest-rate changes for continuation and reversal 
periods; and a long pause before reversals in policy rates. These patterns of policy rates, 
which are dubbed ‗interest-rate smoothing‘, characterise the central bank‘s reaction to 
inflation and the output gap as being less aggressive than the optimising central bank 
behavior would predict. Central banks‘ smoothing of policy rates may be optimal 
behaviour for a variety of reasons, not least of which is that they conduct monetary 
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policy in a considerably uncertain world. When operating the policy strategies, they are 
always confronted with uncertainty about the evolution of economic activity and the 
impact of their policy actions on the ultimate policy goals, such as inflation and real 
output stabilisation. 
 
Chapter 4 examined whether the parameter uncertainty, meaning uncertainty about the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism to economic activities, matters in the conduct 
of monetary policy in Korea. We found that uncertainty can provide a rationale for a 
smoother path of the policy interest rate in Korea. In particular, since the introduction of 
an interest rate-oriented monetary policy in 1998, the call money rates have shown to be 
similar to the optimal rate path under parameter uncertainty. It is found that gradual 
movements in the policy rates do not necessarily imply that the central bank has an 
interest-rate smoothing incentive. Parameter uncertainty can account for a vast portion of 
the observed gradual movements in policy interest rates. 
The main implications of this chapter are: firstly, if we consider exclusively additive 
uncertainty when analysing monetary policy, it is nearly impossible to explain the actual 
behaviour of monetary policy conducted by the central bank. It is found that there exists 
substantial difference between the observed policy interest rate and the optimal policy 
rate; secondly, the optimal policy rate path under parameter uncertainty is much closer to 
the actual policy rate path than those under only additive uncertainty. This empirical 
evidence implies that monetary policy in Korea has been conducted in consideration of 
the possibility of parameter uncertainty. The central bank policymakers have given much 
attention to the possibility of occurrence of parameter uncertainty, therefore conducting 
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the monetary policy in a cautious and gradual manner; Lastly, even though there is no 
interest-rate smoothing motive in the central bank‘s objective function, the central bank 
showed a tendency to behave as if they carry out interest-rate smoothing, if we assume 
that there exists parameter uncertainty in the economy. 
 
Chapter 5 investigated how the presence of data uncertainty can influence the policy-
making, and explored how the optimal policy rules change when uncertainty on data such 
as the output gap and inflation increases. We found that the greater output-gap 
uncertainty, the smaller the output response coefficients in the optimal rules; and 
similarly, the greater the inflation uncertainty, the smaller the inflation response 
coefficients. 
The optimal policy rules derived by using data without errors showed the large size 
of the output-gap and inflation response coefficients. In general, the evaluation of 
monetary policy in most empirical studies relies on the unrealistic assumption that 
policymakers know for sure the current state of the economy without any errors. But, it 
may be true that central banks face a large amount of uncertainty about the actual state of 
the economy when setting their policy rates. This implies that data uncertainty can be one 
of the sources explaining the reasons why monetary policymakers act less aggressively in 
setting their interest rate instrument. Traditionally, however, central bank preferences 
imply a bigger weight on inflation relative to the output gap: this might reduce the impact 
of output-gap uncertainty on the conduct of monetary policy, therefore making the issue 
of data uncertainty on the output gap less crucial than that on inflation. 
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In this section, it may be worth discussing which type of multiplicative uncertainty 
(parameter vs. data) is more plausible to justify an interest-rate smoothing behaviour 
from the central bank. It might be said that parameter uncertainty is more seriously 
accepted than data uncertainty in that the latter is to a large extent inevitable to central 
bankers in the actual conduct of monetary policy. 
 
Lastly, Chapter 6 examined how the central bank should implement monetary policy in 
the presence of high volatility in asset prices such as house prices, and asset-price 
bubbles. To this end, we built a forward-looking structural model that consists of the 
Phillips curve, the IS curve and monetary policy reaction rules, forming a small dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. This small DSGE framework was based 
on the hybrid version of the New Keynesian (NK) model, where asset prices affect the 
DISC. 
The main empirical findings are: firstly, house prices conveyed some useful 
information on conditions such as financial instability and future inflation in Korea; 
secondly, the house-price shock had persistent impacts on the real economy, 
consequently provoking much larger economic volatility in Korea, different from the 
supply or demand shock to the economy; and thirdly, the central bank could reduce its 
loss values in terms of economic volatility, thereby leading to growing economic stability 
when it responds more directly to fluctuations in house prices. This finding provides the 
reason why the central bank should pay more attention to house-price movements.  
Concerning the role of central banks, in the aftermath of the GFC, it is widely 
accepted that they should pre-emptively try to burst, or at least slow, the growth of asset-
  
  Page | 248 
price bubbles by raising interest rates, even though current or near-term inflation remains 
subdued, in order to reduce damage to the real economy after a bubble burst. 
 
7.3  Limitations and Future Research Scope 
Research methodology and results in this thesis have several limitations. Above all, the 
research has been carried out throughout the chapters under the assumption of a closed 
economy for analytic simplicity and convenience. But, if we assume an open economy, 
the empirical results may be changed in terms of the magnitude and persistence of impact 
of uncertainty on the economy, and the degree of the effect of monetary policy on asset 
prices. Of course, it is expected that such an assumption might not overturn the thesis‘s 
empirical findings. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to extend the models to a 
framework of an open economy analysis, by including, for example, an exchange rate 
variable within the models. 
 
Next, as regards the relationship between parameter uncertainty and monetary policy, we 
did not touch the case that suggests the activist prescription for monetary policy, which 
could weaken the degree of completion of this study. Hence, this thesis can be extended 
to the case that deals with parameter uncertainty, especially uncertainty about the degree 
of inflation persistence. This issue is very important as a more aggressive response to 
shocks may be more appropriate when central banks face this sort of uncertainty. This 
policy prescription overturns the Brainard conservatism principle, which is regarded as 
general wisdom in the operation of monetary policy. In addition, we can possibly extend 
the model employed in Chapter 4 to allow for an extra variable in the loss function, the 
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change in interest rate. This extra element would allow us to assess the importance of 
interest-rate smoothing. 
 
Turning to model uncertainty, which is one of the important sources of uncertainty 
discussed in the literature review section, we did not deal with it in terms of in-depth 
analysis in this thesis. As a matter of fact, model uncertainty about the dynamic structure 
of the economy may be a much more crucial issue than other types of uncertainty for the 
analysis of monetary policy. We have no common consensus on the appropriate models. 
Therefore, monetary policy analysis in the presence of model uncertainty can be an 
interesting topic for the future research. 
 
Finally, in order to examine how the central bank should respond to movements in house 
prices, we used a small DSGE model composed of the Phillips curve, the IS curve and 
monetary policy reaction rules, based on a forward-looking approach. Even though this 
model is simple and convenient to handle, such a simplified DSGE model is not enough 
to do in-depth analysis about complicated relationships between asset prices and 
monetary policy. The model used in Chapter 6 could be extended to construct models 
with explicit and more elaborate financial sectors within full-fledged DSGE models. 
These extensions could be realised by focusing on containing particular financial 
variables or frictions. 
In the meantime, we focused on monetary policy using interest rates as policy 
instruments for the achievement of eoconomic stability through financial stability. But, 
as frequently pointed out in recent literature, for example Allen and Rogoff (2011), 
monetary policy alone is unlikely to be successful in effectively attaining financial 
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stability. To buttress the effects of monetary policy, other policies, particularly 
macroprudential ones, are likely to be needed. As an extension of this thesis, a more in-
depth analysis, for instance, on the effects of changes in liquidity ratios and loan-to-value 
ratios for monetary and house-price dynamics and their interactions, would be an 
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Appendices 
Appendix A.  The Derivation of the Basic New Keynesian (NK) Model 
 
For simplification, we consider the closed economy with no capital accumulation. 
Additionally, as is done in the recent numerous literature, we assume a cashless economy.  
The model is composed of households and firms: households supply labour and 
purchase goods for consumption; firms produce differentiated goods by hiring labour, 
and sell them in monopolistically competitive markets. And they both behave optimally: 
households and firms maximise their utility and profits, respectively. The model is ―basic‖ 
due to the fact that it features only one nominal rigidity and one real rigidity. The 
nominal rigidity is given by staggered price adjustment as in Calvo (1983) and the real 
rigidity comes from monopolistic competition in the goods markets, which is modelled 
as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
The NK model in this appendix is derived according to Galí (2008) and Walsh (2010), 
among others. 
A.1.  Households 
 
There is a continuum of households of size one. The representative household seeks to 




























































B  a nominal discount bond that pays $1 at time .1t  
:tC  an aggregate of the household‘s consumption of a continuum of individual goods. 
:tP  the aggregate price index (price of the final goods). 
:tN  hours of work or labour supply. 
:tt PW  the real wage. 
:  the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution or the coefficient of relative  
risk aversion of households. 
:n  the inverse of the labour supply elasticity with respect to the real wage. 
:ti  the short-term nominal interest rate. 
 
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the consumption aggregate is defined as: 
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dzzCC tt  where 1  is the constant elasticity of substitution between 
goods. Maximisng utility function (A.1) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint 
yields the optimal allocation of consumption across time: 


























W   
 
Equations (A.3) and (A.4) are the well-known results of first-order conditions for 
consumption and labour, respectively. Particularly, (A.3) is the familiar intertemporal 
Euler equation for consumption. 
 
A.2.  Firms 
 
(Market Demand for Intermediate Goods) 
 
Assume a continuum f of final goods producers whose individual demand for good z  

















 where )(zPt  denotes the price of good .z  



















  where 
1
0
dfYY ftt  denotes total final good demand. 
 
Assume that intermediate goods producers have CRS homogeneous production functions: 
(A.7)  ),()( zNAzY ttt   where tA  denotes technology. 
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(Marginal Cost) 
Define real marginal cost 
t






















































The FOC implies that the firm sets its relative price 
tt













Following the formalism proposed in Calvo (1983), each firm resets its price with probability, 
( 1 ). A fraction that keeps price unchanged is  . Hence, the expected average duration a 
price remains fixed is given by 
1)1(  . Hence, the parameter,   gives a natural index of price 
stickiness. 
 
(Aggregate Price Dynamics) 
 












  dzzPP tt  
Under Calvo price setting, a fraction 1  of firms reset their price to 
*
tP  while a fraction 














   ttt PzPP  
The aggregate price level at time t  depends on geometric weighted average of price, 1tP  
at time 1t  and the optimal reset price, 
*
tP  at :t  




    ttt PPP  
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 where .1 ttt PP  Notice that in a steady-state with 
zero inflation ,1
*
ttt PPP   for all .t  
 
Here, it is useful to note that lower-case letters denote the natural logs of the 
corresponding variable (i.e., ).log( tt Xx   
 
Log-linearisation of (A.16) around 11
* tt PP  implies: 
(A.17)    )))(1exp(()1(lnln)1( 1*  ttt PP . 
 
Since ,)log( 1 tttt pp )log(
**
tt Pp   and ),log( 11   tt Pp (A.17) can be re-written in 
log-linear form as follows: 
(A.18)    ))(1(exp)1()1( 1*  ttt pp . 
 
We can approximate RHS of (A.18) as: 
 



















If inflation is zero in a steady-state, then pp 
*
 and RHS reduces to 
).)(1)(1( 1
*
 tt pp  
 
Plugging this result into (A.18) and rearranging yields: 
 
 (A.19)  ))(1( 1
*
 ttt pp  or .)1(
*
1 ttt ppp     
 
Calvo price-setting implies a partial adjustment mechanism whereby inflation responds by 
a constant fraction of the gap between the optimal reset-price and the existing price-level. 
 
(Optimal Reset Price) 
 
A firm reoptimising at time t  will choose 
*
tP  to maximize the current market value of 
the profits, so it solves the following problem: 
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subject to the sequence of the demand constraints: 




















For ,,2,1,0 s where stt  , denotes the household‘s nominal stochastic discount factor 
between time t  and  ,st   stMC  is nominal marginal cost which is assumed given, and 
tstY  denotes the output at time st  for a firm that last reset its price at time t . 
The FOC associated with the above-mentioned problem is:  








t MCPYE   
 
A.3.  The New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
 
(Price vs. Marginal Cost) 




tt MCP   
 
However, if ,0  then the optimal reset price is a weighted average of expected future 
nominal marginal costs. Hence we have: 









































In a steady-state, ,,
s
stt   ,YY st  ,PP st  and .))(1(,
s









 , where tMC  denotes real marginal cost. 
 
Log-linearising the equation for 
*
tP  implies: 









tt pmcEp  . 
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where stmc denotes the log of real marginal cost. In a steady-state, mc . Note that 
sttw ,  terms all cancel in the log-linearisation. 
 
Now, we can rewrite (A.25) as: 
 




 ttttt pEpmcp   
 
which implies that ).())(1( * 11
*




 ttt pp we have the forward-looking inflation dynamic equation: 
(A.27)  ,)( 1 tmcE ttt

    
where 
1)1)(1(   is strictly decreasing in the index of price stickiness , and 
tmcmct 

 denotes the deviations of real marginal cost from its values in a steady-state. 
 
Solving (A.27) forward, inflation can be expressed as the discounted sum of current and 
expected future deviations of real marginal costs from steady-state values: 
 









tt stmcE   
 
(Marginal Cost and the Output Gap) 
 
Log-linearisig the production function (A.7) gives: 
(A.29)  .ˆˆˆ ttt any   
 
From the household‘s labour supply condition we have: 
 
 (A.30)  .ˆˆˆˆ tnttt ncpw    
 
In equilibrium, ,ˆˆ tt cy  so that  
(A.31)  tttt apwmc ˆˆˆ 

 
.ˆˆˆ ttnt any    
 
Substituting out for tnˆ  using the production function (A.29) gives: 
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(The Natural Rate of Output) 
 
Define the natural rate of output as the level of output that occurs when prices are fully 
flexible. This occurs when 












In log-deviations from a steady-state value, define the natural rate 
n
tyˆ  via the equation: 
(A.33)   0ˆ)1(ˆ)(  tn
n











Let nytt yyy ˆˆ   denotes the output gap. Then from (A.33) and (A.33), we have: 




so that the output gap is proportional to the real marginal costs. Equation (A.34) implies 
that if ,1 n  the real marginal costs are high relative to a steady-state, when the 
actual output exceeds the natural level of output. The term n   captures the extent to 
which marginal costs rise as the output gap increases. 
Let 
*ˆ   tt  which denotes the deviations of inflation rate from its long-run average 
rate (here, * is assumed to be zero). 
 
Finally, combining the marginal cost expression (A.34) with the inflation equation (A.27) 
leads to the inflation-expectations augmented Phillips curve expressed in terms of the 
output gap instead of real marginal cost: 






Let us call the above equation the basic New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). 
 










   
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A.4.  The Basic Dynamic IS Curve 
 
Market clearing in the goods market requires: 
(A.37)  ),()( zCzY tt   













 dzzYY tt follows that .tt CY   Or taking logs yields, equivalently, .ˆˆ tt cy   
 
Combining the market clearing condition, tt cy ˆˆ   with the household‘s intertemporal 
Euler equation (A.3), and taking logs gives the basic dynamic IS curve (‗DISC‘ for short) 
as below: 
 




  tttttt EiyEy   
 
The real interest rate satisfies the Fisher equation: 
(A.39)   .ˆ 1 tttt Eir   
 
Define the natural rate of interest 
n
tr  as the real interest rate that would prevail when 
actual output equals the natural level of output: 











This implies a positive relationship between the natural rate of interest and expected 
growth in technology: 




t aEr   
 
The basic DISC, (A.38) can be expressed in terms of the output gap and the natural rate 
as: 




ttttttt rEiyEy  

   
 
Equation (A.42) relates the output gap positively to its expected one-period ahead value, 
and negatively to the real interest rate gap, where the latter is defined as the gap between 




Iterating the above equation forward gives: 










    
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in which the current output gap depends negatively on the expected real rate of interest 
relative to the natural rate of interest. 
 
Appendix B.  The Derivation of the ‘Hybrid’ New Keynesian Model 
 
This appendix gives a more detailed derivation of the hybrid version of New Keynesian 
model. First, the hybrid Phillips curve is derived according to Galí (2002), Galí et al. 
(2001), and Sbordone (2002), among others. The derivation leads to generalisation of the 
Phillips curve rationalised by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). Second, the hybrid IS curve is 
derived following Sahuc (2002), among others. 
 
B.1.  The Hybrid Phillips Curve 
 
As shown in Equation (A.19), the log-linearised aggregate price level is given by: 
(A.19)  ,)1(
*




tp  is an index for the prices newly set at time .t   
Let 
f
tp  denote the price set by a forward-looking firm at t  and 
b
tp  the price set by a 
backward-looking firm. Then the index for newly set prices is expressed as the convex 
combination of forward-looking and backward-looking price-setting, which is given by: 
 




t pppt    
 
Equation (B.1) implies that a fraction 1  of the firms, that we refer to as forward-
looking, behave like the firms in Calvo‘s model, while the remaining fraction  , which 
we refer to as backward-looking, set the price using a simple rule of thumb that is based 
on recent history of aggregate price behavior. 
 















 where .stst mcmc 

   
However, we assume that backward-looking firms set the price according to a rule-of-
thumb behavior. Then the log-linearising the backward-looking reset price yields: 
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(B.3)  .1
*





Following Woodford (1996), Galí (2002), Galí et al. (2001) and Sbordone (2002), 
marginal cost of forward-looking firms that reset the price at time ,t  sttmc 



















,  and stmc 






















   
from their steady-state average real marginal costs, respectively. 
 
Combining (A.19) and (B.1) delivers the evolutions of the aggregate inflation rate, which 
is written as: 









    
 
Next, we need to obtain )( t
f
t pp   and ).( t
b
































































s EmcE   
where )).1(1/()1(    
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   11  
where ,)1)(1)(1(
~ 1 
1 f and 
1b with )]1(1[   . 
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Since ,)( tnt ymc  

 the hybrid Phillips curve expressed in terms of the output gap 
instead of real marginal cost is given by: 
(B.10)  ,~)1( 11 ttttt yaEa       
where ,a f
1  ,a b
11      (if 1 ), )(
~~
n   and 
n
ytt yˆyˆy   (the output gap). For ,5.0a  we recover the original Fuhrer and Moore 
(1995) specification. 
 
B.2.  The Hybrid Dynamic IS Curve 
 
Following Sahuc (2002), Carroll et al. (2000) and Fuhrer (2000), consumer‘s utility may 

















where γ  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, tC  is the 
consumption level, tΗ  denotes the level of habit formation, and where h  1)(0 ≤≤h  
measures the degree of habit formation. We assume that the consumer does not consider 
it as an argument to maximise his utility. In that sense, the habit level is external. We 
specify that the habit level (stock) equals the aggregate consumption level in the previous 
period, 1-t
C  , i.e. =tH 1-tC  ex-post. 
 
The representative household is infinitely lived and maximise his life utility, subject to 
the intertemporal budget constraint in Equation (A.2). Then, the Euler equation is given 
by: 




















where   is the time discount factor and tP  is the price level at time t . Equation (B.12) 
extends the usual first-order condition for consumption growth by taking into account the 
existence of external habit consumption.  
Since 1+1+ +1=/ ttt πPP  and  
γ
tttt hHCHCU
1-' ) - (=),( , Equation (B.12) can be written by: 
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In linearising Equation (B.13) with Equation (B.11), we find a consumption equation 


















where tc  is the log of consumption at time t , and )(
* δlnr  . 
When 0=h , this equation reduces to the traditional forward-looking consumption. 
With the external habit formation, consumption depends on a weighted average of past 
and expected future consumption. Note that in this case the interest rate elasticity of 
consumption depends not only on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 
consumption ,γ  but also on the habit formation parameter, h.   
From the market clearing condition for goods, )()( zCzY tt   or ,CY tt  where tY  is 


















As can be seen in Equation (B.15), the monetary transmission mechanism is a 
function of the elasticity of substitution of consumption, ,γ  and the habit persistence 
parameter, h.   
Finally, letting hβ +1
1




i = , we obtain the hybrid dynamic IS curve: 
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Appendix C.   Parameter Distributions 
 
Figure C.6.1   Prior v.s. Posterior Distributions under the Baseline Model 
  
 
Note: The posterior distributions (in the darker lines) of each parameter are contrasted against the  
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Figure C.6.2   Prior v.s. Posterior Distributions under the Alternative Model 
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Note: The posterior distributions (in the darker lines) of each parameter are contrasted against the  
  given prior distributions. 
 
 
Figure C.6.3   Prior v.s. Posterior Distributions under the Alternative Model 
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Note: The posterior distributions (in the darker lines) of each parameter are contrasted against the  
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Appendix D.   Impulse Response Functions 
 
 
Figure D.6.1    Impulse Responses of Variables to Shocks under the Baseline Model 
 
 
 Orthogonalized shock to eps_as                        Orthogonalized shock to eps_is  
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Figure D.6.2     Impulse Responses of Variables to Shocks under the Alternative 
Model that ignores House-price Fluctuations 
 
Orthogonalized shock to eps_as                  Orthogonalized shock to eps_is 
  
Orthogonalized shock to eps_hp                 Orthogonalized shock to eps_mp 
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Figure D.6.3     Impulse Responses of Variables to Shocks under the Alternative 
Model that cares about House-price Fluctuations 
 
Orthogonalized shock to eps_as                 Orthogonalized shock to eps_is 
  
Orthogonalized shock to eps_hp                 Orthogonalized shock to eps_mp 
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